Factors affecting the efficacy of the Commonwealth\u27s Indigenous Business Exemption by Storey, Matthew
  
 
 
 
Factors Affecting the Efficacy of the Commonwealth’s Indigenous 
Business Exemption 
 
by 
 
 
Matthew Storey 
BEc, LLB (Hons) (CDU); Grad Dip Leg Prac (ANU); LLM (Macq);  
Grad Dip Ener & Nat Res Law (Melb). 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Business Administration 
 
 
 
Deakin University 
May, 2017 
 
 
 
 


iv 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my wife, Donna Storey, for her support during the research 
process. I would also like to thank the interviewees who all gave up their valuable time 
to participate in the interviews and review the transcripts and interview reports. In 
particular, I would like to thank the Victorian Traditional Owners represented on the 
Boards of Native Title Services Victoria and the Federation of Victorian Traditional 
Owner Corporations who have both given me the opportunity to be involved in these 
issues and have supported and encouraged me throughout the research process. 
 
  
v 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper describes a qualitative research project that investigated factors leading to 
the very low utilisation of the Commonwealth Government’s Indigenous Business 
Exemption (IBE), particularly from 2011 to 2015. The project involved interviews with 12 
selected stakeholders from Indigenous firms, procuring agencies and policy designers 
which took place in 2016. Analysis of the interviews suggested that poor utilisation of 
the IBE was primarily attributed to risk aversion inside government and limited 
communication of the existence of the policy outside Government. A range of other 
factors and methods of overcoming these problems are also identified; principal 
amongst these is the need for procuring agencies to engage with Indigenous suppliers in 
a coordinated and deliberate fashion. The paper concludes with the identification of a 
number of potential areas for further research. 
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 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
Why has the Indigenous Business Exemption been of Limited Effect? 
Targeted Procurement 
Whatever ideological perspective is adopted, the notion that a key purpose of a 
government is to implement policies that have some impact on the society that 
supports it would generally be accepted. Daintith (1979) draws a distinction 
between government policy activities that occur through exercise of powers of 
imperium (such as legislation) and those that occur through powers of 
dominium. Implementation of government policy through means such as 
legislation is unremarkable in concept. However, implementation of government 
policy through exercise of powers of dominium is a less explored concept. 
Government will almost inevitably constitute at least one of the largest single 
actors in any particular national economy. In Australia, general government final 
consumption expenditure constituted 18 per cent of gross domestic product in 
2015. The equivalent figure for the United States (‘US’) was 14.3 per cent, for the 
United Kingdom (‘UK’) 19.4 per cent, and for the European Union (‘EU’) 20.4 per 
cent (World Bank 2016). A single economic actor of such magnitude will 
inevitably have an impact on the society of which it is part. This is so whether or 
not the economic actor in question deliberately shapes its actions towards 
achieving a particular policy objective. This impact will be felt in areas such as 
employment demand and conditions, the land market, and capital markets. In 
addition though, an economic actor of such magnitude must purchase goods and 
services in order to operate. The Commonwealth Government represents only 
approximately 38 per cent of the total public sector (DTF 2005). Yet in 2013-14 it 
entered into 66,047 procurement contracts with a total value of $48.9 billion 
(ANAO 2015, 31).  
If guided to a particular purpose even a small portion of these transactions could 
have a considerable impact on the economy and consequentially the society that 
supports it. Public procurement can then be a means by which government can 
exercise its powers of dominium to implement government policy. However, the 
use of public procurement to achieve policy objectives beyond the immediate 
purchase of goods and services − a ‘secondary objective’ − (Arrowsmith 1995) is 
often restrained by international instruments (McCrudden 2004) and the 
legitimacy of the approach is often contested. 
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Erridge and McIlroy (2002) explore the basis of this contest in suggesting: “[a]t 
present public procurement policy … reflects the market model supported by 
public choice theorists” (2002, 58). 
 They summarise the competing views succinctly (2002, 59): 
Opponents of the use of public procurement for socio-economic purposes 
have argued that the outcome is likely to be extra or hidden costs and 
therefore policy should remain market based. However … given that the 
market model is flawed there is a moral imperative for governments to 
ensure that the public interest is served. 
The parameters of this particular debate are explored more fully in the following 
chapter. Suffice at this stage to note that the Commonwealth Government 
accepted the legitimacy of utilising its procurement expenditure to advance a 
secondary objective when, in May 2011, it put in place a preferential 
procurement policy in respect of Indigenous enterprises (DFD, 2011 – see now 
DoF 2014). This is the Commonwealth Procurement Rules Indigenous Exemption 
(No 17) (DPMC 2015b) usually referred to as the Indigenous Business Exemption 
(‘IBE’). As becomes apparent throughout the course of the following research 
the policy impetus for the adoption of the IBE are unclear. Some informants 
attributed it to the work of Supply Nation inspired by developments in the 
United States going back to the late 1960s (see below section 4.12). Others have 
suggested its origins lie in the work of Indigenous Chambers of Commerce in 
NSW (Foley, 2017). 
The IBE and IPP Outlined 
The IBE allows a Commonwealth department or agency to avoid the tender 
process that would otherwise apply to contracts for goods and services of a 
value of greater than $80,000 or construction projects of a value greater than 
$7.5 million if the contract is awarded to a firm with greater than 50 per cent 
Indigenous ownership that employs fewer than 200 employees and where ‘value 
for money’ can be demonstrated (DoF 2014; DPMC 2015c; ANAO 2015).  
On 1 July 2015 (during the life of this current research project) the 
Commonwealth Government further expanded the policy represented by the 
IBE with the introduction of the Indigenous Procurement Policy (‘IPP’). The IPP 
has four components (DPMC 2015C): 
• The IBE remains in place; 
• Commonwealth Government departments and agencies must however 
ensure that a percentage of all procurement contracts (0.5 per cent in 
2015-16 increasing to 2.5 per cent by 2018-19) is awarded to Indigenous-
owned firms; 
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• a mandatory requirement that procurements of a value between $80,000 
and $200,000 for provision of goods and services in remote areas must 
be awarded to Indigenous firms; and 
• a requirement that contractors awarded Commonwealth tenders of a 
value in excess of $7.5 million must by the end of the contract period 
ensure either 4 per cent of the contract workforce or 3 per cent of the 
enterprise workforce is Indigenous. 
The objective behind the IPP and its component IBE is contained in a joint 
statement by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Indigenous Affairs issued 
with the announcement of the IPP. The Prime Minister and Minister stated (C of 
A 2015, 2): 
Getting Indigenous adults into work is a critical priority in Indigenous 
Affairs. With employment, people have financial independence, control 
over their own lives and the ability to provide for their families’ future.  
Indigenous businesses are key to creating jobs and employing more Indigenous 
Australians. Indigenous businesses are around 100 times more likely to employ 
an Indigenous person than other businesses.  
This policy is about creating opportunities for these Indigenous businesses to 
grow and employ more people. It is also about stimulating private investment in 
new Indigenous businesses.  
A strong Indigenous business sector will help drive financial independence, and 
create wealth and opportunities for Indigenous Australians. It will also provide 
the basis for Indigenous economic development in regional and remote 
Australia.  
The propositions put forward by the Prime Minister and Minister are well 
supported by empirical data. This data is explored more fully in the following 
chapter but the following provides a summary of the key propositions. 
• Indigenous Australians suffer considerably greater social disadvantage in 
relation to a range of attributes when compared to the broader 
Australian community (SCRGSP 2014; DPMC 2015a). 
• The aspects of this multiple disadvantage are correlated. That is, for 
example, an Indigenous Australian who is not in the labour force is also 
more likely to have lower educational standards, poorer health status 
and less adequate accommodation than an Indigenous Australian who is 
in the labour force (SCRGSP 2014). 
• An increase in the level of economic activity undertaken by Indigenous-
owned enterprises should lead to an increase in the number of 
Indigenous Australians in the labour force (Altman 2001; Furneaux & 
Brown 2008) and consequentially a reduction in the social disadvantage 
suffered by Indigenous Australians (Biddle, 2011). 
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• An increase in Commonwealth government purchasing of goods and 
services from Indigenous-owned enterprises should lead to an increase in 
the level of economic activity undertaken by these firms (DPMC 2014) 
and thus an increase in the number of Indigenous Australian in the labour 
force (Altman 2001; Furneaux & Brown 2008). 
Despite the apparent soundness of the program logic behind the IBE, its 
implementation in practice has been somewhat limited. The only published data 
(prior to the current research project) on the utilisation of the IBE between its 
introduction in May 2011 and June 2015 is a report produced by the Australian 
National Audit Office: Procurement Initiatives to Support Outcomes for 
Indigenous Australians (ANOA 2015). 
That report suggests that in the period from May 2011 and June 2015 only four 
contracts were let under the IBE. The following table from the report details 
those contracts (ANAO 2015, 73): 
Entity Nature of Contract Date Value 
Industry Event Management June 2013 $0.1 million 
Defence Construction May 2014 $0.7 million 
Defence Construction January 2015 $1.5 million 
Department of Human 
Services 
Cleaning February 2015 $8.3 million 
 
It can be seen from this table that the four contracts had a total value of $10.3 
million. The last contract let, in February of 2015, comprised $8.3 million of this 
total value. By way of contrast, in 2013-14 (as noted earlier) the Commonwealth 
Government entered into 66,047 procurement contracts with a total value of 
$48.9 billion (ANAO 2015, 31). During that financial year one contract was let 
using the IBE with a value of $0.7 million. In percentage terms IBE contracts 
amounted to 0.0015 per cent of the number contracts for 2013-14 and 0.0014 
per cent of value for that year. 
It will be recalled that the IBE technically only applies to the purchase of goods 
and services of a value of greater than $80,000 or construction projects of a 
value greater than $7.5 million. A number of the contracts identified by the 
ANAO are therefore of a value that would not require use of the IBE. During the 
research many respondents noted that even for contracts of a value below the 
requirement for a public tender (that the IBE exempts) it would be unusual to 
not go to a public tender process. The IBE provided legitimacy in not doing so. 
Although not stated explicitly in the ANAO report, presumably this is the reason 
for the inclusion of the low value contracts in the report analysis. 
During the course of the research it became apparent that over the period from 
May 2011 to June 2015 there were an additional four contracts let with a total 
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combined value of $0.56 million. Despite this marginal improvement in 
outcomes, the motivation behind this research project remains; that is, to 
investigate: Why has the IBE been of limited effect? 
That investigation is detailed in the following five chapters. Set out below is a 
brief description of those chapters. 
Contribution of Existing Literature 
As a basis for the primary research, a review of relevant literature was 
undertaken. This is contained in the following chapter. However as noted earlier, 
there is extremely limited extant research both specifically on the IBE and more 
generally on factors that affect the efficacy of secondary objective procurement 
programs similar to the IBE. In the absence of any extensive literature 
considering the effectiveness of policies encouraging participation by Indigenous 
enterprises in public procurement processes, the literature concerning small and 
medium enterprises (‘SME’) participation is examined as a useful proxy from 
which some guidance may be taken. This is contained in the literature review in 
Chapter 2. 
That Chapter notes that Flynn, McKevitt and Davis (2015, 446-447) identified 
seven main impediments to SME participation in public procurement: 
• Bureaucracy; 
• Lack of communication between SMEs and public procurers and too much 
weighting on cost; 
• SME lack of knowledge over how to source opportunities or engage with procedural 
aspects of tendering; 
• Onerous tender documentation and unprofessional procurement staff; 
• Time demands of completing tender documentation; 
• Requirements of previous relevant experience and financial costs of tendering; and 
• Large contract size and information asymmetries. 
Of course the foregoing factors were identified as impediments to SME 
participation in public procurement generally, not factors that affected the usage 
of a procurement program that had the secondary objective of the 
encouragement of SMEs. This distinction noted, it was considered that the 
identified impediments provided useful propositions to examine as part of the 
primary research.  
The literature review establishes some definitional and contextual matters 
surrounding the use of public procurement processes to further policy objectives 
beyond the immediate purchase of goods and services for the purposes of 
government. The IBE is an example of this approach, which has also been 
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described as the incorporation of secondary objectives into public procurement 
processes. A starting point in this regard is to consider literature that examines 
the content of the procurement process and explores what characteristics make 
public procurement distinct from (private sector) organisational procurement. 
The literature review goes on to consider existing research that has investigated 
questions around the both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incorporation 
of secondary objectives into public procurement processes. The examination of 
existing research that has considered these questions provides a basis which 
informs the data generation and analysis that forms the main body of the 
investigation. The issue of the perceived legitimacy of the incorporation of 
secondary objectives into public procurement processes has a particular 
relevance to the research project. This is because at least until July 2015 with the 
introduction of the IPP, use of the IBE was at the discretion of the purchasing 
department or agency. If the use of approaches such as the IBE was perceived as 
‘illegitimate’ as many respondents reported, then this may have had an impact 
on its use and thus effectiveness. 
Finally, the literature review looks at the issue of how to the measure the 
achievement of secondary objectives; and how effective procurement policies 
have been in achieving secondary objectives. It also considers the empirical data 
to support the proposition that an increase in Indigenous enterprise leads to an 
increase in Indigenous participation in the labour force. 
Preliminary Questions of Methodology 
The research problem carries with it a number of implied assumptions and 
values. For example, it is implied by the fact that the issue is stated as ‘research 
problem’ that it is desirable to decrease levels of Indigenous disadvantage. 
Similarly, implicit in the selection of the problem is the notion that encouraging 
Indigenous involvement, through ownership or employment, in private sector 
(Indigenous-owned) enterprise is a worthwhile approach to reducing Indigenous 
disadvantage. While some may argue that it is not desirable to have Indigenous 
peoples become a component of the current global market structures (Banerjee 
& Linstead 2001) it is not the purpose of this research project to engage in 
debate around these matters. Rather, this project constrains itself to 
investigating the research problem as posed above. 
With the research problem thus identified it is necessary to present the problem 
as a single precise research question. Although, Creswell (2013, 138) suggests 
that the while the entire study is reduced “to a single overarching central 
question” he adds “and several subquestions”. Bearing in mind the discussion of 
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the research problem above, the central question would appear to be: What 
factors have limited the effectiveness of the IBE? 
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From this central question several subquestions suggest themselves: 
• What are the circumstances when the IBE has been used? 
• What benefit to Indigenous people can be attributed to the IBE? 
• Why is the IBE not utilised more often? 
• How can these identified limiting factors be overcome? 
At the outset of the research there was no presumption as to the nature of these 
factors; for example that they were one or all of legal, economic, administrative 
social or cultural. Over the course of the research it became apparent that the 
most commonly identified factors could be described as cultural more than legal 
or economic. 
In addition to these main research sub-questions a number of respondents also 
referred to the issue of ‘black-cladding’ – the use of sham Indigenous ownership 
to give advantage to a practically non-Indigenous supplier. The interviews and 
research analysis also therefore extends to some consideration of this matter. 
The method that was adopted to investigate these research questions is 
described in greater detail in Chapter 3. However, in summary, due to the very 
limited existing data regarding the research questions, it was considered 
necessary to generate primary data for analysis. This was done utilising a 
method involving a combination of semi-structured interviews of stakeholders 
and some limited documentary content analysis.  
A research method involving such a combination of sources to examine a 
bounded phenomenon (Noor 2008) can be described as a case study method. 
The research is undertaken within an overall paradigm that adopts the pragmatic 
approach to analysis (Morgan 2007). 
The unit of analysis adopted for the purposes of this research is the 
‘stakeholder’. The notion of stakeholder in the current context is also discussed 
further in Chapter 3; however, briefly the stakeholders for the purpose of this 
investigation are considered to be those actively involved stakeholders who 
perform the roles of client, decision-maker or designer (Achterkamp & Vos 
2008). Specifically these were identified as the following: 
• Indigenous firms − who constitute the decision-makers (Group A); 
• the Commonwealth agencies engaging in procurement − who constitute 
the clients (Group B); and,  
• those individuals and agencies responsible for the development and 
oversight of the policy − who constitute the designers (Group C).  
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The Interviews 
From this stakeholder identification, interviews were undertaken with the 
individuals set out below. The research interviews were undertaken with 12 
respondents in the period from February 2016 to April 2016. 
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Group A: Indigenous Firms (Decision-Makers) 
Name Organisation Position 
Simon Walter Barpa JV/Cockram Business Development Manager 
Jeremy Clark Barpa JV/ Federation Managing Director 
Anonymous eNPC General Manager 
Shane Jacobs PSG Managing Director 
Marcia Langton ICRG Chair (& Forrest Review Advisor) 
 
Group B: Procuring Departments (Clients) 
Name Organisation Position 
Ian Cumming Defence Colonel Estate & Infrastructure 
Phil Lindenmayer Dept Human Services National Manager of Commercial Partner 
Management 
Anonymous (2) FMG Manager Community Development 
 
Group C: Agencies or Individuals Who Made or Influenced the Policy 
(Designers) 
Name Organisation Position 
Maya Stuart-Fox Dept Prime & Cabinet Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Economic 
Development Branch 
Yvette Simms Dept of Finance Assistant Secretary, Procurement Policy and 
Advice 
Pete Dunn GHD Business Development Manager 
Supply Nation Supply Nation Chairperson 
  
The interviews were recorded and interview recordings were transcribed. 
Respondents were provided with an opportunity to correct any inaccuracy in the 
transcript including whether the interview did not accurately reflect their views 
on any particular issue.  
For the purpose of reporting the results of the research, reports of the 
interviews conducted with respondents were prepared by the researcher. Each 
report contains a summary of the interview conducted with that respondent. 
Each respondent was given an opportunity to comment and suggest 
amendments to the report of their interview if they thought it did not provide a 
fair and accurate summary of their views. These interview reports are contained 
in Chapter 4. The reports are divided into sections corresponding with the broad 
research subquestions. 
The interview transcripts were analysed by the researcher. This analysis is 
contained in Chapter 5. As part of this analysis the responses to questions 
contained in the transcripts were ‘coded’ in the sense that the information was 
subdivided into categories for the purpose of creating links between locations in 
the data and sets of concepts or ideas (Basit 2003). The data, once assigned into 
categories, was tabulated and the number of respondents identifying a factor as 
impacting negatively on the use of the IBE summed. Respondents’ comments on 
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mechanisms to improve the IBE were similarly categorised, tabulated and 
summed.  
Summary of Findings and Analysis 
Analysis of the interviews showed various negative factors and methods of 
improvement were often connected in respondents’ responses. Foremost 
amongst these ‘clusters’ was the combination of ‘procurement officer risk 
aversion’; ‘doubts about supply certainty’; ‘calculating value for money’; and 
‘procurement officer conservatism’ as related negative factors. These factors 
were seen as connected with ‘introduction of targets’; ‘greater advocacy’; 
‘tolerance of mistakes’; ‘better measuring’; and ‘better definition of value for 
money’.  
Another ‘cluster’ was the factor ‘lack of supplier development work by procuring 
agency’ being (loosely) linked to ‘certification requirements’ and likely to be 
diminished by methods such as ‘greater emphasis on supplier development’; 
‘discussion with suppliers about allocations’; ‘state government adoption’; 
‘ongoing policy stability’; and ‘more emphasis on training the Indigenous 
workforce’. The improvement methods of ‘more practical training for suppliers’ 
and having a ‘central point of contact in departments’ were often connected to 
responses around this cluster. 
A third broad cluster was comprised of the factors ‘awareness amongst 
suppliers’ and ‘limited supply options’. These factors were linked and seen as 
connected to the improvement methods of ‘development of a greater spread of 
Indigenous businesses’; ‘more precision in the Supply Nation directory’; and 
‘greater role for IBA’. Chapter 5 contains the complete analysis of the negative 
factors impacting upon utilisation of the IBE and the methods by which 
respondents suggested these factors could be overcome. 
While all of these factors were identified as significant the overwhelming 
conclusion that must be drawn from the interviews is that the two key factors 
needed to improve the IBE were: (1) the imposition of the IPP targets; and (2) a 
deliberate approach from procuring agencies to establish a relationship with 
Indigenous suppliers and coordinate an escalating series of contracts. In the 
discussion this is referred to as a ‘supplier development approach’. The factors 
developed by Flynn, McKevitt and Davis (2015) referred to above were identified 
by some respondents but not seen as more significant than the imposition of 
targets and supplier development. 
One of the respondents was employed at Fortescue Metals Group (‘FMG’). FMG 
has had significant success in implementing an Indigenous preferential 
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procurement program known as ‘One Billion Opportunities’. A very clear theme 
coming through the interviews (including that with the FMG employee) was that 
there is very little difference in the issues facing public and private sector 
organisations seeking to introduce Indigenous preferential procurement 
schemes. Again the imposition of targets and supplier development were seen as 
the key approaches. This fact suggests that the research conclusions are of 
potential relevance to other private sector organisations seeking to enhance 
their Indigenous supply chain. 
First Year of the IPP Targets and the Impact of the Research 
The first full year of the operation of the IPP occurred over the course of the 
research. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (‘DPMC’) has published 
information regarding the achievement by agencies against the targets as 
contained in the IPP (0.5 per cent of total contracts awarded in 2015-16). That 
information is set out below (DPMC 2016): 
Portfolio Target Contracts 
awarded 
Total value 
of contracts 
Average Value 
2015-16 2015-16 $ million  $ 
Defence 70 285 142 498,246 
Human Services 18 254 10 39,370 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 6 239 28 117,155 
Treasury 19 116 35 301,724 
Attorney-General’s Dept 19 91 4 43,956 
Environment 14 80 4 50,000 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 13 76 14 184,211 
Employment 7 67 1 14,925 
Agriculture and Water 
Resources 
5 55 6 109,091 
Education and Training 4 41 5 121,951 
Social Services 6 36 4 111,111 
Industry, Innovation and 
Science 
15 33 15 454,545 
Immigration and Border 
Protection 
19 29 5 172,414 
Finance 8 27 5 185,185 
Health 12 27 4 148,148 
Veterans’ Affairs 4 19 1 52,632 
Parliamentary Departments 4 15 1 66,667 
Infrastructure and Regional 
Development 
8 12 2 166,667 
Communications and the 
Arts 
5 7 0.1 14,286 
Total Commonwealth 256 1,509 284 188,204  
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The extraordinary turnaround from eight contracts with a total value of $10.86 
million over in excess of four years to 1,509 contracts with a total value of $284 
million in one year requires some commentary at the outset of this discussion. If, 
as it would appear at first blush, the impact of the imposition of the IPP targets 
has been to more than remedy any deficiency in the utilisation of the IBE then 
the central question the research project sought to investigate is rendered 
largely irrelevant. Such an outcome would suggest that the only problem with 
the IBE was the absence of agency targets and the introduction of the IPP targets 
has remedied this problem. 
Indeed, all 12 of the respondents who participated in the research interviews 
which were the main component of the research stated that the introduction of 
the IPP targets would improve utilisation of the IBE. Clearly they were accurate 
in their analysis. However, the statistics showing apparent success of the IPP 
targets may obscure some nuance in the effectiveness of the IPP (and the IBE) in 
achieving their objectives. 
The first point to note goes to the comparison between the period 2011-2015 
and the period 2015-16. One point the research highlighted is that there were no 
consistent records of contracts let to Indigenous businesses kept in the 2011-
2015 period. One informant (Yvette Sims – Department of Finance) stated that 
during 2012-13 and 2013-14 there were a total of 48 contracts of a value of 
greater than $10,000 awarded to Indigenous businesses, but it could not be 
ascertained whether these were pursuant to the IBE (as opposed to by public 
tender). Information about contracts of a value of less than $10,000 was not 
available.  
The 2015-16 DPMC data includes contracts of a value less than $10,000. 
Information about the total number of these small value contracts is not 
currently available. Nor is information regarding, for example, the median value 
of contracts either on an agency or whole of government basis. The research has 
indicated that there were a number of quite large contracts awarded by the 
Department of Defence. Similarly, in October 2015 the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade announced the award of a $9.2 million security contract. This 
single contract constitutes the majority of that Department’s $14 million total. 
The fact of these large contracts will of course impact on the average contract 
value data. However, without more detailed information regarding the 2015-16 
DPMC data it is impossible to even estimate the median value of contracts 
awarded. Certainly from the 2015-16 DPMC data it is not possible to ascertain 
what numbers of contracts were awarded directly to an Indigenous supplier 
without a requirement for public tender as envisaged under the IBE. Nor is it 
possible to ascertain whether the 2015-16 data represents an increase in the 
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number of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses or merely an improved 
reporting of the existing levels of contract award. This point is of course 
important as it is only an increase in the level of Commonwealth business going 
to Indigenous suppliers that could lead to the increase in the Indigenous 
employment levels sought by the Commonwealth. 
The second point is that the research did reveal that a number of contracts had 
been negotiated in the period prior to the implementation of the IPP targets but 
executed after 1 July 2015. While the research only identified several such 
contracts (although they were of significant value) it must be accepted that they 
may also have been other contracts close to execution in agencies where there 
was no respondent interviewee. To the extent this is the case the 2015-16 DPMC 
data could be seen to overinflate the effectiveness of the IPP targets. 
The third point to note is that the virtually all of the respondent interviewees 
discussed the impact of the absence of the targets and the positive effect their 
introduction would have. Often, for example, respondents highlighted not just 
the mandatory aspect of the target but the effect of the target in legitimising the 
use of the IBE: as such the research serves to explain why the introduction of the 
IPP targets has had (and presumably will continue to have) such a significant 
impact. Similarly, this analysis provides guidance for other public and private 
sector organisation contemplating policies similar to the IBE. 
Thus, while the 2015-16 DPMC data provides a valuable indication of the 
possible effectiveness of the IPP targets, it does not render the research 
outcomes otiose. 
Closing 
The conclusion to the discussion contained in Chapter 6 emphasises the key 
themes of the importance of targets like the IPP model and the adoption of a 
supplier development approach. Particularly in the context of facilitating the 
development of a diverse Indigenous supply base, comment is made on the 
compatibility of the joint goals of increasing Indigenous employment and the 
creation of Indigenous wealth. Finally, it is noted that while the IPP represents a 
significant step for the Commonwealth which is an important economic actor, 
there is still significant scope to develop similar programs in other sectors of the 
economy. 
Researcher Interest 
One final point should be stated at this introductory point. The researcher is 
employed as Chief Executive Officer of an Indigenous organisation (Native Title 
Services Victoria Ltd – ‘NTSV’) that has Public Benevolent Institution (‘PBI’) 
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status. NTSV is in turn owned by another Indigenous PBI status corporation, the 
Federation of Victorian Traditional Owner Corporations (‘FVTOC’). The 
researcher is a director of FVTOC. The FVTOC in turn wholly owns a for profit 
corporation – Federation Enterprises (‘FE’). The researcher is also a director of 
this corporation. FE is in turn the majority shareholder in a joint venture 
company Barpa Construction. The minority shareholder in Barpa is Cockram 
Constructions. Barpa is one of the Indigenous companies that is referred to in 
this research. Jeremy Clark and Simon Walter who were interviewed as part of 
this research are employed by Barpa and Jeremy Clark is also a director of FE and 
the Executive Officer of FVTOC. 
While holding these positions in corporations associated with the research the 
researcher has no pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the research. 
 
 
16 
 
 
 CHAPTER 2 − LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
In commencing this literature review it is useful to bear in mind the object of the 
literature review process. Webster and Watson provide an excellent summary 
(2002, xiii): 
A review of prior relevant literature is an essential feature of any academic 
project. An effective review creates a firm foundation for advancing 
knowledge. It facilitates theory development, closes areas where a plethora 
of research exists and uncovers areas where research is needed.  
With this task in mind it should also be remembered that the purpose of this 
research is to investigate the factors that have affected the efficacy of the IBE. In 
an examination of the effectiveness of a government preferential procurement 
program such as the IBE, it is appropriate to explore a number of foundational 
questions the analysis of which will support consideration of the primary data 
generated by the research activity. 
Accordingly, this Chapter will primarily seek to explore what consideration has 
been given in existing academic literature to the effectiveness of government (or 
public) procurement policies aimed at achieving ‘secondary objectives’ 
(Arrowsmith 1995); that is, policy objectives beyond the simple purchase of 
goods or services the subject of the procurement activity. In particular the 
chapter will look at issues relating to policies aimed at enhancing the role of SME 
in public procurement processes. This focus on SME policy has been adopted for 
two main reasons. The first reason stems from the fact that definitions of SME 
are generally by reference to number of employees. In the US, the number is 
statutorily defined at 500; and it is 250 in the EU (Nicholas & Fruhmann 2014). 
Under the current IBE it is only Indigenous enterprises in Australia with 200 or 
fewer employees that are within the scope of the procurement exemption (DoF 
2014); thus the IBE is only available to Indigenous enterprises that satisfy a 
generally accepted definition of SME. Second, in the absence of any extensive 
literature considering the effectiveness of policies encouraging participation by 
Indigenous enterprises in public procurement processes, the literature 
concerning SME participation acts as a useful proxy from which some guidance 
may be taken. 
This is not to suggest that there is a complete absence of literature concerning 
the effectiveness of Indigenous focussed procurement policies. Bolton (2004) 
and Bolton (2006) contains discussion of policies put in place in the Republic of 
South Africa under the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (5 of 
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2000. The latter piece however, focusses particularly on the legal framework of 
these measures. The former piece is discussed further below. In addition there is 
some literature that considers the effectiveness of secondary objective 
procurement programs designed to assist minority- and women-owned business 
in the United States. These are considered further below in section 2.5.3. While 
this literature exists it is not sufficiently plentiful to serve as an independent 
basis for analysis. In order to have a sufficient evidential and theoretical 
foundation for an exploration of these matters identified it is necessary to have 
regard to the more plentiful SME literature as discussed above. 
As a basis to this exploration it is necessary to address a number of definitional 
and contextual matters. This Chapter will undertake this task in a number of 
sections as follows. 
Section 2.2 immediately following this introduction will provide some 
definitional foundation to the subsequent discussion by identifying what is 
meant by the term ‘public procurement’. To do this the section considers what it 
is that constitutes the procurement process and how this process differs in a 
public (government) context from procurement processes that operate in a 
private sector context. 
Section 2.3 moves on to consider the literature relating to SME participation in 
public procurement in the context of two related matters: first, the perceived 
impediments to SME participation in public procurement. The second matter 
considered is what mechanisms have been deployed in various jurisdictions to 
overcome these impediments. 
Section 2.4 considers the question of the legitimacy of seeking to incorporate 
secondary objectives in a public procurement process. This consideration 
involves both the issue of legitimacy at a theoretical level and the related 
empirical consideration of whether the incorporation of secondary objectives in 
the public procurement process can be shown to have a negative impact on the 
price or value obtained by government in the acquisition of the goods and 
services in question. The literature reviewed relating to the empirical analysis of 
the impact of incorporation of secondary objectives again uses SME policies as a 
convenient proxy for secondary objectives particularly as they relate to the 
encouragement of Indigenous enterprise. 
Section 2.5 of the Chapter considers issues relating to the effectiveness of the 
incorporation of secondary objectives into procurement related programs as a 
means of achieving those secondary objectives. This consideration in turn is in 
three parts. The first looks at the literature describing how effectiveness of the 
achievement of secondary policies has been measured. The second traverses 
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academic debate surrounding the effectiveness of these policies. The third part 
turns attention more directly to the effectiveness of such policies in the context 
of Australia’s Indigenous communities. However, as noted above, given the 
absence of any literature directly considering this point, the discussion at this 
point focusses on analysis of evidence in support of the assumption identified 
earlier: that an increase in economic activity undertaken by Indigenous 
enterprises leads to an overall decrease in Indigenous economic and social 
disadvantage.  
In approaching the literature review relevant to the identified research questions 
it is important to note that although the IBE has been in place since 2011 there 
has to date been no academic consideration of it. There are two references to 
the IBE in written material produced by the Commonwealth Government. The 
first is a one-sentence reference in a 2014 Commonwealth Government report, 
Creating Parity (DPMC 2014). The second is a report entitled Procurement 
Initiatives to Support Outcomes for Indigenous Australians produced by the 
Australian National Audit Office (‘ANAO’) in July 2015. Much of the ANAO report 
considers the operation of another policy initiative, the Indigenous 
Opportunities Plan (‘IOP’). The IOP has since been absorbed into that portion of 
the IPP that requires contractors to set Indigenous employment targets. 
References to those aspects of the report that are relevant to the IBE are 
integrated into the following literature review. In summary though in relation to 
the IBE the ANAO concluded (2015, 23): 
Some Indigenous suppliers interviewed by the ANAO observed a low level 
of awareness of the IBE. Entity staff interviewed by the ANAO perceived a 
number of potential barriers to the IBE’s use, including the difficulty in 
identifying a suitable Indigenous business, and having sufficient 
information to assess whether a value for money outcome would be 
achieved through the use of the IBE, compared to undertaking an open 
tender process.  
The Report recommended that the IBE be better promoted by the 
Commonwealth Government and that an improved procedure for reporting use 
of the IBE be put in place. Both recommendations have been accepted by the 
Commonwealth Government (ANAO 2015, 28). 
Not only has there been no academic consideration of the IBE (that can be 
identified) but in fact there has been very little consideration of the effectiveness 
of similar policies in other jurisdictions. The announcement of the enhanced 
Commonwealth IPP package in the absence of any research into the 
effectiveness of the IBE and similar policies elsewhere can only be seen as a bold 
commitment by the Commonwealth Government underscoring the perceived 
need to take expeditious action around Indigenous disadvantage. 
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These matters stated it is appropriate to commence with some definitions. 
2.2. Definitions: Public Procurement 
2.2.1. Organisational Procurement 
The process of organisational (business to business) purchasing has been an area 
of considerable academic interest for quite some time. For example a widely 
cited work by Ford (1980) analyses the relational nature of business to business 
transactions from the time of the decision to evaluate new or alternative 
suppliers to the establishment of a long-term supply relationship. The relational 
nature of organisational supply arrangements continues to be a prominent 
theme in the literature today (for example Baraldi et al 2014; Woodside & Baxter 
2015). 
Another basis of analysis of the organisational supply phenomenon looks less at 
its relational aspects but more at its procedural character and the context in 
which these procedures take place. This line of analysis is often (for example 
Johnston & Lewin 1996; Caldwell, Bakker & Read 2007) attributed as first being 
described by Robinson, Faris and Wind in 1967. The original analysis by Robinson 
et al identified eight phases in organisational purchasing as follows: 
1. Recognition of need and a general solution 
2. Determination of characteristics and quantity 
3. Description of characteristics and quantity 
4. Search for potential sources 
5. Acquire and analyse proposals 
6. Evaluate proposals and select supplier(s) 
7. Select an order routine 
8. Performance feedback and evaluation. 
 
Johnston and Lewin (1996) consider both the stages set out above and later 
analysis by Webster and Wind (1972) and Sheth (1973) both of which 
rationalised the number of phases and explored contextual variables to the 
process such as environmental, organisational, group, participant, seller, 
conflict/negotiation, and informational. Johnston and Lewin (1996) contribute an 
expanded comprehension of the number and scope of these contextual matters. 
These authors developed a composite model of organisational purchasing that 
integrates both the procedural phases and contextual characteristics. This model 
is depicted by them diagrammatically as follows (Johnston & Lewis 1996, 3): 
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The diagram above sets out the eight procedural stages first identified by 
Robinson, Faris and Wind and (1967) also illustrates how the various contextual 
characteristics can impact upon these stages. 
Thus, the literature concerning organisational purchasing suggests that an 
appropriate analysis should comprehend both procedural stages of the activity 
and the context within which these processes occur. Relevantly to the current 
investigation it is necessary to consider whether public procurement differs 
materially from this general model of organisational procurement. 
2.2.2. Public Procurement 
Thai (2001, 9) summarised the economic activities of government under four 
major headings: 
• Providing the legal framework for all economic activities 
• Redistributing income through taxation and spending 
• Proving public goods and services … and 
• Purchasing goods, services and capital assets. 
This last activity is ‘public procurement’. A succinct definition of the activity is 
provided by McCrudden (2007a, 3) as follows: 
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Public procurement involves the purchasing by government from private 
sector contractors, usually on the basis of competitive bidding, of goods 
and services that government needs. 
While this definition identifies the core element of ‘purchase of goods and 
services by government from the private sector’ and has the benefit of brevity, it 
gives little idea of the steps involved in this process. 
Writing in 2007 in the specific context of public procurement Caldwell, Bakker 
and Read adopt Van Weele’s (2005) six-stage analysis: “specification, supplier 
selection, contracting, ordering, expediting and follow up/evaluation” (Caldwell, 
Bakker & Read 2007, 149). Even this six stage analysis can be further 
rationalized. Arrowsmith (2010, 1), again writing in the context of public 
procurement, reduces the process into three distinct phases: 
(i) Deciding which goods and services are to be bought and when 
(procurement planning); 
(ii) the process of placing a contract to acquire those goods and services 
which involves, in particular, choosing who is to be the contracting 
partner and the terms on which the goods and services are to be 
provided; and 
(iii) the process of administering the contract to ensure effective 
performance. 
Arrowsmith (2010) goes on to note the attention of regulators (and often 
therefore researchers) is generally upon the second of these three phases but, as 
will be discussed in section 2.5 of this Chapter, for the purposes of the current 
inquiry it is necessary to consider each of these phases. 
What is noticeable in the literature on the procedural analysis of organisational 
supply is that those writing of public procurement do not suggest that the 
phases of the process differ as between public and private procurement. The six 
stages of Van Weele’s analysis developed in a private sector context were 
adopted unamended by Caldwell, Bakker and Read (2007) in an analysis of public 
procurement; Arrowsmith’s (2010) three phases of public procurement 
correspond with the original eight developed by Robinson, Faris and Wind (1967) 
in the context of general (private sector) organisational purchasing. 
 The distinction between public and private procurement then does not 
fundamentally lie in the details of the process but rather in the content of the 
contextual factors described by Johnston and Lewin (1996) and noted above. 
This notion is illustrated in the following diagram from Thai (2001, 18).  
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In the diagram above Thai is illustrating the functions of ‘policy’, ‘authorisations’ 
and ‘regulations’ in public procurement processes. These constitute many of the 
contextual characteristics described by Johnston and Lewin (1996), in particular 
the ‘environmental’ characteristics (for example, legal cultural and economic 
factors). However, the ‘procurement functions’ and ‘feedback’ illustrated by Thai 
are a mere further compression of the stages of procurement described above. 
The notion that the key distinction between private sector organisational 
purchasing and public sector procurement lies in the areas identified by Thai is 
noted also by Rainey and Bozeman (2000). These authors, after an assessment of 
much extant empirical research, find that while in many respects there is little 
difference between private and public organisations, this is not so in the areas of 
recruitment and procurement. These two areas are notable for the level of 
regulation and authorisation necessary in public organisations before decisions 
can be made.  
A similar theme is identified by Lindskog (2008) who, using the example of the 
purchase of telecom services in Scandinavia, draws a direct comparison between 
the original eight stage model of Robinson, Faris and Wind (1967) and the 
processes in public sector procurement. Somewhat later, Lindskog, Brege and 
Brehmer (2010, 170-171) develop this analysis by suggesting: 
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Public procurement is in almost all situations and countries regulated by a 
specific legislation that is stricter than for the private sector purchasing 
activities. The private and public purchasing is in many ways similar but the 
organization of private buying processes is not stipulated by law … 
The diagram by Thai above illustrates the role of authorisation and regulation in 
public sector procurement. It also illustrates the role of ‘policy making and 
management’ in influencing both authorisation and regulation and also in the 
actual procurement process itself. In Thai’s description of this characteristic, 
‘policy making and management’ is directly associated with the role of executive 
government (as compared to the legislature or judiciary) within the confines of a 
legislated regulatory framework (Thai 2001, 18-20). While Thai’s analysis 
indicates the long standing importance of policy making and management in 
public procurement McCrudden (2007b) puts a contemporary glaze on this 
phenomenon through an examination of how governments have more recently 
extended the reach of governmental policy making and management 
considerations by using private sector corporate social responsibility aspirations 
to further governmental policy objectives in the context of private sector 
organisational purchasing.  
This more recent development aside, the key distinction then between public 
procurement and organisational purchasing lies not in the process itself but in 
the regulatory framework around these processes and in the policy 
considerations that inform both the content of regulation and the exercise of 
discretion by the executive arm of government. 
2.2.2.1. Commonwealth Government Public Procurement  
The Commonwealth Government’s public procurement process provides a 
relevant illustration of many of the concepts identified by Thai (2001). 
Commonwealth Government procurement is regulated by the Commonwealth 
Procurement Rules 2014 (‘CPR’) (DoF 2014). These are issued by the Minister for 
Finance under section 105B(1) of the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). That is although the CPR are issued under 
authority of an Act, they constitute administrative rules of the executive 
government utilising the UK (as opposed to US) model described by Thai (2001).  
The CPR are divided into two divisions. Division One rules must be applied in all 
Commonwealth procurements. Division Two rules must be applied in 
procurements that exceed the ‘procurement threshold’ unless the procurement 
is specifically exempted by virtue of being a matter included in Appendix A of the 
CPR. There are 17 matters contained in Appendix A. The IBE is one of these. The 
procurement thresholds above which Division 2 applies are $80,000 for purchase 
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of goods and services by Commonwealth Departments, $400,000 for purchase of 
goods and services by Commonwealth corporations, and $7.5 million for 
construction contracts (DoF 2014). 
The Division One rules specify that all procurements must (DOF 2014, 13, r 4.4): 
• [be] non-discriminatory and encourage competition; 
• use public resources in an efficient, effective, economical and 
ethical manner that is not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Commonwealth;  
• facilitate accountable and transparent decision making;  
• encourage appropriate engagement with risk; and 
• be commensurate with the scale and scope of the business 
requirement. 
The Division One rules also specify that all Commonwealth procurements must 
achieve ‘value for money’, which is said to include (DOF 2014, 13, r 4.5): 
a. the quality of the goods and services;  
b. fitness for purpose of the proposal;  
c. the potential supplier’s relevant experience and performance history;  
d. flexibility of the proposal (including innovation and adaptability over the 
lifecycle of the procurement);  
e. environmental sustainability of the proposed goods and services (such as 
energy efficiency and environmental impact); and  
f. whole-of-life costs.  
The ‘whole of life’ costs include matters such as original purchase price, 
maintenance costs and disposal costs. 
Thus, the CPR illustrates the regulatory and policy framework diagrammatically 
portrayed by Thai (2001). 
The following section of this chapter turns attention to an aspect of the practical 
operation of public procurement process that has been outlined above, that is 
the role of ‘policy’ in the public procurement process. The position of SME 
illustrates this process.   
2.3. SME Participation in Public Procurement 
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, in this section it is intended to 
consider the literature relating to the impediments to SME participation in public 
procurement processes and also the literature relating to what mechanisms 
have been deployed to mitigate these impediments. The focus on SME policies is 
justified both because the IBE as contained in the CPR 2014, as opposed to those 
originally issued in 2011 (DFD 2011), is expressed only to apply to Indigenous-
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owned SME, defined as 200 employees or less (DoF 2014) and because the 
literature relating to SME participation provides a convenient proxy in the 
absence of literature considering Indigenous-specific policies.  
2.3.1. Impediments to SME Participation 
Before considering the impediments to SME public procurement participation it 
is worth briefly noting what is seen as the benefit of SME participation so as to 
warrant attention to the impediments. This is particularly so as a brief 
consideration of these benefits acts as a useful foundation to the discussion in 
section 2.5.3 regarding the effects of increased Indigenous economic activity. 
The most common definition of an ‘SME’ is an enterprise with fewer than 250 
employees, although a definition of fewer than 100 employees is also common 
across many countries (Kushnir, 2010). Some analysis considers annual turnover 
rather than number of employees; for example, Reis and Cabal (2015) define a 
‘small business’ (in Brazil) as one with an annual turnover of less than 
US$1,157,500 and a ‘micro business’ as one with an annual turnover of less than 
US$157,500.  
While there may be limited consensus around the definition of SME there does 
appear to be broad agreement around the desirability of these firms, in 
particular their participation in public procurement processes. This consensus is 
conveniently summarised by Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008, 230-231) who 
note that the involvement in small businesses in public procurement is seen as 
desirable because it: 
… increases innovativeness, encourages entrepreneurship and contributes 
to job creation and economic development. Small businesses also tend to 
have higher growth rates than large firms. Thus by buying from SMEs the 
public sector can positively influence local economies, regional 
regeneration and local sourcing … they produce over 10 times more 
patents per employee than their larger counterparts [and] are also seen as 
a source of flexible personalized services … they … respond quickly to 
changing market demands, are organizationally flexible and have more 
efficient internal communication.  
Many writers have commented in similar terms (for example: Nicholas & 
Fruhman 2014; Akenroye & Aju 2013; Athey, Coey & Levin 2013; Loader 2007; 
Clark & Moutray 2004; Denes 1997). 
Clearly SME participation in public procurement processes is seen as desirable. 
However, there are also a great many impediments to this participation that 
have also been identified. Reviewing the literature relating to this point Flynn, 
McKevitt and Davis (2015, 446-447) identify seven main impediments: 
• Bureaucracy; 
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• Lack of communication between SMEs and public procurers and 
too much weighting on cost; 
• SME lack of knowledge over how to source opportunities or 
engage with procedural aspects of tendering; 
• Onerous tender documentation and unprofessional procurement 
staff; 
• Time demands of completing tender documentation; 
• Requirements of previous relevant experience and financial costs 
of tendering; and 
• Large contract size and information asymmetries. 
Various writers have identified these impediments or aspects of them (for example, 
Reias & Cabal, 2015; Nicholas & Fruhman 2014; Preuss, 2011; Loader 2011; Karjalainen 
& Kemppainen 2008). However, Akenroe and Aju (2015) provide a hugely valuable 
contribution to this discourse by diagrammatically presenting the impediments to SME 
public procurement participation and identifying the relevant phase of the procurement 
process at which the impediment is encountered. This diagram is set out below 
(Akenroe & Aju 2013, 339): 
 
On the one hand then is the apparent desirability of SME participation in public 
procurement. However, on the other hand, are the impediments to this 
participation that are described above. The question is then posed: What 
mechanisms have been developed to overcome these impediments and 
facilitate SME public procurement participation? This question is addressed in 
the following subsection. 
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2.3.2. SME Procurement Participation Mechanisms 
While the focus of the discussion in this subsection is around SME procurement 
participation, the subsection will also seek to describe mechanisms that have 
been used to further other forms of secondary objective. Of particular relevance 
of course are mechanisms that have been used in various jurisdictions to 
encourage Indigenous enterprise participation. 
In addition to providing the diagrammatic depiction of the impediments to SME 
procurement participation reproduced above, Akenroe and Aju (2013) also 
describe a comprehensive taxonomy of the mechanisms that have been used to 
overcome these. This taxonomy will be adopted for analytic purposes and will be 
enhanced with examples of the various types of mechanisms drawn from other 
authors. 
In the taxonomy of Akenroe and Aju (2013, 349) there are four broad categories 
of mechanism: 
• Broad procurement reform; 
• Subsidy model; 
• Capacity building; and 
• Spending target. 
 
2.3.2.1. Broad Procurement Reform 
In the description by Akenroe and Aju (2013) under this heading are mechanisms 
that simplify the bureaucracy around procurement tendering. Examples 
provided are simplified tender documentation, transparency around process, 
and effective advertising of opportunities (web portals for example) in addition 
to more relaxed requirements regarding the provision of audited financial 
statements and (pre-tender award) insurance requirements. Other writers have 
identified similar mechanisms (Loader 2007) which may extend to simplified pre-
tender qualification mechanisms, and reduced requirements for the lodging of 
pre-contract securities (Nicholas & Fruhmann 2014). Bolton (2004) provides a 
comprehensive description of such measures that were undertaken in South 
Africa in 1995 in an effort to increase the participation of ‘historically 
disadvantaged individuals’ in the tendering process following the regime change 
in that country. These mechanisms included: 
• Improvement of access to tendering information; 
• Development of tender advice centres; 
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• Waiving of security requirements on some construction contracts; 
• Unbundling of larger projects; 
• Promotion of early payment cycles by government; 
• Simplification of tender requirements; and 
• Appointment of a procurement ombudsman. 
ANAO (2015, 23) briefly discusses some of these issues and notes that some 
Indigenous enterprise representatives interviewed as part of the ANAO report 
process had commented that there was very little support offered in the ‘pre-
bidding’ and ‘tender discovery’ phases (using the Akenroe and Aju (2013) 
structure as depicted above). Certainly there is no suggestion in ANAO that the 
Commonwealth Government had engaged in a ‘broad procurement reform’ as 
part of the IBE process. 
2.3.2.2. Subsidy Model 
The next category suggested by Akenroe and Aju (2013) is the ‘subsidy model’. 
The authors state: “Grants might be offered to small suppliers that can bring 
novel products or services to the marketplace” (Akenroe & Aju 2013, 350) and 
suggest that this model has been utilised in a number of jurisdictions in 
particular Ireland, Egypt the US and India. No other literature supports the 
existence of a direct subsidy payment to SMEs. However, Bolton (2004) does 
refer to the existence of targeted financial services to assist SME engaging in 
public procurement tendering in South Africa, and Denes (1997) refers to similar 
arrangements in the US. Athey, Coey and Levin (2013) refer to subsidies in the 
context of a margin on tender price. This mechanism is discussed below under 
the heading of spending targets. 
It becomes apparent that in practice what is referred to by Akenroe and Aju 
(2013) in respect of this category goes to mechanisms such as elimination of 
tender fees and reduced or modified security deposits. These mechanisms were 
discussed under the previous (broad procurement reform) category. However, 
its separate identification under this category does assist in refining analysis of 
the otherwise diverse ‘broad procurement reform’ category. 
2.3.2.3. Capacity Building 
Arguably the third category posited by Akenroe and Aju (2013), capacity 
building, could also fall within the general rubric of broad procurement reform. 
However, the particular mechanisms that are suggested here go not so much to 
reform of the governmental procurement process but rather towards enhancing 
the capacity of the SME to engage with this process. Under this heading Akenroe 
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and Aju (2013) suggest mechanisms such as the provision of training in tender 
writing as a key example. Nicholas and Fruhmann (2014) also identify lack of 
specialist tender preparation skills as a particular impediment to SME 
procurement participation and point to tender preparation training schemes for 
SME in France and the UK as methods to overcome this. Loader (2007, 310) 
refers to a number of informal training arrangements in UK statutory authorities 
to similar effect. A further aspect of this category of mechanism is assistance in 
the development of specialist legal skills relevant to procurement processes. This 
is referred to by Lindskog, Brege and Brehmar (2010). 
2.3.2.4. Spending Targets and Related Mechanisms 
The final category of mechanism identified by Akenroe and Aju (2013) is arguably 
the most contentious. Within this broad category are mechanisms such as the 
compulsory ‘set aside’, ‘subsidies’ ‘selective purchasing’ and ‘preference’. All of 
these mechanisms involve some sanctioned disruption to an otherwise 
apparently ‘open tender process’. The IBE, the Commonwealth policy the subject 
of this investigation, would be included in this category of mechanisms. 
McCrudden (2007a) devotes extensive analysis to each of these mechanisms and 
the legal basis and validity of them in a range of jurisdictions. That author notes 
a number of examples of the use of Indigenous preferential procurement 
policies in the US and Canada. Some of these matters are explored further in the 
following section in the context of effectiveness. The object at this point is 
merely to describe the various mechanisms. 
Athey, Coey and Levin (2013, 1) provide some succinct definitions: 
One approach is to set aside a fraction of contracts for targeted firms. For 
instance [US] federal procurement contracts between $3,000 and $100,000 
are reserved automatically for small businesses … An alternative is to 
provide bid subsidies for favoured firms. 
A further example of a set aside is the Canadian policy described in McCrudden 
(2007a) where procurement of goods and services for delivery on the lands of 
Indigenous Canadians is set aside for Indigenous-owned enterprises. This of 
course is also a component of the new IPP. A bid subsidy as referred to above 
has the effect that a tenderer will still be successful if within a determined 
percentage of the otherwise lowest tenderer. Selective purchasing by contrast 
operates as a prohibition; that is firms that do or do not display particular 
characteristics are precluded from participation in the tender. This of course 
operates to the advantage of remaining firms. Selective purchasing is commonly 
used in the context of ‘boycotts’ of firms associated with particular policies or 
practices (McCrudden 1999). The final mechanism is ‘preferential procurement’. 
Under this approach firms that do display a particular characteristic are excused 
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from the requirement to tender at all. If the selective purchasing arrangements 
are limited by value of contract or total number of contracts it could also be 
described as a set aside arrangement (McCrudden 2007a). 
McCrudden (2007a) draws some distinction between mechanisms that bestow 
some obligation or advantage on a firm adopting a particular policy and those 
where the policy objective is to foster a particular type of firm. An example of 
the first type would be the provision of subsidy, or use selective purchasing to 
favour firms who utilise sustainable energy or engage a certain percentage of 
employees of a particular ethnic minority or gender. McCrudden (2007b) 
explores this approach in some detail in the context of mechanisms to utilised by 
government encourage greater corporate social responsibility in the private 
sector.  
An example of mechanisms aimed at encouraging particular types of firms are 
the use of set asides and preferential procurement for the benefit of firms of a 
particular size or those owned by a particular class of person. In the US, the 
Small Business Act 1953 (US) and its set-aside provisions described briefly by 
Athey, Coey and Levin (2013) above provide an example. A further example from 
the US lies in the Works Employment Act 1977 (US) which requires 10 per cent of 
projects under that Act be awarded to ‘minority owned’ businesses. ‘Minority’ 
under this legislation includes Native Americans, African Americans and 
Hispanics. As McCrudden notes, this approach goes beyond attempting to 
ensure government policy is implemented by the private sector. It is an attempt 
to “restructure the economy more broadly … This was an attempt to stimulate 
the growth of an entrepreneurial [originally] black middle class” (McCrudden 
2007a, 8). 
The Commonwealth Government’s IPP adopts a number of these mechanisms. 
There is the preferential procurement approach found in the IBE which is the 
focus of this examination. There is also the mandatory set aside of contracts for 
delivery of goods and services in remote locations. These two mechanisms are 
buttressed with the mandatory targets for the award of a certain percentage of 
contracts to Indigenous firms. In addition though, the final component of the IPP 
− the requirement for Commonwealth contractors to engage a certain 
percentage of Indigenous employees − displays the characteristics of the ‘policy 
encouragement’ approach described by McCrudden (2007a; 2007b). 
The ANAO (2015, 74) identifies a significant limitation to the preferential 
procurement approach at least in the context of the IBE. This limitation is that it 
is still a requirement of the CPR that ‘value for money’ be demonstrated. The 
assessment of value for money in a non-competitive tender environment 
presented a challenge to Commonwealth procurement officers. 
31 
 
The foregoing then has provided a description of the mechanisms which can be 
used to enlist public procurement in the cause of encouraging government 
policy, even to the extent of (modest) economic restructuring. The following 
section of this Chapter will examine the debate about the legitimacy of this 
enlistment. The latter part of the following section gives particular regard to the 
issue of whether the use of public procurement to achieve secondary objectives 
imposes a greater cost burden. 
2.4. The Legitimacy of Pursuing Secondary Objectives 
2.4.1. The Three Strands of Public Procurement  
While there are records of governmental procurement activities dating back to 
Syria in 2800 BCE (Thai, 2001, 11), contemporary centrally organised 
government procurement is usually identified as having developed in the 19th 
century. Astrom & Brochner (2007) suggest that from the outset the apparent 
sole criteria for the awarding of procurement contracts was price (2007). 
However, McCrudden (2004), discussed below at section 2.4.4, identifies the 
inclusion of secondary objectives within procurement programs from the mid-
nineteenth century. These early instances of the inclusion of secondary 
objectives aside, Astrom & Brochner (2007) suggest it was only in the 1960s that 
matters such as contractor reliability were explicitly being taken into account 
and not until the 1980s that the multiparameter nature of procurement bidding 
was being researched (Waara & Brochner 2006). Erridge and McIlroy (2002) 
explore several suggested ‘strands’ in public procurement (2002, 53): the 
commercial strand, the regulatory strand, and the socio-economic strand. Their 
analysis supports their suggestion that these strands cannot necessarily be 
reconciled. This section of the Chapter will consider each of these strands and 
the factors that may impact upon them. Section 2.4.2.1 pays particular attention 
to empirical data going to the issue of whether incorporation of secondary 
objectives leads to increased costs. The final section brings these three strands 
together by briefly reviewing the extent of procurement related policies 
currently used by the Commonwealth Government. 
2.4.2. Commercial Strand 
In looking at the ‘commercial strand’ Erridge and McIlroy (2002) focus on the rise 
of dominance of ‘public choice theory’ in procurement decision-making from the 
1980s. Reference to the policies of both the European Commission and the UK is 
made in support of this suggestion. The key to the application of public choice 
theory to public procurement decision making is summarised as follows (Erridge 
& McIlroy 2002 54): 
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The understanding that competitive decision making will result in greater 
economic efficiency through reduction in costs, which will produce savings 
and maximise operating efficiency thus ensuring fair and equitable use of 
taxpayer’s money.  
The paper goes on to identify however that even within the commercial strand, 
the notion of ‘lowest price’ is often in practice replaced with best ‘value’. The 
notion of value in turn is seen as comprising three components: economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness (2002, 55). Of these, economy refers to the lowest 
price principle, whereas efficiency goes to “the relationship between the output 
of goods and services and the resources used while effectiveness is concerned 
with the achievement of targets not only in terms of quantity but also quality” 
(2002, 55). In support of this interpretation Loader (2007, 309) notes that the UK 
Treasury defines value for money in procurement as “the optimum combination 
of whole life costs and quality to meet the customer’s requirements”. Loader 
(2011, 288) also notes that the UK government accepts that value for money 
thus defined “is rarely synonymous with lowest price”. The definition of ‘value 
for money’ as contained in the CPR is set out above in section 2.2.2.1. 
Wong, Holt and Cooper (2000) usefully develop the nuance of the commercial 
strand posited by Erridge and McIlroy (2002). These authors surveyed over 80 UK 
construction clients. A quantitative analysis of the responses led to an ordinal 
ranking of the importance of project specific criteria (‘PSC’) by which tenders 
were assessed. The analysis showed little variation between public and private 
sector clients. Over 30 PSC are identified in relation to both private and public 
sector clients. Examples of these PSC are matters such as ‘ability to complete’; 
‘actual work quality on similar jobs’, ‘contractors’ familiarity with geographic 
area’; and health and safety record (Wong, Holt & Cooper 2000, 770). The 
research also examined the weight attached to PSC as against a simple tender 
price criterion. The results indicating that while only 22 per cent of public sector 
respondents suggested that PSC were equal or more important than tender 
price, a mere 4 per cent saw price as the sole determinant and 66 per cent saw 
PSC as playing a role in tender award decisions. Interestingly, 32 per cent of 
private sector clients saw PSC as equal to, or more important than, price (Wong, 
Holt & Cooper 2000, 772). The authors suggest the need for public defensibility 
as the basis for the greater price sensitivity in the public sector. 
The significance of the analysis presented by Wong, Holt and Cooper to the 
research problem is that it provides a good sample of quantitative data to 
support the notion that, even within the commercial strand, it is extremely rare 
for a procurement decision to be based upon a price criterion alone. The 
research illustrates the nuance behind the term ‘value’. Acceptance of the 
proposition that value can include a range of criteria lays the foundation for 
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greater acceptance of the legitimacy of the socio-economic strand discussed 
below. 
These authors highlight that even in circumstances where there is no explicit 
secondary objective incorporated into the procurement process it will be rare 
that the procurement decision is based on the issue of price alone. Rather, the 
generally operative notion of ‘value’ will require consideration of a range of 
matters that can be summarised as economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
Given this background, consideration of the effect on price of the incorporation 
of secondary objectives may be thought unnecessary. This would be naïve. While 
public procurement decisions are not made on the sole basis of price, the issue 
of price is of course significant in the extent to which secondary objectives will 
be adopted. 
2.4.2.1. The Price of Secondary Objectives 
While Wong, Holt and Cooper (2000) investigated the inter-relation of price and 
other factors in procurement decisions, other researchers have focussed upon 
the issue of trying to discern whether the implementation of various secondary 
objective mechanisms leads to increased costs to government. 
In this regard it becomes necessary to differentiate between the various 
secondary objectives that may be pursued. For example a requirement to utilise 
renewable energy on a project in circumstances where renewable energy is 
more expensive than fossil fuel will (in the short term) result in higher project 
costs. By contrast a requirement for a contractor to give preference to 
employees normally resident in a project area may not necessarily involve 
additional costs. 
The limited deployment of Indigenous preferential public procurement policies 
in Australia and other jurisdictions means that there is no data available on 
whether such policies lead to increased procurement costs. However, there has 
been a great deal of research around the issue of whether SME preferential 
public procurement policies have resulted in increased contract costs. In this 
section of the discussion the literature relating to this research will be reviewed 
on the basis that the situation of SMEs may in many respects be a legitimate 
proxy for Indigenous enterprises. The discussion will conclude by noting that 
while consideration of SMEs generally may be useful, the position of Indigenous 
enterprises may differ in a number of regards. 
Denes (1997) provides a useful starting point. Denes commences by noting that 
basic economic theory and previous research suggests that an increased number 
of tender bidders is directly correlated to a decreased bid price. In examining the 
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application of this theory to the provision of dredging services to which on 
occasions the set-aside provisions of the Small Business Act 1953 (US) applied, 
Denes (1997, 443) concluded: ‘No evidence was found to support the hypothesis 
that set-asides increased costs … One possible reason…is that more firms bid on 
the set asides.’ Somewhat by way of contrast Marion (2007) analysed the ‘bid 
preference’ system used to favour small businesses in the award of Californian 
highway construction costs. Under this system small firms received a 5 per cent 
bid preference margin. The analysis showed the system did lead to higher (3.8 
per cent) procurement costs but that these were less than the 5 per cent bid 
preference margin. However, Yoon (2006) showed that if overall contribution to 
social welfare is included in the calculation of the cost of bid preference to 
minorities in auctions of radio broadcast licences, the bid preference system 
provided a more efficient outcome. 
Athey, Coey and Levin (2013) examine small business set-asides in US Forest 
Service contracts and conclude that the set-aside mechanism does achieve 
higher small business participation but also imposes higher costs. The authors 
suggest that a subsidy mechanism would produce more favourable (in terms of 
price and efficiency) results. Nakabayashi (2013) examined the effect of small 
business set-asides in Japanese public construction contracts. The author 
concluded that if the set-asides were removed there would be a significant exit 
of SMEs from the construction procurement market and that the resultant 
reduction in competition would operate to increase procurement costs. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Reis and Cabral (2015). These authors considered the 
effect of the introduction Brazilian federal law that allowed SME set-asides for 
contracts of a value of less than US$35,000 and a 5 per cent bid preference in 
other tenders. They concluded that the introduction of the law did not affect 
prices and did facilitate a significant increase in SME procurement participation. 
However, there was also an increase in post-contract termination for poor 
performance. Unless remedial measures were put in place this would inevitably 
increase the overall cost of procurement. 
This brief review of the academic literature that has examined the impact upon 
price of the incorporation of secondary objectives relating to increasing 
participation of SMEs in procurement processes has identified diverse 
conclusions in the research that has been undertaken. A consistent theme 
appears to be though that the greatest likelihood of SME preferential 
procurement policies not having a negative cost impact is in circumstances 
where these policies facilitate increased competition in the procurement process 
through the increased participation of SMEs. In the context of IBE, which 
operates as an exemption from the usual requirements for public tendering, the 
utilisation of the policy may not lead to an increase in participants in any 
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particular tender process. However, in particular circumstances (for example in 
remote locations) the development of Indigenous enterprises stemming from 
the utilisation of the policy could lead to increased competition and an overall 
reduction in procurement costs. Even in circumstances where IBE did not 
facilitate increased competition around a particular procurement it should be 
borne in mind that the exemption can only be utilised if the Indigenous 
enterprise can demonstrate the broader notion of ‘value’. 
2.4.3. Regulatory Strand 
The second strand identified by Erridge and McIlroy (2002) is ‘regulatory’. This 
strand focusses on the requirement for ‘transparency and equality of 
opportunity’ (2002, 56) in order to ensure genuine competiveness in the 
tendering process. Other writers also emphasise the inherent political sensitivity 
around public procurement and the need to maintain public confidence in the 
integrity of the process as an important foundation for this regulatory strand 
(Schapper et al 2006, 2). The same matters are clearly identified in the CPR (DoF 
2014) as noted above in section 2.2.2.1.  
The political sensitivity associated with public procurement can be seen to 
impact upon the actions of procurement officials who are reported to adopt 
conservative approaches to procurement methods to protect against uncertainty 
arising from possible legal complications (Drijber and Stergiou 2009) and public 
criticism (Love et al, 2008). The issue of procurement official conservatism 
arising from a concern regrading uncertainty comes through strongly in the 
research outcomes. 
Erridge and McIlroy themselves however do not develop this theoretical 
foundation but rather turn their attention to a discussion of detail of European 
Commission processes.  
Thai (2001) in a seminal piece which has already been referred to above (section 
2.2.2) analyses the overall role and structure of government procurement 
processes. The article refers to procurement processes in a range of jurisdictions 
but has a primary focus on those processes in use in the US. Thai identifies a 
differential approach between those jurisdictions that tend to regulate 
procurement through statutory means (particularly the US, Europe and many 
developing nations) and those that utilise administrative practice to regulate 
procurement (the UK and many former British possessions – including Australia) 
(Thai 2001, 27). The dichotomy identified by Thai illuminates the differential 
approaches to management of the regulatory strand identified by Erridge and 
McIlroy (2002). Relevantly, Thai notes though that irrespective of the approach 
taken to regulation or the developed/developing status of a jurisdiction a ‘sound 
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procurement system’ will have two goals. He identifies these goals as: (1) 
‘procurement goals’: “quality, timeliness and cost (more than just price)”; and (2) 
‘non-procurement goals’: domestic preference, environment protection, “social 
goals (assisting women and minority owned business concerns) and international 
relations goals” (Thai 2001, 27). These two sets of goals equate to the 
commercial strand and the socio-economic strand identified by Erridge and 
McIlroy (2002). 
The analyses of Thai (2001) and that of Erridge and McIlroy (2002) are quite 
complementary. The latter provides a clear analysis of the ‘commercial’ and 
‘regulatory’ strands in public procurement policy and an effective dissection of 
the commercial strand into the component parts of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. In so doing they are able to demonstrate that that price alone is 
not (or rarely) the sole determinant of procurement decisions. In ‘opening up’ 
the field of relevant considerations the article provides a strong theoretical 
foundation for the Commonwealth’s IPP. 
Thai (2001) is useful to the analysis because the piece authoritatively 
demonstrates that across jurisdictions, embedded in the procurement process is 
the aim of furthering a multiplicity of objectives beyond simply lowest price. The 
piece also illustrates that satisfaction of the regulatory strands identified by 
Erridge and McIlroy (2002) is not inconsistent with efforts to achieve these socio-
economic objectives. 
2.4.4. Socio-Economic Strand 
The final strand identified by Erridge and McIlroy (2002) is the socio-economic 
strand. The discussion here is largely normative for the authors suggest: “At 
present public procurement policy … reflects the market model supported by 
public choice theorists” (2002, 58). However, they briefly continue to suggest 
that this should not be the case positing (in summary) that the public nature of 
public procurement justifies the inclusion of socio-economic considerations in 
procurement decisions. They summarise the competing views succinctly (2002, 
59): 
Opponents of the use of public procurement for socio-economic purposes 
have argued that the outcome is likely to be extra or hidden costs and 
therefore policy should remain market based. However, as we have already 
discussed, given that the market model is flawed there is a moral 
imperative for governments to ensure that the public interest is served.  
The legitimacy of the socio-economic strand is a theme pursued by McCrudden 
(2004) but from a somewhat different basis. McCrudden in this piece explores 
the history of the concept of ‘linkage’ in public procurement. To McCrudden 
(2004, 257) ‘linkage’ is where government combines the functions of: 
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… participating in the market as a purchaser and at the same time 
regulating it through the use of its purchasing power to advance 
conceptions of social justice 
McCrudden’s ‘linkage’ is thus has parallels with with Arrowsmith’s (1995) term 
‘secondary objectives’. However, McCrudden’s term acknowledges that the 
advancement of “conceptions  of social justice” may not be merely a ‘secondary 
objective’ in the procurement process. McCrudden (2004) traces a number of 
examples of this linkage in (primarily) the US and the UK during the 19th and 
20th centuries. Common 19th century examples are stipulations in government 
contracts regarding minimum wages. McCrudden (2004) notes the tendency 
following World War I to introduce preferential procurement arrangements for 
firms employing disabled workers in an attempt to ameliorate the position of 
injured ex-servicemen. The process continued after World War II expanding to 
use various mechanisms to include preferential provisions for firms employing 
disabled workers generally. McCrudden (2004) goes on to note arrangements in 
a number of European countries to give preferential provision for firms 
employing workers from areas with high regional unemployment. McCrudden 
continues this history by identifying the development of the role of procurement 
in the civil rights movement in the US in the 1960s and more recently. Examples 
provided in this regard are non-discrimination clauses inserted in US federal 
contracts to the more recent affirmative action measures where certain 
proportions of federal contracts are ‘set aside’ for firms owned by ‘minority’ 
groups or women. McCrudden (2004) also identifies a number of further 
examples of linkage in a range of jurisdictions such as Malaysia, South Africa, 
Northern Ireland and Canada. The author places some emphasis on the 
requirements for linkage imposed by international organisations such as the 
International Labor Organisations (‘ILO’) with respect to pay and conditions of 
workers employed by contractors to state parties to the ILO conventions. 
McCrudden (2004) illustrates that there has been a long history of incorporation 
of secondary objectives into procurement decisions stretching back centuries. 
Through international examples McCrudden (2004) also demonstrates the 
practice is commonplace globally. Particularly as the examples cited often relate 
to ‘non-contentious’ socio-economic objectives regarding (for example) injured 
ex-servicemen, McCrudden’s piece illustrates that the inclusion of secondary 
objectives is not contentious. Rather the debate is not about secondary 
objectives or ‘pure’ commercial considerations but rather about which 
secondary objectives are legitimate: in so doing the piece points to (without 
identifying) a potential implicit racism in the reluctance to embrace objectives 
such as Indigenous preferential procurement. 
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A further piece by McCrudden (1999) focusses on the selective purchasing 
mechanism and examines another basis by which the legitimacy of incorporating 
secondary objectives could be challenged; that is, the obligations imposed under 
international law, in particular the World Trade Organisation’s (‘WTO’) 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The piece focusses upon a case 
study of a challenge to a law of the State of Massachusetts which imposed 
‘selective purchasing’ sanctions against corporations involved in the Republic of 
Myanmar. The stated objective of the law was to effect a change in the attitude 
of the government of Myanmar to human rights abuses. In exploring this issue 
McCrudden (1999) looks more generally at the desirability of linking human 
rights issues with public procurement. In so doing he refers to a number of 
examples of such linkages in operation. A number of the examples to be later 
repeated in McCrudden (2004). However, the piece looks more broadly at trade 
law identifying the possible risk that selective purchasing, such as the 
Massachusetts Act may act as a cloak for genuinely anti-competitive practices. 
As part of this consideration the article examines in some detail the provisions of 
the WTO GPA that may impede the incorporation of secondary objectives and 
those provisions that may authorise such arrangements. This detail will not be 
explored here. 
The significance of the piece is that provides a detailed authoritative analysis of 
the GPA. A general awareness of the thrust of the GPA but a lack of familiarity 
with the detail of the agreement could form a basis to question the legitimacy of 
the general incorporation of secondary objectives. The piece provides a basis by 
which this can be responded to. 
Arrowsmith (1995) pursues similar themes to those investigated by McCrudden 
(1999) in that the focus is on legal impediments to the pursuit of secondary 
procurement objectives. However, the focus in Arrowsmith (1995) is on the role 
of procurement in the development of UK industry policy and upon the recent 
(1995) European Commission laws regarding free trade and how these may 
impact upon the UK practices. The piece though commences with a further 
useful survey of the frequent use of procurement as a tool of government to 
deliver social policy objectives. The article contains useful analysis of the role of 
procurement in furthering non-legislated industry policy objectives and the 
impact free trade regulation can have upon this. In the context of the current 
investigation, the European Commission experience considered by Arrowsmith 
(1995) has useful parallels with the development in Australia of bilateral free 
trade agreements whose obligations extend beyond the general WTO GPA 
considered by McCrudden (1999). 
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Indeed the European Union (EU) experience of the tension between the desire 
for (economic) non-discrimination and the achievement of social objectives is 
illuminating. The basic principle is contained in art 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC (the 
Procurement Directive (EU 2004) which provides: 
 
Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and non‑
discriminatorily and shall act in a transparent way. 
 
Attempts to specify social (or environmental) requirements in a tender 
specification are specifically addressed in art 23 of the Procurement Directive:. 
The requirements are described as follows by the European Commission (EC, 
2010): 
… technical specifications must not reduce competition, must be transparent 
and must not discriminate against possible contractors from outside the 
Member State of the contracting authority. 
 
The tension created from the prohibition on discrimination and the desire to use 
procurement to further social objectives has led to a number of cases before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Cases from Beentjes in 1988 (Case 31/87 - 
Beentjes [1988] ECR 04635) to Max Havelaar in 2012 (Case C- 368 European 
Commission v Kingdom of Netherlands [2012] ECR) have though suggested an 
uncomfortable and limited acceptance of such policies. As Muller-Wrede (2012, 
115) notes in the Max Havelaar case the ECJ found: 
compliance with the [tender]  “criteria of sustainability of purchases and socially 
responsible business” and the obligation to “contribute to improving the 
sustainability of the coffee market and to environmentally, socially and 
economically responsible coffee production” are not sufficiently clear, precise 
and unequivocal and therefore infringe the transparency obligation stipulated in 
Article 2 of the Directive. 
The result is that the ECJ has imposed strict controls around the use of such 
policies – demanding a strict “subject matter of the contract nexus” with the 
social policy in question (Muller-Wrede 2012, 117). 
The analysis presented above suggests there is long-standing and significant use 
of public procurement to achieve secondary objectives. So much so, that bearing 
in mind the legal obligations identified by McCrudden (1999),Arrowsmith (1995) 
and those arising under particular regimes such as the EU, the legitimacy of 
using procurement to further secondary objectives should not be able to be 
seriously questioned.  
It should not be surprising therefore that the Commonwealth Government has a 
significant number of procurement related policies in addition to the IBE. A 
number of these relate to considerations to be taken account of during a 
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procurement process. Examples of this are policies such as the National Waste 
Policy, trade sanctions, SME participation in the information and 
communications technology industry, and Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Guidelines. The Indigenous Opportunities Policy and the Workplace Gender 
Equality Procurement Principles are further examples. In these last two 
examples procurement is being used to encourage private sector adoption of 
Commonwealth Government social policies in the way described by McCrudden 
(2007a; 2007b). ANAO (2015, 116) lists 18 such ‘procurement connected 
policies’.  
In addition, as noted earlier in section 2.2.2.1, while all Commonwealth 
procurement is subject to the requirements of Division 1 of the CPR to achieve 
value for money and to maintain ethicality and transparency, Appendix A of the 
CPR sets out a range of procurement activities that are not subject to the more 
technical requirements of Division 2 of the CPR which would otherwise apply to 
the procurements above the procurement threshold. There are 17 such 
exemptions to the operation of Division 2 set out in Appendix A. The IBE is 
number 17. An exemption for “procurement of goods and services from a 
business that primarily exists to provide the services of persons with a disability” 
(DoF 2014, 33) is number 16. The other Appendix A exemptions apply to the 
procurement subject matter (real estate, labour hire etc). Thus, while the 
Commonwealth Government has a range of procurement-related policies aimed 
at pursuing broad policy agendas such as trade, the environment and security 
there are only three instances of secondary objectives aimed at particular social 
groups; women in the context of the inclusion of a requirement for 
procurements to have regard to Workplace Gender Equality Procurement 
Principles; the disabled in including that businesses that primarily exist to 
provide “the services of persons with a disability” is included in the Appendix A 
exemptions and Indigenous Australians. Indigenous Australians are the focus of 
both the IOP (and its more recent iteration in the current IPP) and the IBE. 
However the IBE is unique in that as McCrudden suggests it sets out to 
“restructure the economy more broadly … This was an attempt to stimulate the 
growth of an entrepreneurial black middle class” (McCrudden 2007, 8). 
The preceding discussion in this section examined the theoretical literature that 
considers the legitimacy of incorporating secondary objectives into public 
procurement processes. This literature indicates that incorporation of such 
secondary objectives is commonplace in many jurisdictions and is a policy tool 
that had been deployed in support of such objectives for a considerable period 
of time in both Australia and elsewhere. The discussion has also identified the 
distinction between price and value in public procurement and shown that price 
alone is not necessarily a determinative factor in making procurement decisions. 
41 
 
Further empirical research has been traversed that even in relation to price it 
cannot be automatically assumed that incorporation of secondary objectives 
through mechanisms such as the IBE will lead to an increase in the direct price of 
procurement. 
The following section of this Chapter moves away from consideration of the 
legitimacy of the incorporation of secondary objective policies to considering the 
effectiveness of those policies in achieving their stated objectives. 
2.5. Effectiveness of the Mechanisms 
Given the early experience of the IBE it is reasonable to consider whether 
secondary objective procurement policies are effective at all. Some of the 
literature that considers the legitimacy of secondary objective procurement 
programs for the advantage of Indigenous peoples has been examined above. 
However, there is little published research that considers the effectiveness of 
these programs. This section aims to examine some of the literature that is 
available. Before doing so however it is necessary to consider whether there is 
some empirical foundation to support the inference that a procurement 
program effective in increasing the economic activity amongst Indigenous 
suppliers will also then be effective in reducing Indigenous disadvantage. This 
threshold consideration follows immediately below. 
2.5.1. The Link between Indigenous Enterprise and Indigenous Well-Being 
The report Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2014, produced 
by the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision 
(SCRGSP 2014) is a recent and comprehensive evidence source. The Report 
provides evidence in regards to key disadvantage indicators such as: 
• Life expectancy; 
• Young child mortality; 
• Early childhood education; 
• Literacy and numeracy; 
• Year 12 attainment; 
• Post-secondary education participation and attainment; 
• Employment; and 
• Household and individual income. 
The Report shows that Indigenous Australians are at a considerable, at times 
devastating, disadvantage when compared to the broader Australian 
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community. More recently this conclusion has been reiterated by the DPMC in 
the 2015 Closing the Gap Report (DPMC 2015a). 
As noted in the introduction to this discussion, the aspects of this multiple 
disadvantage are statistically correlated. That is for example, an Indigenous 
Australian who is not in the labour force is also more likely to have lower 
educational standards, poorer health status and less adequate accommodation 
than an Indigenous Australian who is in the labour force (SCRGSP 2014, 3112-
3123). 
Given this correlation, an increase in the number of Indigenous Australians in the 
labour force should consequentially lead to a reduction in the social 
disadvantage suffered by Indigenous Australians. This expectation is supported 
by empirical research (Altman 2001; Furneaux & Brown 2008; Biddle 2011). 
Intuitively one would expect that an Indigenous-owned firm is more likely to 
employ Indigenous people. 
This proposition is also supported by the available research. For example, Hunter 
(2014) concludes that Indigenous-owned or jointly owned business report on 
average a 64 per cent Indigenous workforce. The figure for majority-owned 
Indigenous businesses were 72.4 per cent. The equivalent figure for non-
Indigenous businesses is 0.7 per cent. Other researchers have reached similar 
conclusions (Foley, 2000). 
Hunter’s general conclusion is strongly supported by Morrison et al (2014). The 
study by Morrison et al involved a quantitative analysis of 324 Indigenous 
entrepreneurs across the private (n=263), community (n=51) and cooperative 
(n=10) sectors. The Indigenous businesses surveyed were 50 per cent or more 
Indigenous-owned. Respondents were located in remote, rural and urban 
settings and involved in over 19 industry sectors. There was additional 
quantitative research to further investigate some aspects. Businesses included in 
the study ranged in size from 1 to 450 employees. One hundred and eighty-nine 
or 58.9 per cent employed less than three people. Six employed greater than 100 
people. In summary, of 321 Indigenous businesses 67.8 per cent had more than 
50 per cent Indigenous employees. The median number of Indigenous 
employees across all firms was one (Morrison et al 2014, 173).  
A more detailed analysis is contained in the following table (Morrison et al 2014, 
176, Table 49): 
  
43 
 
 
Percentage of 
Employees that 
are Indigenous N 
Respondents 
Urban Regional Remotes Private Community Cooperative 
0% 16 6 8 2 10 4 2 
  5% 3.6% 7.4% 4.5% 3.8% 8.5% 20% 
1-10% 2 2 2   
  0.6% 1.2% 0.8%   
11-25% 20 9 6 5 19 1   
  6.2% 5.3% 5.6% 11.4% 7.3% 2.1%   
26-50% 66 32 18 15 53 10 1 
  20.2% 18.9% 16.7% 34.1% 20.2% 21.3% 10% 
51-67% 32 17 10 5 22 9 1 
  10% 10.1% 9.3% 11.4% 8.4% 19.1% 10% 
68-75% 12 6 3 3 5 7   
  3.7% 3.6% 2.8% 6.8% 1.9% 14.9%   
76-100% 173 96 63 14 150 16 6 
  53.9% 56.8% 58.3% 31.8% 57.3% 34% 60% 
Total 320 168 108 44 261 47 10 
 
The study also reported that the Indigenous businesses involved would prefer to 
employ greater number of Indigenous employees: 72.8 per cent (Morrison et al 
2014, 178) but often encountered supply limitations to this ambition. 
These findings would suggest that in terms of the total number of Indigenous 
employees the six firms that employed more than a hundred employees at least 
50 per cent of which were Indigenous would employ more Indigenous people 
than the 189 micro firms. 
These findings allow us to conclude that since an increase in Commonwealth 
government purchasing of goods and services from Indigenous-owned 
enterprises leads to an increase in the level of economic activity undertaken by 
these firms, then this should lead to an increase in the number of Indigenous 
Australians in the labour force and a reduction in Indigenous social disadvantage.  
There is also private sector evidence to suggest that procurement schemes 
targeting Indigenous enterprise lead to an increase in economic activity by these 
firms. For example, the Creating Parity Report (DPMC 2014) noted that one 
corporation, FMG, has awarded 156 contracts since 2011 with a total value of 
$1.56 billion to over 50 Indigenous businesses. 
Having dealt with this threshold consideration it is next necessary to consider 
how the effectiveness of a program such as the IBE can be measured. 
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2.5.2. The Measurement of Effectiveness 
In the context of procurement, ‘monitoring’ can refer to the process of contract 
management by the procuring agency. For the purposes of this discussion the 
monitoring and evaluation under examination is that of the effectiveness of the 
IBE, in particular the collection of data regarding the award of contracts under 
the IBE and consequently the identification of methods to increase the rate of 
award of contracts. In the context of the IBE as an effective policy measure, the 
collection of data confirming the connection between the award of contracts to 
Indigenous enterprise and reduction in Indigenous disadvantage and if need be 
adjustments in the program to enhance this connection would also be an 
important part of monitoring and evaluation. 
The development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation methods is 
of course essentially a discipline in its own right (Markiewicz & Patrick 2015) and 
it is beyond the scope of this discussion to do justice to this body of knowledge. 
However, it is appropriate to identify some key components of an effective 
monitoring and evaluation approach to secondary objective public procurement 
programs. It is useful to provide some definitions at the outset. 
The OECD defines the term ‘monitoring’ as follows (2015, 27): 
Monitoring is a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of 
data on specified indicators to provide management and the main 
stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of 
the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the 
use of allocated funds.  
In the same document ‘evaluation’ is also defined (2015, 21): 
Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or 
completed project, program, or policy, including its design, 
implementation, and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and 
fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and 
sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and 
useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision 
making process of both recipients and donors.  
The discrete nature of the functions of monitoring on the one hand and 
evaluation on the other is clear in Storey’s (2008) suggested six-step approach to 
the monitoring and evaluation of procurement specific and other SME targeted 
policies which can be summarised as follows: 
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Monitoring 
Step 1   Take up of program 
Step 2   Recipient opinions 
Step 3   Recipient views of impact of program 
 
Evaluation 
Step 4    Comparison of assisted firms with ‘typical’ firms 
Step 5   Comparison with matched firms 
Step 6   Selection bias taken into account 
 
Storey goes on to note that while steps 1 to 3 are often undertaken it is rare that 
a comparison with a ‘control group’ as required in steps 4 to 6 are. The 
methodology outlined by Storey and the view that most program review 
activities are limited to the monitoring and not the evaluation of funding is also a 
feature of the more recent analysis of SME policies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean undertaken by Acevedo and Tan (2010) for the World Bank.  
To date, with the limited exception of the 2015-16 DPMC data and the ANAO 
Report (ANAO 2015) which reported against Step 1 (albeit partially) and to a 
limited extent Step 2 of the methodology suggested above, there has been no 
thorough going work that has undertaken a monitoring exercise of the IBE let 
alone the control group based evaluation suggested by authors such as Storey 
(2008) and Acevedo and Tan (2010).  
In the absence of an existing comprehensive evaluation and monitoring program 
it is useful to consider reports of evaluation of similar secondary objective 
procurement programs in other jurisdictions. 
2.5.3. Are Secondary Objective Policies Effective? 
‘Effective’ in the context of the immediate discussion should be taken to have 
two aspects. First whether Indigenous businesses participate in the procurement 
program so as to improve the proportion of government contracts being 
awarded to Indigenous firms. This aspect of effective is also influenced by 
consideration of whether the cost of the procurement program was such as to 
suggest there were other more efficient means of increasing Indigenous business 
participation. The second aspect is whether Indigenous businesses participation 
in the procurement program improves the overall levels of Indigenous well-
being. This latter matter was considered in section 2.5.1. above. It remains now 
to consider the first aspect.  
Material from the US (particularly in light of the ‘strict scrutiny’ requirement 
arising from Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena 115 US 2097 (1995)) and relating to 
secondary objective procurement programs designed to assist minority- and 
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women-owned business is the most fruitful. This indicates that while minority 
(including Native American-owned) businesses still receive disproportionately 
fewer government contracts the disparity is less marked in areas where special 
measure procurement programs (in the nature of the IBE) are in place 
(Enchautegui et al 1997). Further, as at 2003, of six surveyed US federal 
government departments, four exceeded the overall government target of a 5 
per cent procurement from socially disadvantaged businesses as did the federal 
government procurement overall (US Commission 2005). These general 
conclusions are supported by an analysis of a specific program (in Erie County, 
New York) which indicated that while the program was effective in developing 
women- and minority-owned business that participated in the procurement 
program, there was a limited take up of the program (Wallace 1999). 
Aside from this generally quite high-level data, however, there is little empirical 
analysis of the effectiveness of a particular secondary objective procurement 
programs designed to benefit Indigenous businesses. This shortcoming in the 
analysis of secondary objective procurement programs has been noted also in 
the context of programs intended to benefit SME generally (not specifically 
Indigenous SMEs). Often the high-level data can obscure the success or 
otherwise of particular programs (Nicholas & Fruhmann 2014; Freeman 2013). 
With this in mind it is useful to consider analysis of the effectiveness of some 
particular secondary objective procurement programs. Similarly to the use of 
literature regarding the impediments to SME participation in public procurement 
and the policies developed in response to this (section 2.3 above) the absence of 
data in respect of the effectiveness of Indigenous-targeted programs, analysis of 
SME targeted programs act as a useful proxy also in the analysis of effectiveness.  
Athey, Coey and Levin (2013) examine small business set asides in US Forest 
Service contracts and conclude that the set aside mechanism does achieve 
higher small business participation but also imposes higher costs. The authors 
suggest that a subsidy mechanism would produce more favourable (in terms of 
price and efficiency) results. Nakabayashi (2013) examined the effect of small 
business set-asides in Japanese public construction contracts. The author 
concluded that if the set-asides were removed there would be a significant exit 
of SME from the construction procurement market and that the resultant 
reduction in competition would operate to increase procurement costs. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Reis and Cabral (2015). These authors considered the 
effect of the introduction of Brazilian federal law that allowed SME set-asides for 
contracts of a value of less than US$35,000 and a 5 per cent bid preference in 
other tenders. They concluded that the introduction of the law did not affect 
prices and did facilitate a significant increase in SME procurement participation. 
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However, there was also an increase in post contract termination for poor 
performance. Unless remedial measures were put in place this would inevitably 
increase the overall cost of procurement. Examining preferential bank financing 
programs for SME, Freeman (2013) is dubious in relation to their effectiveness. 
In a study involving 800 firms employing from less than 10 to greater than 250 
employees in the UK Georghiou et al (2014) found that while procurement 
policies were targeted at the barriers faced by firms they were ineffective in 
removing them. Similarly, Nicholas and Fruhmann (2014) raise questions about 
the effectiveness of SME targeted procurement programs intended to foster 
innovation. 
The mixed assessment revealed by even this small survey of analysis of the 
effectiveness of secondary objective procurement programs highlights a number 
of issues in relation to such programs. First, the high level data from the US 
suggests that overall such programs do tend to foster targeted businesses 
although do not of themselves eliminate disparate access to government 
procurement opportunities. Second, assessment of the results for procurement 
programs of differing designs (not surprisingly) differ.  
These factors point to the importance of putting in place arrangements for 
monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the IBE and, if need be, 
adjusting the design of the program in light of the results of that monitoring to 
improve its effectiveness.  
2.6. Literature Review Conclusions 
This literature review has been necessarily broad ranging. A significant portion of 
it has involved the foundational tasks of exploring the definitions of 
procurement in general and public procurement in particular. An aspect of this 
exploration was an exposition of the processes of Commonwealth procurement 
that form the context of the discussion of the operation of the IBE. Despite this 
breadth of coverage a number of key themes have emerged. These are that: 
• The processes of procurement in both the public and private sectors are 
essentially similar. The distinction is the environmental and contextual 
factors (for example legal, policy, cultural factors (Johnston & Lewin 
1996; Thai 2001). 
• Generally participation by SME in the public procurement is seen as 
positive but a number of currently identified impediments to such 
participation include (Flynn, McKevitt & Davis 2015): 
o Bureaucracy; 
o Lack of communication between SMEs and public procurers and 
too much weighting on cost; 
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o SME lack of knowledge over how to source opportunities or 
engage with procedural aspects of tendering; 
o Onerous tender documentation and unprofessional procurement 
staff; 
o Time demands of completing tender documentation; 
o Requirements of previous relevant experience and financial costs 
of tendering; and 
o Large contract size and information asymmetries.  
• Mechanisms to overcome these impediments include (Akenroe & Aju 
2013): 
o Broad procurement reform (bureaucratic simplification); 
o Subsidies; 
o Capacity building; and 
o Targets. 
• The issue of the legitimacy of pursuing secondary objectives within the 
public procurement process is impacted upon by various competing 
‘strands’ within procurement ideological discourse. Erridge and McIlroy 
(2002) identify three such strands: 
o Commercial (minimum price); 
o Regulatory (transparency and accountability; and 
o  Socio-economic (rectifying imperfect markets and nature of 
public enterprise). 
• In addition, while there are various analyses of the cost of including 
secondary objectives the outcomes (for example, Denes 1997) of which 
may depend on the objective pursued, the incorporation of secondary 
objectives in public procurement has been a policy tool deployed by 
governments for centuries (McCrudden 2004).  
• In the context of Indigenous preferential procurement programs such as 
the IBE there is significant empirical evidence both as to existing 
Indigenous disadvantage; that participation in the workforce reduces this 
disadvantage (SCRGSP 2014; Biddle 2011) and that Indigenous firms are 
significantly more likely to employ Indigenous people (Morrison et al 
2014; Hunter 2014). 
• While there are some broadly mixed data there is empirical evidence 
(primarily for the US) to support the proposition that procurement 
programs targeted at ‘minority’ are effective in increasing economic 
activity by these groups (US Commission 2005) but that there is 
inadequate monitoring and particularly evaluation of such programs 
(Storey 2008). 
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The application of these propositions will be considered in light of the research 
outcomes. 
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 CHAPTER 3 − METHODS 
3.1. Overview 
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify the methodological approach that was 
adopted in the research project. In summary the Chapter indicates that the 
project utilised a method involving a primarily semi-structured interview of 
stakeholders and where possible documentary content analysis (this was 
undertaken in the literature review). A research method involving such a 
combination of sources to examine a bounded phenomenon (Noor 2008) can be 
described as a case study method. The unit of analysis adopted for the purposes 
of this research is the stakeholder. The research is undertaken within an overall 
paradigm that adopts the pragmatic approach to analysis. 
To demonstrate the appropriateness and validity of these approaches the 
Chapter proceeds in several sections. The following section 3.2 will consider the 
research approach or paradigm that was adopted in the course of this 
investigation. While various approaches (paradigms) may have relevance to an 
investigation of the research problem, the approach considered most relevant is 
what is described as the ‘pragmatic approach’. This is because of the strong 
focus the pragmatic approach places on the objective of the research. As 
Cherryholmes notes: “[I]t is driven by anticipated consequences” (1992, 13). As 
was stated in the introductory chapter an explicit purpose of this research is to 
identify measures that can be taken to improve the IBE and the IPP more 
generally. As discussed in section 3.2 below it is this concise objective that 
renders the pragmatic approach appropriate.  
Section 3.3 of this Chapter discusses the methodology that was employed as the 
foundation to the investigation. The section identifies that a determining factor 
in the framing of the investigation’s methodological approach is the paucity of 
existing data regarding the IBE. Essentially the existing data comprises minimal 
working documents from government departments. The section identifies that 
while these documents should certainly be analysed as part of the investigation 
it will also be necessary to generate primary data. The section discusses the 
three main forms of primary data generation: direct observation, interviews, and 
questionnaire survey (Snow & Thomas 1994; Patton 2002).  
Of these forms of primary data generation, section 3.3 concludes that the 
transactional nature of the phenomenon under investigation and its relative 
novelty indicate that interviews with stakeholders in the IBE is the most 
appropriate method to generate primary data. In particular, the ‘semi-structured 
interview’ is seen as providing the necessary combination of ensuring relevance 
while allowing for flexibility of response. The section then identifies that the 
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combination of content analysis of the limited existing documents and 
interviews with stakeholders indicates that the methodological approach to be 
adopted is best described as ‘case study’ with the unit of analysis being the 
individual stakeholders who are interviewed.  
The section then examines the issue of the validity of a case study approach 
where stakeholder interview is the predominant method of generating primary 
data. The section concludes that while there may be legitimate questions raised 
about the validity of the case study methodology, these concerns can be 
addressed by an explicit statement of the known shortcomings and an 
acknowledgement of these. 
Section 3.4 describes the implementation of the selected methodology. With 
reference to relevant literature, the section analyses the nature of a 
‘stakeholder’. It identifies that while there are various and broad definitions of 
stakeholder the most relevant for the purposes of this investigation is that of 
actively involved stakeholders (Achterkamp & Vos 2008). Actively involved 
stakeholders comprise three main groups: clients, decision-makers, and 
designers. This theoretical description is then translated to the specific context 
of the IBE. Thus translated, the stakeholders are: Indigenous firms (who 
constitute the decision-makers), the Commonwealth agencies engaging in 
procurement (the clients) and those individuals and agencies responsible for the 
development and oversight of the policy (the designers). Section 3.4 then 
proceeds to set out the five questions (although in a semi-structured interview 
‘prompts’ may at times be a more appropriate description) that were put to the 
individuals constituting (or representing) these stakeholders and sets out in 
tabular form how these interview questions are relevant to the identified 
research subquestions. 
The concluding section 3.5 reviews the process of analysis of the transcript 
analysis through the coding process and the necessary limitations of this process. 
3.2. The Research Paradigm 
3.2.1. Relevance of a Paradigm 
As noted earlier, the current research is guided by a number of assumptions. 
Primarily these are that: it is desirable to reduce the economic disadvantage 
suffered by Indigenous Australians; and that this goal can be achieved by 
improving the effectiveness of the IBE and the IPP of which it is now part. Given 
these explicit assumptions it is appropriate to consider an accurate explicit 
statement of an appropriate research paradigm.  
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A paradigm can be relevantly described as “the basic belief system or worldview 
that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but ontologically and 
epistemologically in fundamental ways” (Lincoln & Guba 2004, 105). Creswell 
(2013, 19-20) identifies that paradigms have also been described as ‘alternative 
knowledge claims’, ‘broadly conceived research methodologies’ or 
‘interpretative frameworks’. While Lincoln and Guba (2004) conceive of the 
paradigm as involving (or being determined by) questions of ontology, 
epistemology and methodology, Creswell (2013) would include axiology as a 
central component. The role of values is acknowledged by Lincoln and Guba 
(2004, 112) but not given by those authors as central a status as Creswell (2013). 
In short, a paradigm can be described as “a basic set of beliefs that guides 
action” (Guba cited in Creswell, 2013, 18). 
While inevitably each individual investigator has a somewhat unique set of basic 
beliefs and thus research paradigms, various authors have categorised these 
paradigms in general terms. At its broadest level, paradigms could be analysed 
on the basis of those interpretative frameworks that suggest there is a universal 
knowable reality and those that suggest that reality is a culturally defined 
construct existing within a particular historical juncture. The former approach is 
associated with positivist and postpositivist paradigms. The (at least probably) 
knowable nature of reality of these paradigms suggests an epistemology that 
separates inquirer from the inquiry. Quantitative research may generally be seen 
as falling within this paradigm. Although as Creswell (2013) notes, much 
qualitative research in areas such as health sciences where qualitative research 
is often ancillary to quantitative investigation and is bounded within a post-
positivist paradigm. By contrast research paradigms identified by terms such as 
constructivist, postmodern, pragmatic or critical theorist (to name only some) 
proceed on a basis that essentially reality is a cultural construct. These may also 
be termed ‘metaphysical paradigms’ (Morgan 2007, 57). Thus the research 
process, its findings and consequences are influenced by cultural factors such as 
who is undertaking it, when it is undertaken, what the researcher’s objectives 
are and the attitude of the researched. The identification of these issues is seen 
as an important component of the research methodology. 
Of this second category much is written of the constructivist paradigm. A central 
tenant of the constructivist approach is summarised in the following (Lincoln, 
Lynham & Guba 2011, 102): 
To me this means that we construct knowledge through our lived 
experiences and through our interactions with other members of society. 
As such, as researchers, we must participate in the research process with 
our subjects to ensure we are producing knowledge which is reflective of 
their reality. 
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The same authors suggest a further feature of a constructivist approach is an 
emphasis on ‘trustworthiness’, ‘credibility’, ‘authenticity’, ‘transferability’ and 
‘confirmability’ as an indication of ‘goodness’ or quality of research (Lincoln, 
Lynham & Guba 2011, 109). These characteristics they argue give research 
‘validity’ (cf correctness) amongst participants and position the research as a 
basis for action.  
3.2.2. An Appropriate Paradigm 
The constructionist emphasis on ‘validity’ as a measure of the quality of research 
and a foundation for policy development is attractive in the context of the 
nominated research problem. However, the constructionist conception of 
validity as “producing a knowledge which is reflective of [the] reality” (Lincoln, 
Lynham & Guba 2011, 109) of both researcher and subjects is problematic. In the 
context of the nominated research problem quite conceivably the constructivist 
reality would be one founded upon the potentially racist views of some 
stakeholders. This raises a question as to whether it is acceptable to the 
researcher to give ‘voice’ to the racist. The answer to this question can only be 
‘no’. 
This emphasis on race points to consideration of a further example of the second 
category of paradigm: critical race theory (‘CRT’). Parker and Lynn (2002, 10) 
suggest that CRT has three objectives: to present narratives as valid approach to 
examining race and racism in society; to argue for the eradication of racism and 
develop an understanding that race is a social construct; and to develop an 
understanding of the relationship between race and other ‘axes of domination’. 
‘Race’ in this context should be understood in a social, historical, political and 
cultural context. It is not seen necessarily (or even) simply biologically (Ladson-
Billings 1998). Parker and Lynn (2002) argue CRT relies heavily on narrative for 
two reasons. First, it has its origins in legal discourse where narrative is a 
legitimate (in fact arguably the dominant) form data collection; and, second, 
because the narrative provided a mechanism for giving voice to communities 
long silenced by institutional structures. As Parker and Lynn describe (2002, 11): 
The thick descriptions and interviews, characteristic of case study research, 
not only serve illuminative purposes but also can be used to document 
institutional as well as overt racism. The interviewing process can be pulled 
together to create narratives that can be used to build a case against 
racially biased officials or discriminatory practices. 
At first blush then CRT would appear to provide an appropriate paradigm within 
which to investigate the nominated research problem. However, this may not be 
the case for the reason: that the axiological foundation of CRT is based in race 
and racism (Villenas & Deyhle 1998; Ladson-Billings 1998). By contrast, the 
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research problem, while clearly investigating a racial phenomenon, is not 
assuming a foundation in racism. Almost to the contrary the research problem 
proposes to investigate the apparent failure of a positively discriminatory 
measure. Similarly, the research is not primarily aimed at giving voice to 
Indigenous Australians any more than it is aimed at giving voice to officials of the 
Commonwealth Government. Thus, while the research explicitly has a 
transformational objective (to improve the efficacy of a positively discriminatory 
measure) it would not appear to be founded in CRT as it does not take racism as 
axiomatic. This noted it must also be stated that the research has suggested that 
some manifestations of historical or contemporary racist attitudes towards the 
abilities of Indigenous entrepreneurs and their firms. 
3.2.3. A Non-Paradigm: The Pragmatic Approach 
A further paradigm approach that has a keen focus on the outcomes of research 
is often termed ‘pragmatic’ (Cherryholmes 1992), although proponents of this 
approach eschew the term ‘paradigm’ (Morgan, 2007 66). Adherents of the 
pragmatic approach appreciate that research is undertaken in “social, political 
and other contexts” (Cherryholmes 1992, 14). The approach suggests that there 
is an “external world independent of our minds” (Cherryholmes 1992, 14); 
however, it also accepts that the question of whether or not any particular 
representation of that real world is accurate, is unknowable. Rather, “truth is 
what works at the time. It is not based on a dualism between reality 
independent of mind or within the mind” (Creswell 2013, 28). Cherryholmes 
goes on to identify the core of the pragmatic tradition (1992, 13): 
Pragmatic research is driven by anticipated consequences. Pragmatic 
choices about what to research and how to go about it are conditioned by 
where we want to go in the broadest of senses. Values, aesthetics, politics 
and social and normative preferences are integral to pragmatic research its 
interpretation and utilization. 
In short, the researcher’s objective (informed by their own value system) informs 
both what and how to research. The research process assists in achieving the 
desired objective: “[I]t is not the abstract pursuit of knowledge through ‘inquiry’ 
that is central to a pragmatic approach but rather the attempt to gain knowledge 
in the pursuit of desired ends” (Morgan, 2007, 69). 
It was acknowledged that the nominated research problem brought with it a 
number of implied values. The purpose of the research explicitly is to develop a 
research foundation not just for further action but for further action to achieve 
particular objectives that are informed by the researcher’s values. While these 
values encompass a denial of the validity of racism, the research problem is not 
(necessarily) founded upon a racial analysis of the subject matter. These 
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considerations suggest that the appropriate paradigm for the research is that 
identified above as ‘pragmatic’. With this conclusion in mind, it remains to 
demonstrate what is the most appropriate research methodology to give effect 
to:  
• the research ‘paradigm’ adopted;  
• the particular research problem context; and 
• the explicit objectives of undertaking the investigation.  
This task is undertaken in the following section. 
3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. The Methodological Context 
The Policy under investigation was put in place in 2011. However, as is apparent 
from the literature review section of this discussion, with the exception of the 
contribution of the ANAO (2015) there has been no thorough going appraisal of 
the policy undertaken at this time. However, as noted earlier, the main catalyst 
to undertake the current investigation is the fact that there have been very few 
instances where the IBE has been utilised. Necessarily then the volume of 
relevant documents is severely limited.  
The absence of existing significant data relating to the IBE suggests it is 
necessary to generate this information. In the absence of pre-existing 
information in the form of written documents, generally three main methods of 
generating data in social sciences are identified: direct observation, interviews 
and questionnaire survey (Snow & Thomas 1994; Patton 2002).  
As noted in section 3.1, the following analysis will conclude that of these options 
the most appropriate method for generating primary data in the context of the 
IBE is semi-structured interviews of relevant stakeholders. The results of these 
interviews and the limited documentary material that is available constitute the 
data for the purposes of the investigation. The use of different sources of 
evidence to investigate a particular bounded phenomenon (Noor 2008) would 
suggest that in aggregate the approach to be taken to the investigation is 
appropriately described as the ‘case study method’.  
Following this contextualising introduction this section will proceed to: 
• Establish why it is asserted that the interview was the most appropriate 
method to generate new data; 
• Consider the variety of interview approaches that were possible and 
conclude that the semi-structured interview was the most appropriate in 
the current investigation; and 
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• Consider issues relating to the validity of the case study approach 
adopted. 
The following section 3.4 will consider the identity of the interviewees in the 
context of an analysis of stakeholder concept as it applies to an investigation of 
the IBE. 
3.3.2. Direct Observation, Survey or Interview?  
The nature of the phenomenon investigated (the processes of government 
procurement) suggested direct observation was not an appropriate method for 
data generation. This is because the process from identification of need by the 
government/purchaser to ultimate conclusion of contract with supplier and 
subsequent discharge of obligation under the contract can take a number of 
years, often with long periods of little activity and significant confidentiality 
requirements. Direct observation by contrast is an effective method to observe a 
particular instant transaction (Wells & Lo Sciuto 1966) or if the researcher has 
the opportunity to stay in the field for the period over which the phenomenon 
occurs (Walsham 2006). This is impractical in the context of government 
procurement. 
Survey or interview methods are the two possible remaining techniques. The 
survey approach was rejected for the following reasons. A survey approach is 
generally seen as having the advantage of its “efficiency in generating large 
amounts of data that can be subject to statistical analysis” (Snow & Thomas 
1994, 462). The survey does though have two major drawbacks. First, a low 
response rate and small sample can undermine the credibility of the study 
(Gable 1994). Second, the instrument is not flexible. Once the instrument has 
been designed, trialled and deployed it cannot be amended to reflect the 
preliminary information gathered as part of the research process without 
developing and administering a new survey instrument (Gable 1994). The static 
nature of the survey also indicates it is an appropriate method to test a pre-
existing hypothesis but not as apposite in the development of hypotheses. 
(Gable 1994). In the instant case, where there has been no previous work 
considering the research problem, the static nature of the survey therefore 
appeared inappropriate. 
The fact that the IBE appears to have been utilised on so few occasions pointed 
both to the inappropriateness of survey techniques and to the desirability of the 
interview as a primary data generation technique. This is because the small 
population size of engaged individuals and organisations created an opportunity 
to gain information from a large proportion of the stakeholder population but 
militated against a purely statistical analysis of this population. (The term 
‘stakeholder’ is described below in section 3.4). The interview allowed for a 
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depth of insight from this small but comprehensive group of potential 
informants (Atkins 1984). Further, the interview can be sufficiently flexible so 
that information gained during the course of the research process can be 
integrated into subsequent interviews and, if need be, additional propositions to 
be explored in further interviews with informants (Qu & Dumay 2011). A further 
factor that pointed to interview as the desired approach is the absence of any 
previous research in relation to the research problem. The absence of previous 
research inevitably means that theories to explain the phenomenon to be 
explored can only be entirely speculative. In such a situation the greater depth 
made possible by the interview facilitated the development of explanatory 
theory that can be tested by research with a greater emphasis on quantitative 
approaches at a later time (Diefenbach 2009; Chetty 1996; Decrop 1999). 
Having concluded that the interview was indeed the most appropriate technique 
for additional data generation it is necessary to further examine what 
constitutes an interview and what form of interview is most appropriate in the 
circumstances of the current investigation. 
3.3.3. The Interview 
An ‘interview’ has been defined as “a verbal exchange often face to face, though 
the telephone may be used, in which an interviewer tries to elicit information, 
beliefs or opinions from another person” (Burns, cited in Kumar 2014, 177). 
Snow and Thomas (1994) identify five types of interview:  
• open-ended;  
• structured; 
• group; 
• longitudinal; and  
• telephone.  
However, these classifications cannot be exclusive (an open-ended, longitudinal 
telephone interview is possible for example). Taking then the fundamental 
distinction between an open ended (or semi-structured) and a structured 
interview the question is which model was appropriate in the circumstances of 
this investigation?  
There is a clear distinction between structured and semi-structured interviews. 
In a structured interview exactly the same questions are asked of each 
respondent in as much as possible the same way and often with limited response 
options (Qu & Dumay 2011; Kajornboon 2005). This has the advantage of 
facilitating coding and analysis but has the disadvantage of discouraging or 
preventing probing into the respondents’ answers. By contrast in a semi-
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structured interview, while the interviewer has a list of themes, issues and 
questions to explore these, the order and content of the questions can be 
altered to facilitate probing, provide clarification and encourage a conversation 
(Qu & Dumay 2011). It “offers sufficient flexibility to approach different 
respondents differently while still covering the same areas of data collection” 
(Noor 2008, 1604). 
The structured interview is more akin to a verbal questionnaire and more apt to 
the testing of hypothesis. A multiple choice interview or questionnaire is a clear 
example. Here the researcher has sufficient confidence in their understanding of 
the phenomenon being investigated so as to pose a finite range of responses to 
the questions put to the informant. (Atkins 1984). The “rich and interesting” 
(Atkins 1984, 253) data produced by a semi-structured interview is more 
appropriate to the development of such a hypothesis (Qu & Dumay 2011). In the 
circumstances of the current investigation where, as noted earlier, there was 
little existing research and a complex phenomenon to be explored, the semi-
structured interview appeared the most appropriate. 
Some information derived from semi-structured interview can yield both 
nominal and ordinal data that will be susceptible to quantitative analysis (Atkins 
1984). To do so involves coding of the data gleaned from interviews. The process 
of coding itself involves consideration of a range of factors including the raw 
data itself, the issues raised in relevant literature, and potentially any hypothesis 
posited by the researcher (DeCuir-Gunby, Marshal & McCulloch 2011).The 
description of the coding process in respect of the current study is contained in 
the following section.  
Accordingly, as noted in section 3.3.1 above, the research methods employed 
that in aggregate the approach taken to the investigation was best described as 
the ‘case study method’. The following subsection considers issues associated 
with the validity of the case study method, particularly in the situation where the 
results of interviews constitute a significant component of case study data. 
3.3.4. Case Study and Validity 
 A number of definitions of ‘case study’ have been proposed. A common 
definition (Chetty 1996; Noor 2008) is that developed by Yin (1989, 22): 
[T]he term refers to an event, an entity, an individual or even a unit of 
analysis. It is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence. 
Having assigned the research method as ‘case study’, it is appropriate to briefly 
consider the issue of the ‘validity’ that can be ascribed to results produced by 
this method. There are four criteria generally agreed for assessing qualitative 
59 
 
research: credibility (internal validity); transferability (external validity); 
dependability (reliability); and confirmability (objectivity) (Lincoln & Guba 1985; 
Reige 2003). Decrop (1999, 158) illustrates these criteria with the following 
questions: 
• Credibility – how truthful are particular findings? 
• Transferability – how applicable are the research findings to another setting or 
group? 
• Dependability − are the results consistent and reproducible? 
• Confirmability – How neutral are the findings (in terms of whether they are 
reflective of the informants and the inquiry and not a product of the researcher’s 
biases and prejudices)? 
There is a substantial volume of literature that considers the soundness of the 
case study method in relation to these criteria (see for example Chetty 1996; 
Decrop 1999; Angen 2000; Reige 2003). Diefenbach (2009, 876) provides a 
succinct yet comprehensive summary of the concerns that have been expressed 
around the use of case study method: 
Major areas of concerns are the influence of the researcher on the research 
design, weaknesses and limits of methods and theories, the selection of the 
units of investigation, interviewees and other data sources, the sufficiency 
and reliability of the sources of information, internal validity (truthfulness 
of the data) selection and grouping, interpretation and presentation of 
data, external validity (generalisation of the findings) testing of theory, as 
well as relation between social sciences and social. 
Despite this apparent litany of doubt much of the literature raising concern 
about aspects of a case study approach also identifies methods by which these 
concerns can be allayed. For example Diefenbach (2009) suggests that issues of a 
researcher’s political perspective affecting the research process can be 
ameliorated by making this perspective explicit; that the absence of a pre-
defined research question can be of benefit in an exploratory qualitative 
process; and that issues of generalisability only arise if it assumed that case 
study based research outcomes should have a predictive function.  
In the context of the soundness of data collection, a case study approach could 
be challenged on the basis that the selection of the unit of investigation or 
interviewees was unduly influenced by the views and attitudes of the researcher 
or organisational gatekeepers. There are two responses to this challenge. The 
first is to appreciate that the case study is not seeking a quantitative 
representative sample. The second response is again that therefore it is 
incumbent on the researcher to make the basis of the selection of unit of 
investigation and interviewees explicit in order that the reader is aware of the 
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choices that have been made in the research process (Angen 2000; Diefenbach 
2009).  
The internal validity of case study data can also be a basis for concern. In essence 
this is a concern going to whether the interview (or other method) collects the 
relevant data or indeed whether the interviewee (knowingly or unknowingly) 
provides inaccurate information. Some level of comfort in this regard can be 
derived from the use of ‘triangulation’ (Jick 1979; Decrop 1999; Diefenbach 
2009). Essentially this involves confirming the concurrence of data from a 
number − preferably three − (Decrop 1999) of different sources. In the current 
investigation the main source of information was the interviews. However, 
triangulation can occur within sources; for example, one interview to another 
(Reige 2003; Diefenbach 2009). Thus, triangulation within the respondents was 
possible. 
A further significant concern that can be raised regarding the internal validity of 
the data goes to the role of the researcher in determining what data is included 
for consideration and how this data is organised − what Diefenbach called 
‘selection and grouping’ (2009, 884). This concern identifies the fact that it is 
inevitably a subjective determination by the researcher as to what, out of the 
volume of data produced by numerous interviews or documents, is included for 
consideration and how this is grouped for analysis. The process of coding is a 
clear example of grouping. Similar concerns can be expressed in relation to the 
writing up of the data that is analysed. A number of mechanisms are possible to 
address this concern. Having more than one researcher involved in the process is 
commonly suggested (Atkins 1984; Reige 2003; Diefenbach 2009). Unfortunately 
this approach was not feasible in the current project. In addition though, 
mechanisms such as mechanical recording of data and confirmation of summary 
of interviews with respondents can be deployed (Reige 2003). Both these were 
employed in the current investigation. Ultimately though there must be a 
“degree of trust in the diligence in and integrity of the researcher” (Pyett cited in 
Diefenbach 2009, 885; see also Angen 2000) because ultimately decisions 
regarding the selection, analysis and presentation of data and their 
interpretation can only be subjective. While this can be portrayed as a weakness 
of the qualitative case study method, it is also its strength in that it allows for 
human creativity in the development of analysis (Diefenbach 2009). 
Having identified that a number of the concerns regarding the validity of a case 
study approach can at least be ameliorated by an explicit in relation to the 
identified matters, it is appropriate at this point to summarise these matters. 
• The researcher’s interest in some of the organisations involved in the 
research has been disclosed in the introduction. 
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• The research considers it desirable to reduce the economic disadvantage 
suffered by Indigenous Australians, and that this goal can be achieved by 
improving the effectiveness of the Commonwealth’s IPP policy. 
• The research question (and subquestions) posed are pre-defined but 
necessarily exploratory in nature (that is, ‘what factors affect the IBE?’ as 
opposed to ‘what is the effect of factor X on the IBE?’). 
• The informants (who also constitute the unit of investigation) were 
selected on the basis that they constitute the limited population that may 
have knowledge of the research question. 
3.3.5. Conclusions as to Methodology 
This section has described the methodology adopted in the investigation. It has 
identified (in general terms) the limited extant data that was available for the 
purposes of the study and concluded that was necessary to generate additional 
data to found any useful analysis. The section then considered the alternative 
techniques available in the generation of additional data and concluded that the 
interview, or more particularly in the circumstances of the current investigation, 
the semi-structured interview was the most appropriate. The semi-structured 
interview was appropriate as it allowed the flexibility necessary in circumstances 
where there was limited pre-existing information. Noting that the investigation 
could best be described as adopting a case study approach, the section moved 
on to consider issues associated with the validity of this approach. The section 
concluded that while there may be legitimate interrogation of the validity of the 
case study approach with appropriate disclosure of the basis of the exercise of 
investigator discretion and acknowledgement of the limitations of the approach 
it was recognised as an appropriate method to provide valuable insights in fields 
where there has been limited prior research. 
The following section 3.4 moves on to consider several matters relevant to the 
implementation of the identified methodology. These go to the basis for the 
identification of the interviewees, the notion of a ‘stakeholder’ and the 
identification of an appropriate unit of analysis. 
3.4. Stakeholders and Implementation 
3.4.1. Introduction 
As noted immediately above, in order to implement the methodological 
approach described in the previous section it was necessary to determine the 
identity of the interviewees. This section examines the notion of ‘stakeholder’ 
and the application of the concept of stakeholders in the current circumstances. 
It is concluded that the stakeholder (or its individual human agent) was the 
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appropriate interviewee. Related to these considerations is the determination of 
the unit of analysis that was adopted in the investigation.  
Not surprisingly, given the central role of the interviewee/stakeholder to the 
research project, it was determined that the appropriate unit of analysis is the 
stakeholder. However, this conclusion also requires some consideration of the 
relationship between an individual and the organisations of which they may be 
part in the identification of stakeholder.  
The section continues by applying these more theoretical considerations to the 
circumstances of this particular investigation concluding that the relevant 
stakeholders are:  
• Indigenous firms;  
• The Commonwealth agencies engaging in procurement; and  
• Those individuals and agencies responsible for the development and 
oversight of the IPP.  
The section contains a discussion of the basis for this conclusion. 
The section then progresses to identify the questions that will be put to the 
interviewees and how these questions relate to the particular research 
subquestions. 
3.4.2. Stakeholder 
Clearly, the central player in the phenomenon under investigation is the 
Indigenous enterprise that is, or is not, utilising the IBE in seeking the award of 
Commonwealth Government procurement contracts. This fact may suggest that 
the relevant stakeholder would naturally be an Indigenous enterprise. 
However, while the focus of the study is necessarily Indigenous enterprises, 
these firms can only exist in a context: decisions about the awarding of contracts 
are made by government procurement officers, support is provided to 
Indigenous enterprises by organisations such as Supply Nation, and policy 
parameters are set by the Commonwealth and informed by academics and other 
advisors. In short the operation of the IBE (and the IPP) is a social phenomenon 
that extends beyond the Indigenous firms to which it is targeted to include other 
parties. It is appropriate therefore that these ‘stakeholders’ also constitute 
potential interviewees. The question arises though where the boundary to the 
phenomenon is to be drawn. 
Reference to the literature regarding the definition of the term ‘stakeholder’ can 
assist in defining these boundaries. This literature inevitably commences with 
Freeman’s seminal 1984 definition: “A stakeholder in an organisation is (by 
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definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (1984, 46). As most writers in the 
area have noted though this definition is potentially vague and leaves “the field 
of possible stakeholders unambiguously open to include virtually anyone” 
(Mitchell et al 1997) or indeed anything (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz 2008). A 
number of further definitions which can be appropriately characterised as 
‘broad’ or ‘narrow’ (Mitchell et al 1997, 856) have arisen from this ambiguity. 
Adopting this categorisation, ‘broad’ definitions (of which Freeman’s 1984 
definition would be one) can be “unidirectional or bidirectional … [e]xcluded 
from having a stake are only those who cannot affect the firm (have no power) 
and are not affected by it (have no claim or relationship)” (Mitchell et al 1997, 
856). Narrow definitions focus on the issue of salience or “which stakeholders do 
managers really care about?” (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz 2008, 1161). The answer 
to this question is summarised by Laplume, Sonpar and Litz as being “managers 
pay attention to stakeholders who have power in relation to the firm (i.e. 
possess valued resources) are deemed legitimate (i.e. are socially accepted and 
expected), and can muster urgency (i.e. have time sensitive or critical claims)” 
(2008, 1161). Between the broad and the narrow view are many variations. 
Mitchell et al writing in 1997 identified 27 in literature published between 1963 
and 1995. Laplume Sonpar and Litz writing in 2008 identified more than a 
hundred.  
In the tradition of the salience model (or narrow definitions) with its focus on, 
power, legitimacy and urgency are classification models that attempt to define 
stakeholders by their roles. Four roles are suggested in this type of model: client, 
decision-maker, designer, and passively involved. The first three of these roles 
are collectively referred to as actively involved stakeholders (Achterkamp & Vos 
2008), while Freeman’s original broad definition of stakeholder may include 
some of those that would be described as passively involved in the classification 
model. 
 In the current project interviewees were selected from those actively involved in 
the IBE. Adapting the denominations of the classification model interviewees 
were selected from either: 
• Indigenous firms (who constitute the decision-makers);  
• The Commonwealth agencies engaging in procurement (the clients); and  
• Those individuals and agencies responsible for the development and 
oversight of the policy (the designers).  
As many of these stakeholders are organisational, as noted earlier by Yin (2012), 
the actual interviewees were often employees or officers of these stakeholder 
organisations. 
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3.4.3. Unit of Analysis 
The discussion in section 3.3.4 (Case Study and Validity) highlighted the 
significance of the selection of the unit of analysis. It also pointed to the 
importance around transparency of the unit of analysis. In the context of a case 
study Yin (2012, 141) suggests: 
The case serves the main unit of analysis in a case study, although case 
studies can also have nested units within the main unit … A case is generally 
a bounded entity (a person, an organization, behavioural condition, event 
or other social phenomenon) … 
The idea of nesting referred to by Yin above arises in circumstances where, for 
example, the main unit of analysis is a firm or government department in which 
case the individual employees, managers or contractors of the firm may be 
considered a “secondary unit of analysis” (Yin 2012, 146). 
In an almost identical fashion to that described above in relation to identification 
of stakeholders, the Indigenous enterprise that is, or is not, utilising the IBE in 
seeking the award of Commonwealth Government procurement contracts may 
at first blush appear as the obvious unit of analysis in an examination as to 
factors affecting these enterprises taking advantage of the policy. However, as 
also discussed above, these firms can only exist, operate and make decisions in a 
context that is necessarily impacted upon by the actions of other stakeholders. A 
clear example of this is the government procurement officers making decisions 
regarding the award of Commonwealth contracts and the appropriateness of 
utilisation of the IBE. 
For these reasons the unit of analysis adopted was the stakeholders as identified 
above. 
With these matters addressed, it remains to identify matters that went to the 
implementation of the selected method in investigating the research sub-
questions identified earlier. This required both identification of particular 
stakeholders (or at least classes of stakeholders). In cases where a particular 
subquestion is proposed to be addressed the question (or at least prompt) that it 
is anticipated will elicit the relevant data needs to also be specified. These tasks 
are undertaken in the following section. 
3.4.4. Implementation 
3.4.4.1. Stakeholder Identification 
To commence with the identification of (classes of) stakeholders, three classes 
equating with the three classes of actively involved stakeholder were identified 
above. These were: Indigenous firms (referred to below as Group A), procuring 
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departments (Group B) and those who made or influenced the policy (Group C). 
Set out in Table 1 below are the interviewees from each class. 
Within each class of actively involved stakeholder selection of the actual 
interviewee must be made on some explicit bases. The bases of selection are 
necessarily guided by both the desire for research integrity and practical 
considerations. These are discussed below. 
Within the restrictions of (word) space and (researcher) time a maximum 
number of twelve interviewees is suggested. This maximum is reinforced by the 
practical aspect that given the limited efficacy of the IBE there are limited 
numbers of both Indigenous firms who have been involved in the IBE and 
government departments that have utilised it. In addition it is desirable to 
achieve some balance between the views of he various stakeholder classes to 
present an appearance of a balance of stakeholder views. 
Further, as noted in section 3.4.4.1 above, while the unit of analysis is usually an 
organisation of firm the actual interviewee must be an individual. Where 
possible the interviewee should be the individual who actually made the 
participation decision or formulated the relevant policy. Almost without 
exception, this objective was achieved in the Interviewees who were selected 
and ultimately agreed to participate and are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Proposed Interviewees 
Group A: Indigenous Firms (Decision-Makers) 
Name Organisation Position 
Simon Walter Barpa JV/Cockram Business Development Manager 
Jeremy Clark Barpa JV/ Federation Managing Director 
Anonymous eNPC General Manager 
Shane Jacobs PSG Managing Director 
Marcia Langton Guma-ICRG Chair (& Forrest Review Advisor) 
Group B: Procuring Departments (Clients) 
Name Organisation Position 
Ian Cumming Defence Colonel Estate & Infrastructure 
Phil Lindenmayer Dept Human Services National Manager of Commercial Partner 
Management 
Anonymous (2) FMG Manager Community Development 
Group C: Agencies or Individuals Who Made or Influenced the Policy 
(Designers) 
Name Organisation Position 
Maya Stuart-Fox Dept Prime & Cabinet Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Economic 
Development Branch 
Yvette Simms Dept of Finance Assistant Secretary, Procurement Policy and 
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Advice 
Pete Dunn GHD Business Development Manager 
Leah Armstrong Supply Nation Chairperson 
 
3.4.4.2. Research Questions and Interview Question Matrix 
The research subquestions were set out in Chapter 1 above. For ease of 
reference they are repeated below and assigned an identification letter. Table 2 
which follows describes the proposed interview questions and identifies which 
of the research subquestions it is anticipated that each interview question will 
elicit data in relation to. 
Research Subquestions 
(a) What are the circumstances when the IBE has been used? 
(b) What benefit to Indigenous people can be attributed to the IBE? 
(c) Why is the IBE not utilised more often? 
(d) How can these identified limiting factors be overcome? 
Table 2: Interview Question/Research Question Matrix 
Interview Question/Method Research Subquestions 
Relevant 
Can you describe your organisation? ( For Group A also describe 
number of Indigenous employees and company holding structure) 
a, b 
What involvement have you (or has your organisation) had with the 
Policy? 
 
a, 
Why do you think more firms have not taken advantage of the Policy? 
(What was your experience in taking advantage of the Policy) 
a, c 
How do you think the Policy could be made for effective?  d 
 
3.5. Ethics, Implementation and Coding 
3.5.1. Ethics 
The project is research involving human subjects (the interviewees) carried out 
for the purposes of a higher degree at Deakin University. As such the project 
required consideration pursuant to the Deakin University Human Ethics 
Guidelines (Deakin 2015). The project has a focus on ‘Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander peoples or issues’ (Deakin 2015). As such the project was automatically 
deemed to be ‘not a low risk project’ and required consideration by the Deakin 
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University Faculty of Business and Law Human Ethics Advisory Group (‘HEAG’). In 
considering the ethics application for a research project involving Indigenous 
Australian people or issues the HEAG is guided by an ethical assessment of the 
project informed by a number of published ethical guidelines. These are in 
particular the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 
(Chapter 4.7 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples) (NHMRC 2015) and 
the Guidelines for Ethical Research in Australian Indigenous Studies (AIATIS 
2012). Of these the AIATSIS guidelines are probably the most relevant to the 
current project. 
The AIATSIS Guidelines are based around 14 central principles. Without at this 
point setting out each principle, many are informed by the fundamental notion 
that Indigenous people have the right to free prior and informed consent in 
relation to any activity involving or affecting them or their lands or culture. In 
addition, the AITSIS guidelines at principle 11 articulate that: “Indigenous people 
involved in research, or who may be affected by research, should benefit from, 
and not be disadvantaged by, the research project” (AIATSIS 2012, 15). 
The project stems from the researcher’s involvement as the Chief Executive 
Officer of Native Title Services Victoria Ltd (‘NTSV’). NTSV is a native title service 
provider under the Native Title Act 1992 (Cth) funded by the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet to assist Victorian Traditional Owners in achieving 
outcomes under that legislation. As such the researcher has as clients the 
Traditional Owner Corporations of Victoria. A key policy objective of these 
Traditional Owner groups is enhancing and extending the operation of 
Indigenous preferential procurement policies (FVTOC 2015).  
The research was directly inspired by the desire to achieve this policy purpose. 
Correspondence to this effect from the Traditional Owner Corporations with 
which the researcher is involved was provided to the HEAG. In addition 
appropriate consent forms were obtained from all interviewees who were 
beforehand provided with plain language statements explaining the project. 
More generally the interviewees were given the opportunity to have their 
comments anonymised. Two respondents did in fact chose to identify as 
‘Anonymous’. A ‘proof’ of the transcript of their interview was provided for 
corrections prior to analysis. The summarised report of the interviews (contained 
in the following chapter) was also made available to each interviewee for 
comment prior to thesis submission. 
3.5.2. Implementation 
The interviews were conducted between February and April 2016. Five were 
conducted over the telephone and the other seven in person in Melbourne and 
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Canberra. The interviews lasted (on average) for approximately one hour and 
were recorded. The recordings were transcribed professionally. The transcripts 
were provided to the respondents for correction and a number of respondents 
took the opportunity to undertake minor editing of their comments. 
3.5.3. Coding 
Weston et al (2001, 386) describe a “recursive, iterative process” in developing a 
coding system that took somewhat over four years to complete. Basit (2003) 
describes a process that was undertaken in significantly less time. Both projects 
though involved a similar approach. In both cases the researchers describe 
commencing with a reading (and rereading) of the transcripts of recorded 
interviews. Aside from (re) familiarisation with the contents of the transcript, the 
reading facilitates an open coding process in the sense described by Male (2016, 
182): “the identification of categories which emerge as the data is examined.” 
Despite this open coding the researcher’s familiarity with the much of the 
subject matter did suggest a number of a priori codes which were added to by 
emergent codes that were apparent from the transcript.  
This transcript perusal led to the development of two further tools. The first was 
a basic spreadsheet identifying the key themes that emerged from the 
transcripts in the columns matched by rows where the interviewees were 
identified. This provided a simple index to which interviewees identified with a 
broad category of issue. In essence this is (a very simplified form of) the 
codebook described by Weston et al (2001). The spreadsheet by itself is, though, 
a very bare tool. In summarising respondents’ comments to manageable pieces 
of information to fit within a spreadsheet the richness of the comments can be 
lost. Basit (2003, 146) describes the dilemma when she identifies: 
… two strategies which are commonly used for analysing these data: to 
report the results in terms of a relatively simple category scheme or to put 
before the reader by extensive though necessarily selective, quotation the 
data themselves, hoping this that the essential flavour comes through. 
As with Basit, in the event both approaches were utilised. However, the second 
approach required the creation of manageable information not as bare as the 
spreadsheet. Accordingly, the other tool that was developed was the interview 
reports which are contained in the following Chapter Four. The report provides a 
summary of the interview prepared by the researcher but which the interviewee 
was provided with the opportunity to make comment. Where comments were 
made they were incorporated. The reports also contain a number of direct 
quotes from the interviewee some of which are used also in the analysis of the 
interviews contained in Chapter Five. 
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The reports were produced through a process of first re-reading and then 
summarising the transcripts and utilising this as an opportunity to collect 
respondents’ comments about particular issues together despite where these 
comments may have occurred in the course of the interview. The transcript page 
reference was included with the comment to facilitate subsequent verification 
by the researcher. This first draft of the interview report was then rewritten 
using style and syntax more appropriate for final publication. It was at this stage 
that many of the quotes were included in the final interview report. Where 
included the quote are direct quotes unedited from the transcript. 
The combination of the two tools allows for analysis based on the frequency 
with which a particular factor was identified by respondents to be integrated 
with more detailed analysis of the specific comments made in relational to that 
matter. The inclusion of the interview reports, particularly given the 
respondents’ opportunity to comment on these should also assist in overcoming 
some of the methodological deficiencies of the stakeholder approach in at least 
ensuring that there was respondent concurrence in the researcher subjectivity. 
The interview reports also allow for triangulation of data between respondents’ 
reports particularly where not all respondents’ comments have been reproduced 
in the analysis chapter. 
The interview reports represent an attempt to include the ‘voice’ of the 
respondents in the research. However, it is undeniable that the process of 
coding and summarisation inevitably involves subjective decisions by the 
researcher in relation to which data is not included and how the data that is 
included is presented. However as noted above (section 3.3.4) in the end there 
must be a “degree of trust in the diligence in and integrity of the researcher” 
(Pyett cited in Diefenbach 2009, 885) as decisions of this kind can only be 
subjective. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR − RESEARCH RESULTS: REPORTS OF INTERVIEWS 
This Chapter contains the reports of the interviews conducted with respondents. Each 
report contains a summary of the interview conducted with that respondent. The report 
is broken into sections corresponding with the broad research sub-questions. The report 
is clearly not a verbatim reproduction of the transcript of the interview. However on 
occasions a direct quote from a respondent is included. A direct quote is clearly 
indicated as such in the following reports. 
The reports have been grouped according to the several category of stakeholder as 
previously described. These are: 
Group A: Indigenous Firms (Decision-Makers) 
Name Organisation Position 
Simon Walter Barpa JV/Cockram Business Development Manager 
Jeremy Clark Barpa JV/ Federation Managing Director 
Anonymous eNPC General Manager 
Shane Jacobs PSG Managing Director 
Marcia Langton ICRG Chair (& Forrest Review Advisor) 
Group B: Procuring Departments (Clients) 
Name Organisation Position 
Ian Cumming Defence Colonel Estate & Infrastructure 
Phil Lindenmayer Dept Human Services National Manager of Commercial Partner 
Management 
Anonymous (2) FMG Manager Community Development 
Group C: Agencies or Individuals who made or influenced the Policy (Designers) 
Name Organisation Position 
Maya Stuart-Fox Dept Prime & Cabinet Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Economic 
Development Branch 
Yvette Simms Dept of Finance Assistant Secretary, Procurement Policy and 
Advice 
Pete Dunn GHD Business Development Manager 
Supply Nation Supply Nation Chairperson 
 
The reports are presented in this Chapter without any commentary or analysis. 
Analysis of the interviews is contained in the following Chapter. 
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4.1. Simon Walter, 2 February 2016 (Group A) 
Business Development Manager – Barpa Constructions 
Describe Your Organisation 
Simon Walter is employed by Cockram Constructions, a Melbourne-based 
international construction company that was established in 1861. It is a 
management-owned, second-tier construction company. Simon also performs 
the functions of Business Development Manager for Barpa Constructions. Barpa 
Constructions is a joint venture (‘JV’) between Cockram Constructions (49 per 
cent) and the FVTOC, through its subsidiary Federation Enterprises (51 per cent). 
Barpa was specifically established to lever the advantages presented by the IBE. 
Barpa was established on 30 June 2014. Cockram’s motivation in participating in 
Barpa was partly influenced by notions of ‘corporate social responsibility’, a 
desire to work with Aboriginal people to improve their position; and, in part, a 
potential profit opportunity it saw in the IBE. Cockram had been preparing to 
tender for a job in Victoria and was told that it had been awarded under the IBE. 
This event made Cockram aware of the IBE and its potential. 
Barpa (and Cockram) are essentially specialist contract manager firms. Neither 
firm employs tradespeople or labourers directly. Rather, they manage 
subcontractors to do the actual construction work. So to use the example of a 
Department of Defence Puckapunyal Base job currently on foot, Barpa has four 
employees on site and there are 40 contractors. Barpa currently has three 
Indigenous employees but uses specialist non-Indigenous staff seconded from 
Cockram when needed. 
Barpa has developed reporting mechanisms to catch the Indigenous status of 
contractor staff but the data is not yet available. These reporting mechanisms 
will also be use to Cockram Constructions. Cockram is also required to 
demonstrate satisfaction of the IPP Indigenous employment targets as part of 
the Commonwealth contracts Cockram undertakes. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
Barpa has recently been awarded its first job with Defence at Puckapunyal. This 
was after over a year of going to talk to Defence officials in Canberra. With the 
Puckapunyal job Defence approached Barpa and asked it to tender (but not a 
public tender). Otherwise the paperwork was the same as any other Defence job 
including the need to show qualifications and certifications. The Puckapunyal job 
is about $2 million. Barpa is in discussions with Defence about other bigger jobs; 
Defence approached Barpa about jobs that were coming and Barpa advised that 
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it had capacity to undertake that work. Barpa is currently at pre-contract stage 
with Defence in relation to this work which is valued at about $19 million. 
The jobs that are coming up are below the $7.5 million limit where a public 
tender process would be required (if it were not for the IBE) but in practice 
Defence would normally put these jobs out to public tender if it were not for the 
IBE.  
Procurement rules aside, Defence categorises its contracts by size (big, medium, 
small) and this can affect the amount of tender paperwork involved. Under the 
IBE the big jobs will still involve a tender but not a public tender. The tender 
process gives Defence assurance about value for money. 
The process of getting work under the IBE was very lengthy. There was a lot of 
early face to face discussion with Defence procurement officials outlining Barpa’s 
existence and capacity and suggesting that Barpa might write to the officials 
outlining these matters. Once there was an indication that this was an 
appropriate course Barpa would write to the officials outlining capacity and so 
forth. Defence would respond indicating that there may be some appropriate 
work and the process would continue.  
It is unlikely that a ‘cold call’ seeking allocation of a particular job would be 
successful. Despite the IBE, if the procuring officials did not want to allocate 
a job to a firm plenty of ways could be found to avoid doing so. 
Defence is the main client for Barpa because it is the Commonwealth agency 
that has the greatest construction spend and Barpa is a construction company. 
There are some other Departments that undertake construction work such as 
Finance and Tax, Commonwealth Science and Industry Research Organisation 
(‘CSIRO’) and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (‘AMSA’) but 
overwhelmingly it is Defence. 
Certainly Defence is the best organised, and its procurement is the best run. So 
even though Defence can sometimes be difficult, it is probably better than 
anyone else. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
A first issue is the lack of knowledge of the policy. Cockram found out about it 
when it missed out on a job because of it, but only really understood the policy 
when it met with representatives of the FVTOC to talk about it. That meeting 
was facilitated by Pete Dunn from GHD. Clearly if a firm the size of Cockram was 
not aware of the policy it was not broadly publicised. 
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Even within Government it is not well known. There are plenty of statutory 
authorities that seem to think the IBE does not apply to them. This mistake 
should be pointed out to them by Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
A bigger issue though is the conservatism of the government people who do the 
procuring; procurement officers and sponsors/advocates – the budget holders. 
They rely on the central procurement function to prepare and run the tender 
process, doing the evaluations. There is a lack of knowledge in the budget 
holders and a fear factor. 
It just goes against all their public sector grain of, you know, the heavy 
responsibility they have to spend public money and the incredible due 
process they have to go through, the burden of all that, to suddenly short 
circuit it with this favouritism is kind of possibly seen as risky. 
Another issue is supply capacity. There are just not many Indigenous (non-civil) 
construction companies to be awarded contracts. Most Indigenous construction 
capacity was civil and involved in the mining sector, although there was some 
presence of Indigenous construction firms in Queensland and the Northern 
Territory. So Cockram was very surprised when there was an Indigenous firm 
that was awarded a government science laboratory job in Port Melbourne. 
The public sector purchasing culture of caution is far more important than the 
supply issue though. The idea of picking winners is such a conflict of their 
mindset. Especially procurement people; they are not policy driven apart from to 
get best value for the dollar for the department. As noted earlier, even with the 
IBE if an official does not want to allocate a job outside of a public tender 
process, there are plenty of ways around the IBE. 
The normal value for money calculation involves a simple matrix of price against 
capability/risk assessment. This is why it might not be the lowest tender that 
wins. People that are used to doing the usual matrix find adding the Indigenous 
factor difficult.  
Most Australians are completely ignorant of Indigenous issues apart from the 
mix of bad news and guilt. To ask someone like that to decide whether 
Indigenous participation is worth an extra 10 per cent or greater risk. It is asking 
for a sophisticated assessment of value for money. How does an officer dollarise 
the Indigenous thing? It is hard for people to do. 
A procurement officer may have a notion of value for money because there will 
be a pre-determined price range for a job. But the final decision may come down 
to a difference of 1 or 2 per cent so the officer will find it hard to deal with an 
Indigenous tender that could be +10 per cent. They do not know how to do it. 
Barpa is a guinea pig in the current contract it is working on. 
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Even after the IPP targets were announced there is still reluctance to use the IBE. 
Procurement officers suggested to Barpa that the reluctance comes from further 
up the hierarchy – with the budget holder or the project decision-maker. 
The requirements of certifications from the ISO Safety Accreditation and Federal 
Occupational Health and Safety Commissioner (‘FOHSC’) can be very difficult and 
require some expert attention from senior management. However, these 
accreditations are necessary particularly for bigger jobs. It would be a big 
investment to get these accreditations for a smaller outfit or start up. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
To improve the use of the IBE takes more leadership and vocal advocacy and 
championing of it. 
I think the way to get more out of it is through leadership and through vocal 
advocacy and championing of it and making an example of successful cases 
and say: “Hey everybody! Look at these guys. They used exemption to do 
this. This is fantastic. This is what we want.” If [government is going to] be 
aggressive like that, I think you’ve got to be tolerant of some issues maybe 
arising and having a few stuff ups and saying: “We know there’s gonna be 
stuff ups. That’s what you get”, and it’s not just the Aboriginal businesses 
and contracts that have stuff ups. There’s plenty of stuff ups all over the 
joints, so let’s not have one stuff up in an IBE awarded contract pull it – the 
whole thing. We’re ready for it and we know it’s going to happen, but that’s 
part of what we do, but we’re running a portfolio here. We put 80 contracts 
out. Three of them went bad, so what? You look at contracts in a white 
business and probably ten of them went bad. So, I just think there’s a real 
need for strong public advocacy and championing and backing people who 
do it. 
In addition the introduction of some measurement process around the use of 
the IBE and publication of these will assist. It has taken everyone a while to get 
the IBE going but it is now. It is important that its evaluated in five or six years 
and not one or two to see what it can really do. 
The basic elements of the IBE are right. There needs to be commitment from the 
top levels, politicians and particularly senior bureaucrats, to say “the IBE is here 
we really don’t mind, in fact we want you to use it”. 
Setting targets under the IPP has made a significant difference, particularly the 
remote area set-asides. Because Barpa was set up before the IPP was introduced 
it is starting to get more direct approaches from Departments calling Barpa to 
see if it is interested in particular jobs. 
The possibility of a number of Indigenous firms all tendering against each other 
is wasteful. It takes a lot of resources to tender and if the idea is to grow 
Aboriginal business, it is self-defeating. It would be better if firms were allocated 
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particular projects guided by capacity. The Barpa JV model helps overcome the 
difficulties around the bureaucracy of tendering. Cockram is set up just to do 
this. For a $300,000 contract it can be hundreds of pages of tendering, which is a 
waste of Indigenous resources if it is unsuccessful. If you know there is a job at 
the end of it, then it can be worth it of course. In addition the JV model 
overcomes the difficulties of requirements of ISO and other health and safety 
certifications.  
The IPP targets raise the issue of whether targets are best set by number or 
value. At present Barpa is probably doing a number of small jobs that would be 
better suited to a smaller outfit but having Barpa do them satisfies a number of 
contracts target. The current structure of using both number and value allows 
for a spread of big and small jobs (and tenderers) and normalises Indigenous 
supply. 
Beyond the IPP targets it would be good if procurement officers were more pro-
active in contacting Indigenous suppliers and say “you know what you’re best at, 
this is what is on the books and coming up, don’t be greedy but pick something 
that you think you would do a god job at , then write to us and tell us why”. Of 
course what is on the books usually already has a procurement plan attached to 
it. It is best not to upset that but to think about Indigenous procurement early.  
The Federation and Cockram have invested a lot in the project. It will take time 
for the benefits to flow back into the Indigenous community and lead to more 
Indigenous people coming back into the system as a result of the impacts of 
those benefits – the virtuous cycle – but it takes 10 to 15 years. From inception 
of the Barpa project to the time when we see the first real community benefits 
flowing from it will take five years. Given this time frame you need some policy 
certainty. 
It would be good if State Government (particularly in Victoria) copied the 
Commonwealth policy. It would help defray the investment cost if the target 
market was ultimately bigger. 
 The IBE is a great policy. We do not need any more initiatives or other 
policies we just need to use what we have got, embrace it, advocate it, 
communicate it, celebrate it, don’t freak out if there is a mistake or two. 
Keep going. Stay the course. 
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4.2. Jeremy Clark, 18 February 2016 (Group A) 
Managing Director, Barpa Constructions 
Describe Your Organisation 
 Jeremy Clark is the Deputy Chair of the FVTOC and the Managing Director of its 
commercial subsidiary, Federation Enterprises Pty Ltd. FVTOC is a peak body of 
the various native title organisations in Victoria. Jeremy is also General Manager 
of Barpa Constructions. Barpa Constructions is a JV between Cockram 
Constructions (49 per cent) and Federation Enterprises (51 per cent). Barpa was 
specifically established to lever the advantages presented by the IBE. Barpa was 
established on 30 June 2014. 
The FVTOC was interested in the Barpa project as it saw an opportunity to 
pursue its economic agenda.  
The FVTOC economic agenda has several elements: to generate income to 
support the activities of the FVTOC, to make it independent of the need for 
government funds, and allow it to pursue its own political agenda. Another key 
goal is to generate employment both directly in Barpa and through its member 
traditional owner corporations; that is, employment directly associated with 
Barpa and funding other cultural strengthening projects and helping traditional 
owners build their own enterprises. FVTOC also hopes Barpa will provide 
another career pathway for young Koori people to do things like engineering, 
project management or cost estimating at university. Currently most Indigenous 
university students do courses in health, education or law. Barpa provides a 
whole new range of opportunities 
Barpa currently has three Indigenous employees. It is primarily a project 
management company and uses subcontractors for the actual trade work. Barpa 
hopes to see opportunities opening up with the subcontractors and 
opportunities for Indigenous subcontracting businesses. There are well-known 
statistics around the fact that Aboriginal businesses employ more Aboriginal 
people 
So whether it is employment with Barpa, as a subcontractor or for a 
subcontractor there should be more employment opportunities and that makes 
for healthier communities. 
Aside from the IBE and Defence, Barpa is also pursuing opportunities with the 
private sector that may be coming out of its reconciliation action plans. 
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Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
It took more than 12 months for Barpa to be awarded any work. There were 
seven trips to Canberra over that time to meet Department officers. Those 
officers knew of the policy, they were fairly positive about the policy, but 
translating that into actual contracts was another thing. More recently, in the 
last five months Barpa has had the opportunity to tender for work (mainly 
Defence but one with Finance) and has been awarded seven contracts. Some of 
those were pretty small but a couple of larger ones now. 
The total value of the contracts to date would be about $7 million, but the 
contracts range from about $200,000 to $2.8 million. The Barpa partners were 
starting to get a bit dismayed but things are picking up now, although it took two 
years and a lot of investment of time and money and people to get there. As part 
of the process Barpa staff spoke to a lot of Departments as well as Defence and 
Finance, such as Tax, CSIRO and Australian Maritime Safety Organisation.  
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
Cockram has a long history of Commonwealth contracts (in particular Defence 
contracts), so Barpa was able to use these contacts when it started. Even then it 
was very difficult for both the Federation and Cockram. The Defence capital 
works structure is divided into minor, medium and large works and then divided 
again along State and base lines. On top of that, Defence itself will outsource a 
lot of the work to a private sector project manager who would manage the 
procurement. There is not just one firm that does all the Defence work; there is a 
panel of these firms and each will do different projects. There was some 
confusion with these project managers (and Defence) as to whether the IBE 
applied to projects they were managing. 
So one difficulty is the number of people involved; there is not one key contact.  
In other Departments even when they manage their own projects they have 
suppliers they are used to going to and it’s hard to get them to change. This is 
why Barpa hasn’t really gotten any contracts outside of Defence. 
Uncertainty as to Barpa’s capacity was another issue.  
One of the issues we came up against was the fact that Barpa was a new 
company, even though our capacity partner, Cockram, has been around for 
150 years and has a fantastic track record on jobs and it’s done jobs up to 
140 million dollars’ worth. There was some uncertainty about Barpa’s track 
record because we didn’t have one … But our capacity partner has done 
heaps, and they – while, they accepted that; in the bureaucratic type black 
and white mind, we had no track record. 
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There was also the issue of accreditation particularly with the FOHSC. A company 
cannot get a job or even tender on a job above $4 million unless it has FOHSC 
accreditation. A company cannot get FOHSC accreditation unless it has had a job 
to demonstrate its systems. It is a chicken and egg situation. Eventually Barpa 
was able to use the Cockram accreditation and tender for this work. 
It took two years and a lot of investment of time and money and people to get 
Barpa there. It really depended on the goodwill of both JV partners.  
The other technical issue with construction is the bonds that are required. For a 
$20 million job a company would need a bond of about 25 per cent of the 
contract price that has to sit in an account until the guarantee period is over. 
Barpa used Cockram to guarantee its bond requirements but most Indigenous 
companies could not manage it without a capacity partner.  
When you think about the time involved and the accreditations necessary it 
really is only the JV structure that could make the IBE work. You would need a lot 
of resources and even then you would not want to rely on the IBE for a start-up. 
As far as Jeremy is aware other Indigenous companies that have succeeded in 
construction were in mining and had mining companies as capacity partners. 
The policy had been in place since 2011 but none of the FVTOC member 
corporations was aware of it until we had a presentation from Pete Dunn at GHD 
in 2013. He wasn’t doing it as part of any program, just that he was passionate 
about developing Indigenous business. It can’t have been that widely promoted 
by government or else FVTOC members would have heard of it. Before Jeremy’s 
current job he ran an Indigenous cultural centre for 10 years, so he was in 
business and providing services and had never heard of it. 
It was Pete Dunn that helped link the Federation up with Cockram as well. So 
Barpa’s success is just fortuitous really, the Commonwealth had very little to do 
with it. In fact at the end of the road there were some recalcitrant 
Commonwealth procurement officers. It was fortuitous also that Pete Dunn 
could link up two partners who had goodwill and capacity to invest the two years 
lead time. It would be hard to imagine an individual, family or community that 
would have the resources to invest and the opportunity to link up with a capacity 
partner that had the resources, reputation, expertise and contacts to make it 
happen. 
There are a range of other factors as well as the bond mentioned earlier: the 
insurances, registering on Austender, knowing what’s coming up before it gets 
on to Austender, the expertise needed to prepare hundreds of pages of tender 
documentation, having the contacts and keeping up with the contacts . 
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The procurement officers struggled to understand how to demonstrate ‘value 
for money’ without a competitive tender process. The bureaucracy is set up in a 
way that people are very scared to step out of their level of responsibility or 
don’t want to put the thing on the line to push things through. So you need 
some champions. 
Value for money should be able to be satisfied by the Department’s general 
market knowledge and their initial estimating process. So in the end the 
reluctance was probably not so much value for money but more the concern 
that the officer taking the decision to do something new would pay negative 
consequences for it afterwards. Even if they said: ‘I was applying the IBE’ it’s still 
the individual officer who has to take responsibility and that can be daunting. 
Another related problem is the high turnover of staff in the decision-making 
positions. So you invest time talking an officer through the IBE and then the 
officer will move to another position or department or into the private sector 
and you have to start all over again. You have to get up to Canberra and start 
again with the new officer. 
Supply Nation has not done a lot but Barpa has not really sought its assistance. 
Supply Nation is good at networking particularly with private sector − the ‘meet 
and greet’ − but not so much the actual support. 
The best thing Supply Nation has done is to create the Indigenous Business 
Directory which is part of the policy now. Departments can look at it and see if 
there is an Indigenous supplier for whatever it is they need. However the 
directory lists whatever a supplier puts in it, so if a small civil company from 
Perth says it will do construction in Victoria they will come up in the Directory. 
Apparently there are 400 Indigenous companies working in Victoria according to 
the Directory! It could do with some work. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
One difficulty is the number of people involved. There is not one key contact. It 
would be useful if each department had a centrally designated contact point to 
work with. In departments other than Defence, even when they manage their 
own projects they have suppliers that the Department is used to going to and it 
is hard to get them to change. A central contact would assist with this. 
Government or an organisation like Supply Nation should run very practical 
programs to help Indigenous businesses learn about the technical requirements 
that have been identified; to introduce those firms to the contacts and so on. 
There probably needs to be more support for Indigenous businesses. Something 
along the lines of what Pete Dunn was doing voluntarily with Barpa. Also as 
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noted earlier the Supply Nation Indigenous Business Directory could be refined 
so that a firm must be able to demonstrate the capacity it claims to have. 
Setting the targets is one thing but they need to be strictly enforced.  
The targets have to be enforced and they keep telling us they’re going to be 
and they’re going to be held to account ... Well, I’ll need to see that. 
Greater promotion of the policy in the bureaucracy and with Indigenous 
businesses would help achieve the targets and ensure there is greater scrutiny 
around the targets being achieved. 
Indigenous Business Australia (‘IBA’) should have been in this space but it has 
not been. It has just run their three-day business workshop, the sort of thing the 
ANZ does for free. IBA has a bit of work to do. IBA seems to have a lower profile 
in the southern states. 
Black-Cladding 
In a complex industry like construction there is just not the existing Indigenous 
expertise to develop a firm. Indigenous interests have to have a capacity partner 
or else it just will not happen. So at present Cockram does the majority of the 
(particularly) technical work but the long term aim is for Barpa to be a stand-
alone company independent of Cockram’s resources. This is the only way that 
FVTOC can start up a company like Barpa. 
‘Black-cladding’ is too simplistic a term. Some arrangements should be criticised 
but you at something like Barpa; there are thousands of Traditional Owners that 
stand to benefit when it is at full function. 
If a single Aboriginal person was partnered with a white company who is 
benefitting? Well it is benefitting that person and their family but how do you 
drill down to what are the benefits that you want to see from the program? Even 
if a mum and dad company hooked up with a Cockram and got very rich, they 
will still be employing more Indigenous people. They will be doing scholarships 
and the like and they will have an effect on their partner company. 
Before Barpa, Cockram had no engagement with Aboriginal people. As one of 
the Cockram personnel said once ‘you know we’re builders, what we do is build’. 
They had no engagement with politics or community issues but they could see 
something like the partnership as their corporate social responsibility. They 
could get some money out of it eventually sure but that’s not why they did it. So 
the partner needs to want to make a difference. 
It is complex because if you see an Aboriginal-owned company that is not 
achieving employment targets, well the business is still doing well. The benefits 
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will flow into the Aboriginal community and they will still start employing more 
Aboriginal people even if not in the short term. It is not all about jobs in the 
short term. 
There is also an issue that some people are happy to support a program 
that helps Aboriginal People “but geez we don’t want to see them actually 
driving a Mercedes, be wealthy or be successful”. Really they are happy to 
help Aboriginal people to not be a welfare burned but not get above any 
white people. It’s the same in sport – be a good grateful player but don’t 
get too big for your boots. I think business involvement, the economy it’s 
the same. 
The following quote from Jeremy highlights the significance of broader role of 
the IBE: 
 Preferential procurement really does give us a foot in the door to be 
involved in the business world and if we can have successful Indigenous 
businesses in a range of industries – that would hopefully lead us as a 
people to lift a lot of our poorer cousins, and brothers and sisters to a level 
where they can achieve a better standard of living and being able to offer a 
good education for their children, provide an opportunity to enter into the 
career that they’ve never thought of and as well as support vehicle to 
strengthen their cultural ties to their country and everything else. It’s not 
just all about economy, but you need capacity and resources to achieve a 
lot of what we need to achieve as Aboriginal people. 
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4.3. Anonymous, 14 March 2016 (Group A) 
General Manager eNPC 
Describe Your Organisation 
eNPC Australia is wholly owned by the Waanyi people from the Gulf of 
Carpentaria. It started about 14 years ago to provide mining related services to 
Century Mine (which has shut now). It provided crushing, screening, equipment 
hire and labour hire but has since diversified. It employs 50-60 people about 75 
per cent of whom are Indigenous. In 2015 it had about a $20 million turnover. 
Since the mine closure eNPC has moved into some drilling and quarrying 
operations. In general the mine closure has been difficult for the company and it 
has been looking for partnership opportunities. One of these is with a 
construction company to build in remote locations. The work with this company 
was picked up through the IPP. eNPC is also looking at a partnership with a civil 
construction company to do more remote civil work. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
eNPC started working on the IPP contract about two years ago and it was signed 
in late 2015. It is the construction of defence facilities (sheds) at various 
locations in the Territory, Western Australia and Queensland. Although the 
contract was signed during the currency of the IPP it was negotiated before that 
– when there was only the IBE. 
The IBE contract is quite small for eNPC overall but it is seen as an important 
pipeline into the future. The increased civil experience in particular is useful 
because it gives eNPC the local experienced labour to undertake more of the civil 
roadwork back in the Gulf. Ultimately eNPC would like to see IPP contracts as 
constituting about half its turnover. 
The contract value is $10 million but it may increase as the work progresses. 
In about 2013 eNPC realised that it needed to branch out from the one client 
(Century Mine) because the mine closure was coming. eNPC were looking for 
opportunities. Anonymous didn’t know about the IBE then but that year he went 
to a conference in Alice Springs and met Pete Dunn of GHD who told him about 
it. eNPC hadn’t really had any involvement with government work before then, 
mainly mining. 
eNPC has found that DFAT is interested in the company doing some international 
aid work because of the IPP. The issue of value for money seems to be pretty 
easily resolved here because of DFATs existing remuneration framework and 
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experience in the market. It is really more about capability and experience in the 
area. 
The only companies Anonymous knows of that have gotten work under the IBE 
are eNPC, Barpa and PSG. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
The main issue eNPC had in securing the IPP contract was the requirement for 
Federal Safety Commissioner accreditation. In the end eNPC got certification 
based on the existing certification of the partner firm but it took a year of 
negotiation, and even then eNPC had to complete and be audited on a number 
of little projects before the partner certification could be extended to it. Similar 
issues have applied to eNPC’s civil contracting work; even though the company 
has more experience there − it is just easier to use the JV accreditations.  
There was certainly no advertising. Anonymous is not aware that there had been 
any previous experience of Aboriginal (particularly community) organisations 
picking up Commonwealth procurement work, so without advertising it simply 
wasn’t on the agenda. His experience is mainly in remote communities, though. 
There has not really been any Commonwealth procurement opportunity in 
remote communities anyway. The only real presence is Centrelink offices. 
Certainly most procurement offices are used to focussing on tendering process 
and achieving value. 
The requirement for sureties of financial bonds can be very difficult for most 
community operations that do not have strength in their balance sheets. 
In most of the remote communities the only experience of Government has 
been in a grant-based context. To change that into tendering and ‘value for 
money’ procurement is to turn all of that on its head. Most people in remote 
communities are born into a welfare system. To get remote community people 
into procurement you need external actors (like eNPC and Barpa) to be involved. 
Even when people in remote communities do try to start small businesses, they 
rarely have even the basic financial skills to make it work. The original Chair of 
eNPC was a ringer, not very educated at all. It will be interesting to see where 
the IPP contracts over the next few years fall. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
The IPP targets have made a big difference. The change for procurement officers 
from ‘available policy’ to ‘measurable output’ made a big difference. That’s why 
it is such an opportunity. Anonymous would imagine that if a public servant is 
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told to do something they do not have a hesitation about doing it. This is what 
the targets achieve. From the conversations eNPC has had with DFAT, after the 
targets have been announced they are keen as mustard. Even though the 
Department still needs to achieve value for money, now it can look creatively at 
how to achieve it. Most of the JV partners are familiar with the requirements of 
value for money, so this is not a difficulty, at least not with the targets set. The 
targets make it real. 
However, there still will not be many remote Indigenous communities that can 
get a contract in their own right. The partnerships will be vital. 
Aside from targets the most important thing is monitoring measures. Not letting 
it get mossy. Be on top of what is and is not working. To show that it can 
demonstrate impact back to the community. 
Neither the IBA nor Supply Nation has really figured out what eNPC does. It is 
registered, but not certified, with Supply Nation. Supply Nation did not want to 
talk to eNPC because it employed a white manager. It did not go down that well 
with eNPBC. However, eNPC got the Defence job so being certified does not 
seem to matter that much. 
It is important to be on the register just so the procurement officers know a firm 
is there. Supply Nation is probably more important for Departments that do not 
do a lot of procurement who do not know the players. That sort of work does 
not really bring much benefit to a community. 
There needs to be mechanisms to help people with the processes of start-up: 
insurances, certifications, and support while it is all coming together. Otherwise 
it will be hard to get new players into the market. 
Black-Cladding 
The relative lack of capacity of many remote communities can lead to a risk of 
black-cladding. It is important that there are mechanisms in place to ensure 
subcontracting and employment opportunities are directed back to communities 
and procedures to transfer management. 
There are many stories in mining of companies trying to partner traditional 
owner groups just to get access to markets. If a company can partner and gain a 
sole source advantage it can improve returns. It’s a matter of being careful that 
the JV partners are there for the right reasons. 
It also comes to the right partner − not a Tier 1 like Leightons − but someone 
where there can be access to the CEO or the Board. If there is access to the 
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decision-makers then there can be influence on the direction and that is what is 
needed, to be important to the partner. 
The difference between black-cladding and a legitimate JV is the degree of 
control or influence the Indigenous partner can exercise. You need that 
transparency and input into decisions. 
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4.4.  Shane Jacobs, 26 April 2016 (Group A) 
Managing Director Pacific Services Group 
Describe Your Organisation 
Shane Jacobs is the co-owner and managing Director of Pacific Services Group 
(‘PSG’). PSG is a fully integrated facilities management business focussing on 
construction and cleaning. PSG was formed when Shane, who had been running 
a large plumbing business, joined up with his cousin Troy, who had been in the 
Fire Brigade, to form PSG about five years ago. About two years after it was 
formed, the company heard of the IBE. At that time it had between 30 and 40 
employees and three or four of them were Indigenous. PSG now has about 160 
employees and 58 of them are Indigenous. About 30 per cent of the supply chain 
is Indigenous. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
PSG was the first business to be awarded a contract under the IBE. This was a $6 
million Defence facility (HMAS Waterhen) redevelopment. (Stage Two of the 
contract HMAS Waterhen contract never eventuated so the original contract 
value was only $1.2 million.) PSG learnt about the job from the Defence forward 
planning documentation and directly approached Colonel Ian Cumming about 
the work. Colonel Cumming got PSG to submit pricing documentation to 
demonstrate value for money and was awarded the job. The IBE was brought to 
PSG’s attention by its CEO at the time (Mike Coleman). However, the IBE was not 
well advertised. Mike only found out about it by chance while Googling 
information about Commonwealth contracts generally. Mike called the number 
that was listed and then Mike and Shane went to Canberra and saw an officer in 
Finance who suggested a small defence job which never eventuated. At first 
everyone was terrified of using it. This was in 2012. David Liddiard (the 
Indigenous ex-NRL player) alerted PSG to Supply Nation. PSG had to be Supply 
Nation certified to demonstrate that it was an Aboriginal business.  
After that PSG was awarded a number of contracts by DHS for office fit outs. This 
was about three or four contracts worth somewhere between $100,000 and 
$500,000, but they were on the open market (not IBE). It was then awarded a 
large cleaning contract for Centrelink and Medicare offices in WA for about $9 
million. PSG also secured a cleaning contract for the Australian Tax Office (‘ATO’) 
in Queensland worth about $3.5 million. PSG has also just finished a contract for 
fitout of the ATO in Newcastle worth $8 million but that was on the open market 
(not IBE) also. 
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Issues that have Impacted on IBE 
PSG found it hard initially to get traction with the IBE. There was no real 
framework around it and departmental procurement officers were reluctant to 
use it. There was a lot of concern around demonstration of value for money. PSG 
had meetings in Canberra where there was a lot of doubt expressed about value 
for money and the absence of competitive tendering. It was really only when 
Defence (Ian Cumming) and Finance (John Owen) decided to champion it that 
headway was made. 
For PSG, purchaser doubts about capacity did not seem to be the major issue. 
The firm had been delivering similar contracts for a while and achieved various 
ISO and Federal OHS Commissioner Certifications. It took a lot of time and a lot 
of money but that is what needs to be done to work in that space. PSG knew the 
firm had to perform at 110 per cent to overcome any initial (racist) perceptions.  
PSG demonstrated satisfaction to the system auditors through a $0.5 million job 
at the (Commonwealth) Parliamentary Offices in Victoria. Going through the 
accreditations process improved the firm’s performance. It was worthwhile. 
For many other firms there would be a monetary impediment in doing what PSG 
has done.  
I can’t answer for other people, but just from me talking to other suppliers 
… I think it’s a monetary issue. You’ve got to be able to invest. I think the 
Federal Safety Accreditation would have cost us $30,000-$50,000. Then the 
next issue to come into play is going to be Bank Guarantees. The 
department’s going to say to them “We want a couple of hundred thousand 
dollar bank guarantee.” … I think there are not a lot of mature Aboriginal 
suppliers out there, and yeah, that scares them, mate. The whole process 
scared them, you know? And that’s why I think – I don’t know, whoever it is, 
if it’s Supply Nation, if it’s the IBE, if it’s the Chambers, there’s going to be a 
lot educating happening. 
Most of the mature Aboriginal firms have been in mining (Rusco Brothers, ICRG) 
but they are moving into IPP work. 
To put together a tender for a $5 million opportunity can cost you $20,000 and 
there is no guarantee you will get it even with the IBE. People do not understand 
that an Indigenous firm using the IBE still has to go through a tendering process, 
just not the competitive tender. 
It can be hard to get an Aboriginal labour force on the jobs. It’s easier in cleaning 
than construction because there is not such a high initial skill set necessary and 
people can be trained ultimately moved into management roles but construction 
can be very hard. 
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To assist in the development of Indigenous suppliers PSG has developed the 
BD101 program. There are three steps to the program. The first two are 
compulsory. The first step involves a potential supplier answering a self-
assessment questionnaire of about 70-80 questions that goes to diverse matters 
such as accountancy software, email format, insurances and marketing format. 
The second stage occurs after any remedial action arising from stage 1. The 
second stage involves going ‘live’ on a contract. This allows the tracking through 
of the administration of purchase order, invoicing and the accounting of it. The 
last stage, which is voluntary, is for the individual supplier to undertake a 
Certificate IV in Business. PSG has an MOU with the University of Technology 
Sydney to facilitate this. 
Supply Nation and IBA have been very useful to PSG. Shane Jacobs was on the 
board of Supply Nation in 2012 and 2013 and IBA has provided a lot of support.  
We have a close working relationship with IBA. IBA have really supported 
our growth and to be honest with you I don’t think we would be in this 
position today if it wasn’t for the IBA supporting us … IBA helped us out with 
seed funding on our projects. They helped us out with some capital to 
attract staff, get our own equipment. Like … our cleaning opportunities, we 
needed equipment to start them, so, they helped us out. So that’s seed 
funding to start the jobs off. 
PSG is Supply Nation certified and the contacts and networks this has facilitated 
have been hugely useful. It would have taken PSG another 10 years to get where 
it is today without this support. 
While Finance knew about the IBE, a lot of other departments PSG had contact 
with were not so sure. Immigration for example was contacted by PSG and 
stated they were still researching its use.  
Peter Dunn from GHD was of great assistance in the early lobbying of 
departments to use the IBE. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
The introduction of the IPP targets is crucial: 
I think that was the game changer and I think now it’s filtering through the 
DNA of federal government. I think, one with the targets; and, two, with all 
the media that’s around it and you know, Nigel Scullion saying “this has to 
happen, this is happening … there’s a target now”. You know, the Ministers 
or the Dep secretaries are going to sit in front of budget estimates and 
they’re going to ask them “Why didn’t you do it?”. 
When Ministers and Deputy Secretaries are showing their public support for the 
policy it has an impact on the way departmental procurement officers think. 
When a target is introduced it has the effect of also indirectly saying ‘you can 
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and must use this policy’. The important thing will be to put use of the policy into 
the KPIs for the Deputy Secretaries and make sure achievement of the KPI has a 
remuneration benefit. 
The increasing target levels just emphasises this point. 
The Government’s main objective may be the creation of Aboriginal employment 
and not the creation of Aboriginal wealth but Government also knows that the 
best way to do this is to build Aboriginal businesses that are hundreds of times 
more likely to employ Aboriginal workers. IBA has produced research of this. 
Government appreciates that the two objectives are linked. 
One can imagine the situation were a department has a limited tender 
arrangement between several Aboriginal companies and suggests this is 
utilisation of the IBE but it is not, although it would satisfy their IPP targets. 
You can imagine a situation where some Departments issue a lot of small office 
supply contracts just to satisfy the target without making much of an impact, but 
even that will assist in developing small Indigenous office supply companies. 
Black-Cladding 
Black-cladding is when a business just uses an Aboriginal person but does not 
build capability or capacity and the Aboriginal person is just used as a face to 
gain the benefit without making it flow on to the broader Aboriginal community. 
You couldn’t say it doesn’t happen but it certainly doesn’t happen a lot. Really as 
long as there is enrichment in terms of capacity and capability and opportunities 
and developing micro-businesses there is a benefit.  
There will always be mockers but you shouldn’t waste your time and energy 
on them. 
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4.5. Professor Marcia Langton, 4 April 2016 (Group A) 
Chair Guma – ICRG, Advisor Forrest Review 
Describe Your Organisation 
Professor Marcia Langton is Professor of Australian Indigenous Studies at the 
University of Melbourne. She is also a director of the Indigenous Construction 
Resource Group Pty Ltd (‘ICRG’) and the Chairman and shareholder/director of 
Guma ICRG Pty Ltd, a related company to ICRG. She was an Advisor to Andrew 
Forrest in the preparation of the Creating Parity Report that recommended the 
introduction of the IPP. Neither Guma ICRG nor ICRG have utilised the IBE. ICRG 
is a civil mining construction and maintenance contractor with a presence in WA, 
NT and Queensland. It has a workforce of approximately 240, about 70 per cent 
of which are Indigenous. The first contract was with FMG. It took about 12 
months for ICRG to get that contract which really came from the direct contact 
between the ICRG Chair (Clinton Wolf) and Andrew Forrest of FMG. ICRG now 
works with FMG, Hancock Prospecting (Roy Hill), BHP and Queensland Roads. 
More recently, as part of a diversification project, some of the ICRG affiliated 
companies have tendered for Defence work but the result is not yet known. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
Guma ICRG has had no involvement with the IBE but in another capacity Prof 
Langton was an advisor to the Forrest Review Creating Parity report that 
recommended the setting of targets around Commonwealth procurement. This 
recommendation was (in part) implemented in the IPP. 
Issues that have Impacted on IBE 
There was not enough awareness of the policy amongst the Commonwealth 
public servants so even if an Indigenous supplier was aware of the policy and 
went to a Department they would simply be told that there were no 
opportunities under the policy at present. 
Even when there was awareness of the policy there was reluctance to use the 
policy by Commonwealth officers because of the ‘inherent risks involved in 
implementing the policy’. The other aspect was that one would hear 
Commonwealth officers say that they could not locate Indigenous suppliers, 
despite all the money the Commonwealth spent on Supply Nation, or if they 
could find them, they could not be sure of their capacity. 
Guma ICRG is a member of Supply Nation. It took a lot of effort to become a 
Supply Nation member and it has served no useful purpose. Guma ICRG 
participates in events but nothing has come of it. The process of getting Supply 
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Nation certified probably ended up costing Guma ICRG between $30,000 and 
$40,000 because people had to be flown in from the west. It has been of no 
value. 
The processes are completely different between the Commonwealth and the 
private sector (e.g. FMG). In the early stages FMG ‘developed’ ICRG by awarding 
a series of small contracts. There was still a tender process, but it is an invited 
tender. In one recent incident an ICRG JV company was knocked out of a tender 
with Rio Tinto because the JV partner had had a previous safety incident. It is 
wrong to say that there is ‘special consideration’ for Indigenous suppliers. The 
thing that is special is that companies like FMG and Rio Tinto will invite selected 
Indigenous suppliers to tender and look realistically at their capacity. Previously 
there has been a somewhat racist assumption that Indigenous companies did 
not have capacity (although of course some did not). What FMG did as well was 
arranging partnering between the Indigenous company and a known capacity 
partner to ensure delivery. If that works FMG will consider the Indigenous 
company for stand-alone work. But the process is actively managed by FMG. 
At other times the ICRG company will be awarded the contract on a stand-alone 
basis but will subcontract to an FMG known supplier. 
By contrast dealing with Government is difficult. Governments are slow and 
inefficient and if the Indigenous business is trying to keep its cash flow in a good 
position to keep staff on, the delay in government contracts can be impossible. 
For example one colleague reported a Commonwealth Department asking her to 
single source quote for a $5,000 job. They did it in order to develop the 
relationship with the Department but it was going to cost them money. 
IBA has not helped. 
Look, IBA is another one of these clunky entities in the Commonwealth’s 
reach into the Indigenous business sector and for instance their interest 
rates have been far too high, well above market rates. The conditions under 
which they insist on having some equity or shareholding in operations is a – 
I think oppressive and onerous in many circumstances from talking to 
people who are in them. … Business moves fast, bureaucrats move at a 
glacial pace. It is just hopeless. 
If they are going to take equity they should actually be involved in the 
development of the business. There are some things IBA has done well but it is a 
worry that it is run by Commonwealth public servants who have never been in 
business and have no idea about business.  
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Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
Commonwealth bureaucrats have a perception of all Indigenous suppliers as 
micro-businesses; they do not understand that these businesses really are in the 
private sector. It costs a lot of money (in terms of staff time) to do up a tender. 
However, a contract like that will still count towards that Department’s IPP 
target. 
The Forrest Report recommended targets by value. This is what FMG itself does 
with its one billion opportunities policy. The one billion is a dollar value. Of 
course that includes the contract value to non-Indigenous JV partners. 
Nevertheless it is a better approach than the Commonwealth targets. 
Although the Commonwealth policy is now changed to allow for an imputed 
value to number calculation it is still not sufficient.  
[A] Commonwealth department could go to four Indigenous companies and 
sole source four contracts for, say, stationery, and each contract’s worth 
$5,000 and then they’ve reached their target. But what is the point of that? 
That is not creating economic development. It’s not encouraging 
entrepreneurship. It’s not actually the spirit of the policy in any way at all in 
terms of sharing the government spend fairly with the Indigenous business 
sector, that’s cheating the system. 
To achieve any real encouragement for economic development the target should 
be aimed at a percentage of value. That was what Forrest recommended. 
There is also a risk that the large number of Supply Nation registered (as 
opposed to certified) companies that are coming on to the books will not have 
the capacity to deliver, but that particularly private sector companies may be 
under the impression that Supply Nation registration is also some guarantee of 
capacity when it isn’t. 
The Forrest Review recommended that the level of Indigenous equity in a 
company for it to be eligible to take advantage of the IPP be set at 25 per cent, 
not the current 50 per cent. This is an important recommendation. It allows 
Indigenous business to get beyond merely small to medium. There is only a 
handful of Indigenous businesses at greater than 200 employees. To get beyond 
this there needs to be innovative arrangements like capability partners, JV 
vehicles, and subcontracting arrangements.  
We need capability partners, we need joint ventures, we need the 
subcontracting arrangements … we need partnerships of various kinds to 
bring in capability partners, and to bring in capability partners that have 
effective control and hand it over. Hand over the business within a set 
period of time under a contractual arrangement. And who in business is 
going to do that if the demand is that – the Indigenous ownership is 50 or 
51 per cent? Nobody in their right mind would do it, just watch shark tank, 
93 
 
right? What are the offers made? Well from the investor, the investor is 
going to want a majority shareholding and then when you’re talking about 
– you’re going to put 50 million out there to make a project happen, why 
would give an Indigenous business with no capability, no capital track 
record, and no equipment a 51 per cent free carried shareholding? You 
wouldn’t if you were serious about business. You just wouldn’t. If the 
requirement was to give them a 25 per cent option or even 25 per cent free 
carry or under a loan arrangement, sure, you’d consider that. You would 
want to stagger the contract so that you get your return and then at the 
end of the contract, the Indigenous business would be in effective control, 
would take over the whole operation, and the non-Indigenous company has 
taken their return. 
This is much more of the nuanced model used by the US National Minority 
Supply Council. It is much better than the current Supply Nation approach. 
The introduction of the targets is a start but the Commonwealth needs to adopt 
a lot more of the relational supplier development approach that has been used 
in the resources sector. There are a number of examples. One was when Rio 
Tinto assisted an Aboriginal person to get a loan for a water truck on the 
strength of guaranteeing a road watering contract. The loan was got, the 
contract was awarded and a business was started. This is a good example of 
private sector supplier development that the Commonwealth needs to adopt. 
There also needs to be an emphasis on developing businesses, not just achieving 
the targets by using the very few well-established Indigenous businesses. 
The State governments should adopt policies along the lines of the Northern 
Territory policy. 
Black-Cladding 
There are various forms of black cladding, but what it is is a non-Indigenous 
owned company taking advantage of an Aboriginal person by either giving 
them a free carriage shareholding or a consultancy fee on a daily or other 
basis to give the impression that the company has some Indigenous content 
whether it be shareholding, employment and Indigenous supply chain. 
Usually, none of that exists. 
Black-cladding needs to be distinguished from normal business practice. If Guma 
ICRG subcontracted with a (white) company for jigs and crushing in the mining 
sector, that is just sensible business practice because that is a specialised piece 
of equipment and you need specialist staff to operate it. Guma ICRG needs to 
ensure that it keeps the contract work necessary to employ the Indigenous staff 
who have normally come from traineeships and the other work can be 
subcontracted out. That is not black-cladding. Guma ICRG is well above 60 per 
cent Aboriginal owned; that is not black-cladding. Black-cladding is where a 
company is majority white-owned or even 49 per cent and where there is no real 
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Aboriginal control or Indigenous employment and any Aboriginal involvement in 
management is really just a sham in order to get preferential contract treatment. 
In the mining sector when Rio Tinto started taking Indigenous procurement 
seriously there was a number of tier 2 and 3 companies employing Aboriginal 
‘agents’ to represent them to try and take advantage of the policy. That is 
another blatant form of black-cladding. 
Another form of black-cladding comes from ‘late identifiers’; that is, people that 
may have some Aboriginal ancestry but who have never identified as Indigenous, 
that are not a part of the Indigenous community. The definition of Indigenous is 
a threefold test: descent, self-identification, and acceptance by community. The 
late identification issue poses a threat to the integrity of the IPP. When Guma 
ICRG achieved Supply Nation registration, Prof Langton had to track down an 
organisation that would issue her a certificate of Aboriginality. However, there 
are stories of individuals having Aboriginality being dubiously confirmed by a 
statutory declaration signed by an officer from a NSW Local Aboriginal Land 
Council. These people’s companies then gain Supply Nation registration in order 
to get into the IPP. This is a concern. More attention needs to be paid to it. 
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4.6. Colonel Ian Cumming, 3 March 2016 (Group B) 
Department of Defence Capital Facilities and Infrastructure 
Describe Your Organisation 
Ian Cumming is a Colonel in the Australian Army. For the previous three years he 
had been the director of various major national land projects in SE Australia. In 
the Defence Department these functions are located within Capital Facilities and 
Infrastructure which in turn sits within Estate and Infrastructure that builds new 
buildings for Defence, and deals with the death and rebirth of facilities for 
Defence at the widest interpretation of the Defence organisation. The current 
budget sits at about $1.2 billion, about 12 per cent of the total commercial and 
industrial construction market in Australia. Defence is therefore quite influential 
in that market. 
Defence is also the largest single spend of any Commonwealth department. So in 
the IPP targets Defence has a target of 73 equivalent contracts; all the other 
departments are in single digits. Defence is one of the really only three ‘doing’ 
departments of the Commonwealth (along with the Department of Human 
services and the ATO). Other Commonwealth departments are really policy 
related and so have a smaller disposable budget. This makes Defence, along with 
Finance, quite influential in the procurement industry. There are entire 
industries that are dependent on the defence spend (e.g. weaponry). 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
Defence has been the most active in the IBE. The ANAO identified four IBE 
contracts during the period between 2011 and 2015. Two of those were with 
Defence, and Ian had a direct role in both contracts. Both those contracts were 
with PSG. Ian became aware of the existence of PSG and pursued those 
outcomes. The ANAO spoke to Ian when it was doing its audit about the 
comparative success of Defence with the IBE. 
In the Defence project management structure, third party project contract 
manager administrators are involved but those administrators operate within 
the parameters set. Defence can still specify that the IBE will apply to a particular 
contract. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
For a procurement officer, using the IBE was not a comfortable proposition. It 
demanded a level of perceived (not necessarily actual) personal risk. 
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The IBE was not given enough time to work before the introduction of the IPP 
targets. The IPP is a bit of a stick to the IBE carrot and the IBE was about to take 
off like a bush fire. There may have been a middle management fear of using the 
IBE but it was just starting to take off. There were a lot of contracts that were 
lined up under the IBE that will show up as under the IPP. 
The thing that made Defence (and Ian in particular) different was that, perhaps 
because of the military background, Defence could read that the intent behind 
the policy was to create long-term sustainable Indigenous employment and 
Defence could develop strategies to get to that objective − strategies like 
developing suppliers that were able to deliver the desired outcomes. This meant 
actually taking the personal time and risk to talk about mentoring a company 
into a position where it could get a job. There was a degree (or sense) of risk and 
the sense of unease about actually teaching someone to be a business before 
they were actually given a contract. 
There is no doubt a procurement officer using the IBE as opposed to a public 
tender process was exposing themselves to risk: the risk of a hostile the Senate 
Estimates Committee if nothing else. If they didn’t use it, there was not a risk. 
There was pressure on Ian not to give PSG a third contract because of perception 
of probity. 
There is also the risk that an unknown Aboriginal business will not be able to 
fulfil the contract and the officer would be held responsible for that.  
I think there is still some caution about going to an Aboriginal business 
because people don’t want to be seen to be told to go to an Aboriginal 
business because they aren’t necessarily a business that will fulfil the 
obligations of the contract … but I think people still perceive that there is 
this thing “why would you go to an Aboriginal business when they can’t do 
the job when there is someone who can?” Well, the understanding is of 
course that you don’t go to somebody who can’t do the job whether they be 
whatever colour, race, creed, or whatever.  
The procuring officer is probably at the ‘doing’ level (Commonwealth Public 
Service Executive Level 1 or 2). To expect someone at this level to track down 
and develop an Aboriginal business is not realistic. 
In the public sector the procurement process is like hanging a poster on the 
outside of the door and saying “those who are willing to bid, come and see 
me”. You don’t walk out the door, down the street and say “okay, you. I’d 
like you to work for me. Come with me. Can you work for me? Tell me about 
how good you are. What sort of price? Are you value for money? Okay, I will 
take you”.  
This might be why Defence was better able to utilise the IBE. Ian is not a 
Commonwealth procurement officer. He comes from a combat background and 
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has spent time in the private sector and so his perspective was different and he 
was prepared to develop suppliers. 
When it comes to value for money, in construction it is possible to run an open 
book approach where the (potential) builder is involved in the planning process 
and they will have a clear understanding of the parameters and Defence will 
have a clear understanding of their margins. Value for money can also be tested 
by reference to other similar acquisitions and many other ways.  
… there’s many different ways that you can test the value for money 
proposition. So I don’t think there was a discomfort from our point of view 
on that basis.  
It may be because Defence had such a lot of procurement experience it was 
comfortable with a more robust approach to looking at value for money and 
looking at issues around certainty of supply. 
Of course IBE only applies to construction above $7.5 million and goods and 
services above $80,000 but despite this there would be a lot of discomfit to 
procure at even below these levels without the IBE. The IBE is the statement of 
Government policy that justifies an officer going to an Aboriginal business even if 
the full CPR rules do not apply compulsorily. 
There was probably also a range of other factors that may have had an impact: 
the limited publicity; insurance health and safety certification, and construction 
guarantee bonds. It all takes time to get through and can be confusing if a 
supplier is not aware of these factors. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
The Commonwealth needs to develop intelligence about supply capacity in a 
particular location. Because Defence does so much procurement it is probably 
better at that than most. Supply Nation information can help but it is not 
comprehensive. Part of this is marketing the existence of IBE so that Indigenous 
businesses can come forward and be identified. 
The mainstream political leadership needs to push it more; there needs to be 
more marketing and politicians talking it up. The Indigenous leadership also 
needs to encourage greater participation on the supply side. 
Procurement officers should be able to assist Aboriginal businesses work 
through the other impediments: insurance, health and safety certification, and 
construction guarantee bonds. Defence did this with PSG. The Commonwealth 
needs to be more relational in its procurement, like the private sector, not 
simply as transactional as it is now. 
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The scope of Aboriginal supply needs to be broadened to take advantage of a 
range of opportunities (outside of simply construction). There is scope in 
subcontracting and in training. There needs to be a move from supply of goods 
to delivery of specialist services and the more high-tech end. 
Black-Cladding 
Some individuals will make a lot of money and that will impact on culture – the 
creation of a black middle class. There will still be areas where people struggle. 
Into the future there might still be the higher employment of Aboriginal people 
by Aboriginal businesses but maybe not. Aboriginal business can be community 
owned and privately owned. Both are legitimate. 
A completely credible JV could be labelled black-cladding; it really comes down 
to the ethical behaviours of each partner. The goal of ‘closing the gap’ is more 
important than the final 50-50 or 49-51 number. If you look at Barpa and 
Cockram; Cockram supports Barpa not for the extra work but to build an 
Aboriginal company. Anything beyond a sole Aboriginal owner or a community 
owned company can be called black-cladding but it depends on the behaviour. 
An associate of Ian’s once suggested you can tell by the way the money flows: if 
it flows in an even way and decisions are made in an even way it is not black-
cladding. Supply Nation can play a role in ongoing certification. 
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4.7. Phil Lindenmayer, 24 March 2016 (Group B) 
National Manager of Commercial Partner Management, Department of Human 
Services 
Describe Your Organisation 
Phil Lindenmayer is the National Manager of Commercial Partner Management 
with the Department of Human Services (‘DHS’). DHS delivers social welfare, 
health and child support services across Australia. It employs 34,000 people. It is 
one of the few Commonwealth departments to deliver services directly to 
clients. DHS is an active player and an early adopter in Indigenous procurement. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
DHS was active in Indigenous procurement before the exemption was 
introduced into the CPR. An officer from the Department of Finance came over 
to DHS to work on it with Phil. The DHS facilities management contract of $8.3 
million to PSG was the biggest under the IBE at the time. It took the creation of a 
deliberate project by DHS to bring it about and it was specifically designed to 
demonstrate what was possible. It was a deliberate attempt to get through the 
psychological resistance to trying something new. 
In the PSG contract there had to be a process of demonstrating capacity. This 
was done by having PSG single source for a total of four contracts that were 
under the CPR Division 2 threshold. PSG did four fit-out contracts over a period 
of about 18 months. By doing this the property services people in DHS could 
have confidence in PSG. The contracts were: (1) August 2013 ($80,000), 
Bundaberg; (2) September 2013 ($110,000), Lismore; (3) May 2014 ($170,000) 
Redfern; and (4) December 2014 ($200,000), Orange. PSG is still doing more 
fitouts now. The $8.3 million contract was in February 2015. 
We did a total of four under the threshold … They did one small fit-out for 
80,000 dollars. They did another one, I think, for 110, one for 170, one for I 
think about 200 or thereabouts over a period of about 18 months. That then 
got our property people and the outsource service provider into a mindset 
to say, “Okay, right, here’s a company that can deliver”. 
Phil met the PSG personnel at a Supply Nation (in fact Australian Indigenous 
Minority Supply Council) ‘Connect’ Conference. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
Once the IBE was introduced in 2011 it took close to 18 months to make use of it 
despite the Department’s support for it. This was because the nature of 
government procurement and the people who are attracted to working in it. 
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Government procurement is by its nature very process driven: 
… for very good reason … what tends to happen is that the processes are 
designed to be repeatable and therefore … take some of the perceived or 
actual risk out of the procurement. [This] allows you to get comparatively 
secure or comparatively reliable … acceptable outcome each time you do it. 
And therefore when there is something sort of new that doesn’t fit the 
mould, then there’s a sense of “oh, well, what risk does this bring?”.  
The people that work in procurement are those who feel comfortable in this 
environment: 
The psychology issue is that people who tend to be attracted to do 
government procurement are people who are very comfortable with 
structure, process, and I suppose, the need to be able to demonstrate and 
document. So, their sort of natural behaviour … 
Further the issue of (at least the subjective) assessment of value for money plays 
a role.  
… where you have a busy and in some cases, stressed procurement person 
and they’re trying to say, “Okay. Well, holistically does this represent better 
value for money?”. “Oh, geez. I don’t know. They look sort of fairly similar. 
I’ll take the cheaper one.” That tends to be – it’s much easier to be able to 
argue to somebody – to say – just to prove this was the lowest bid. 
That is to say price is the easiest reference point. If there is an element of 
uncertainty, price is easily quantifiable and thus certain. 
It required very senior level endorsement and it required a specific project to get 
properly off the ground. 
The public sector is not used to developing relationships with suppliers in the 
same way as in the private sector. Public sector procurement is much more 
transactional whereas the private sector is more comfortable with relational 
supplier development. This was much more the model used to develop the PSG 
relationship. Although PSG was already quite a substantial company, it just did 
not have a lot of dealings with Government. 
It took time for PSG to get used to Government expectations. At first PSG was 
quoting for a much higher quality of work than Government expected. As each 
contract progressed the process required less and less intervention. 
Two other issues that are involved are that of simply awareness of the existence 
of Indigenous suppliers and also doubts amongst some officers as to whether 
Indigenous suppliers are ‘serious players’ that is do they have the necessary 
reliability. There is also a perception that you might find an Indigenous supplier 
in the Northern Territory but not in metropolitan Sydney. Also there is a bias 
that makes people think that Indigenous suppliers are propped up, not 
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‘industrial strength’. This comes in part from media portrayals of failed 
Indigenous organisations. It is not everyone that thinks like that but it is 
something to be conscious of. 
There is an issue in the catch 22 of not getting a contract because of not being 
able to have demonstrated reliability in delivering a contract. This is part of the 
teething of the IPP. It is also why it is very important that there is publicity 
around the success of Indigenous suppliers when they do deliver on a 
government contract; so that other procurement officers can have confidence in 
using them. 
The IBE was publicised quite well but in DHS that there was an officer who had 
been quite involved at Department of Finance. In other Departments there was 
certainly material circulated from Finance about the IBE but is was one of the 
100 emails an officer might get a day, and one that didn’t demand that they do 
anything immediately and so was easily ignored. This is why the IPP targets are 
important, because an officer’s superior will need to know how the Department 
is tracking against the target; it demands a response. 
A further issue is the nature of goods and services that government 
needs: 
 … most of the money we spend is on stuff that’s really not a strong target 
for Indigenous business. We lease a lot of buildings. There may very well be 
some Indigenous businesses there, but I’m not aware of too many. We buy 
lots and lots of heavy duty IT stuff … like mainframes and enterprise 
software and communications equipment. We buy a lot of 
telecommunications services. So, in terms of what the broad categories of 
the things we buy are, an awful lot of it is stuff where Indigenous businesses 
do not operate actively in their own right. My personal understanding is 
that with the more operational things that state and local governments do, 
there’s probably more opportunity than for Commonwealth departments. 
This is where DHS is a bit different because it delivers services directly to clients. 
Other factors (insurance requirements, contract size, and complicated tender 
process) may also have had an impact but it really just depends on the extent of 
corporate sophistication. 
Dealing with Government can be quite difficult as well, there can be significant 
costs attached with compliance with government contract provisions but this is 
counter-balanced by surety of payment. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
The catch 22 of not getting a contract because of not being able to have 
demonstrated reliability in delivering a contract is part of the teething of the IPP. 
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It is also why it is very important that there is publicity around the success of 
Indigenous suppliers when they do deliver on a government contract − so that 
other procurement officers can have confidence in using them. Publicity around 
the success stories will also help promote successful Indigenous business people 
as role models for the next generation. 
There can be scope in developing second-tier procurement, ensuring that 
suppliers to government are themselves using Indigenous suppliers. In addition 
developing the Indigenous supply register is important. 
The requirement to report against targets should have a positive impact because 
it can create some level of competition between Departments in achieving and 
exceeding the targets. The targets will also help publicise how to go about using 
the exemption. 
… the reporting will create of an impetus of itself, because there is nothing 
as effective as a little bit of creative competition between agency heads. … 
[T]hey want to – what I desperately wanted and still want is our secretary 
to be able to sort of look over the table at secretaries board at the 
department of whatever and say, “How are you going with your indigenous 
business target? Oh. By the way, we got to triple our target this year”. 
Black-Cladding 
DHS has had little direct engagement with this issue because the suppliers 
engaged are clearly Indigenous, but it is an incredibly difficult issue (“wicked 
problem”) to distinguish between genuine capacity development and short-term 
convenience for the sake of a quick profit. 
It is where the US Minority Supply approach has some merit. There, the 
expectation is that the arrangement will mature and while on day one there is a 
degree of dispensation, over two years Indigenous people should be in practical 
control and over five years the company should be operating in a completely 
commercial space. The difficulty with this approach is how you manage ‘phoenix’ 
arrangements. 
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4.8. Anonymous (2), 21 April 2016 (Group B) 
Anonymous (2), Manager Community Development at Fortescue Metals Group 
Describe Your Organisation 
Anonymous (2) is the Manager Community Development at FMG. He started 
there in 2011. His role is to increase the number of Aboriginal businesses in the 
FMG supply chain.  
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
There were two main drivers for FMG to increase Aboriginal participation in the 
supply chain. One was the provisions of various land access agreements with 
Traditional Aboriginal Owners. The other was the personal commitment of 
Andrew Forrest to closing the gap and eliminating disparity. Anonymous (2)’s 
particular role was in Aboriginal business engagement. Anonymous (2) had 
assumed with such high-level support that job would be straightforward, but 
that was not the case.  
FMG data suggests that Aboriginal companies are five times more likely to 
employ Aboriginal people. So in the case of FMG suppliers this means Indigenous 
employment levels of between 8 and 10 per cent for a non-Aboriginal company 
up to between 40 and 50 per cent for an Aboriginal company. Before 2011 the 
employment levels were not measured, but in 2011 the starting base was about 
4 per cent. The current overall percentage (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
companies averaged) is 13 per cent. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
At first, middle management while clearly supporting the company objective 
would take little action themselves to implement it. The procurement section at 
FMG did not have the processes in place to be able to engage with Aboriginal 
businesses, to think laterally about how to engage with Aboriginal businesses. 
The process involved in the first instance determining which existing Aboriginal 
businesses had the ability to tender for FMG contracts. This did not work. 
Although Aboriginal businesses were included on the tender list, for various 
reasons they were unsuccessful and began to be disillusioned. There seemed to 
be two main reasons for the initial lack of success. The procurement section was 
not satisfied they were achieving best value for money and had concerns around 
the reliability/capacity of the Aboriginal businesses identified. At this stage only 
$20 million in contracts had been awarded. 
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In response in December 2011 Anonymous (2) proposed to the CEO and 
Chairman the introduction of the Billion Opportunities Program ($1 billion worth 
in two years – originally Anonymous (2) proposed $2 billion in five years). 
Achievement of the goal became a company target, like output targets, safety 
targets and costs targets and achievement was included in management KPIs. 
Once this occurred it was not a question of procurement or other sections 
passively allowing Indigenous procurement but a question of how to increase it. 
This led to steps like reducing the contract size to a level that relatively small 
Aboriginal businesses could deliver. This did create some resistance because it 
meant a greater workload for procurement but this was the significance of the 
company target. When FMG started to do this it started to get some really good 
results. It was a ‘punt’ for FMG sometimes but the company supported the 
suppliers as much as it could. 
Ownership of the target by the CEO was critical as was the accountability against 
the target. This was critical because there can be push back in the organisation, 
and when that happens it is good to know the CEO is taking a personal interest. 
That and having the accountability, having each section report against the 
procurement target each quarter as they do with output, OHS and costs, plus 
having the Aboriginal Engagement Strategy (‘AES’) in the procurement template 
and having a dedicated resource within the firm to oversee it. 
The original identification of Aboriginal suppliers did not come through Supply 
Nation but just from Anonymous (2)’s previous knowledge and some Aboriginal 
suppliers that directly approached FMG. FMG helped to develop these firms and 
then directly sourced them rather than going to tender. 
Aboriginal businesses were knocking on our door looking for opportunities 
and they were brand new, never had a contract before, but they had built a 
team around them and we then basically helped them. We basically got 
them in, so we didn’t actually go up to tender, we just direct sourced with 
them. We … built a project up with them. And then we really helped them 
manage the project with them on site to a point where we could … then 
back off. And so, that model was very, very successful. 
The project operated to lower the risk profile associated with Aboriginal 
businesses. One thing that helped is because a number of the Aboriginal 
businesses were Traditional Owner businesses that FMG had to have an ongoing 
relationship with. It was imperative to the company and the Traditional Owners 
that the initial projects not fail. 
An important part of the process was to get the Aboriginal businesses to have a 
realistic assessment of their own capabilities so that the first jobs were 
attainable and there was a solid base to build from. 
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Over time there was increasing acceptance to the point where the mine site’s 
GM would approach Anonymous (2) with ideas for increasing Aboriginal supply 
participation. The projects started to increase in duration (from an initial six to 
eight weeks) to long-term projects that allow purchase of more significant 
equipment and retention of skilled personnel. 
The JV model really developed as a way to ‘break up’ contracts. If there was an 
Aboriginal business that could do a portion of a contract FMG would arrange for 
it to work with an existing supplier either in a JV or as a subcontractor who could 
complete the balance. At first there was some resistance from some non-
Aboriginal contractors to this approach. In response to this FMG introduced AES 
clauses into its tender documentation that required the explicit identification of 
Aboriginal employment and supply chain opportunities. The AES is a mandatory 
part of the template but can be waived if the goods in question make it just 
impossible. The level of employment/number of supply opportunities are then 
part of the tender assessment matrix.  
… [A]s part of the tender evaluation … they were weighted and that score 
would be a part of the overall assessment and evaluation of who actually 
was the successful tenderer. So, what that did was that the … what I call the 
smart contractors, start to realise that it was in their best interest to start to 
form relationships with Aboriginal businesses. And also, the contractors 
started to realise that – well, if they actually went in a joint venture with an 
Aboriginal party, then their score was much higher. 
Many of the issues that affect public sector procurement can also affect private 
procurement, such as: being aware of procurement opportunities before they go 
to public tender, attachment to existing supply arrangements, having suppliers 
aware of procurement processes, and having procurement officers that do not 
have a personal interest in advancing the strategy. 
This is one of the advantages of JV arrangements because the capability partner 
might be familiar with both the doing side of the industry and also with things 
like procurement processes. If it works it can lead to situations as happened at 
FMG where the JV is between an experienced Aboriginal business and a new 
local traditional owner business. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
Having the targets in the IPP is critical, but it is not enough. You need to have the 
other elements that have been mentioned (contracting splitting, procurement 
templates, capacity building strategies etc). 
The other key thing is being held accountable to the targets; that is, having 
achieving (or not achieving) the targets really means something. Even if people 
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are only doing it to achieve the KPIs that doesn’t alter the fact that now at FMG 
there are 40 Aboriginal businesses in the supply chain. 
The Forrest Review recommendation on level of ownership was based on FMG 
practice which focusses more on capacity enhancement than the restrictive 
definitions of Supply Nation. If a capability partner is providing the majority of 
capability and taking most of the risk it is unlikely to hand control to a less 
experienced partner so that suggests 50 per cent. Ninety-five per cent of the 
FMG $1.8 billion is with 50 per cent plus firms. Twenty-five per cent covers both 
the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal spouse in a JV. 
So if you’ve got the capability partner coming along that’s providing 
majority of the capability and therefore taking most of the risk, but you’re 
handing control of that business or joint venture to a less inexperienced 
party, it’s going to be very, very difficult to form those relationships. So I 
was always advocating the 50 per cent where it is equal board 
representation, equal decision-making and it’s equal so you’re go into a 
business relationship where no party has the upper hand on the other and 
you work together to build the capability over a period of time. Where the 
25 per cent comes into it, our definition is minimum of 25 per cent. Ninety-
five per cent of our $1.8 billion in contract is actually 50 per cent or higher 
[Indigenous ownership]. But we’ve had some situations where an Aboriginal 
husband and wife had done a joint venture with a non-Aboriginal business 
and therefore, that joint venture is only 25 per cent owned. 
FMG now has to look at opportunities for the diversification of Aboriginal 
companies because the earlier civil engineering opportunities that came with the 
construction phase are drying up and it is necessary to look at maintenance and 
shut-down opportunities. So many of our suppliers are looking at State 
Government work and they don’t have the same policies yet. 
Black-Cladding 
FMG addresses the possibility of black-cladding through its contractor due 
diligence.  
You do your due diligence on the contractor. You ensure that the 
capabilities if – you want to know who the people are – if you do your 
internal due diligence and your pre-qualifications on them – and these sorts 
of things, then black cladding to me doesn’t – we’ve never had an issue with 
it. It doesn’t really arise because we actually drilled down to what is your 
Aboriginal employment, what are the parties bringing to the table to deliver 
these services. We survey them on a monthly basis to ensure what they’ve 
said they’re going to do, they do. The other thing that we’ve done that 
we’ve been doing for about the last three or four years is if we award a 
contract to an Aboriginal joint venture, then instead of special clauses that 
we put into that contract that we talk about the sum of the outcomes that 
we want to see from the joint venture about building the capacity, transfer 
of information. We actually get invited to their board meetings as an 
observant. We’re not there for the commercial because we don’t want to 
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know their commercials, but we certainly are there to sort of get a feel on – 
that the Aboriginal party actually knows what’s going on in the contract, 
that information is being shared between both parties and the Aboriginal 
party really is making informed decisions about the project and what’s 
happening. 
If there is thoroughness about the pre-qualification the issue does not arise. If 
the early scrutiny of a contractor includes matters like existing employment 
levels and then there are regular surveys of progress it just is not an issue. In the 
case of a JV, FMG will scrutinise clauses around capacity transfer and transfer of 
information and will attend part of the JV Board meetings to get the feel of it. 
This is part of reviewing the operational plan for contractors that also goes to 
OHS and other matters. It creates a good opportunity for dialogue and 
understanding the contractor.  
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4.9. Maya Stuart-Fox, 29 February 2016 (Group C) 
Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Economic Development Branch in the 
Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet 
Describe Your Organisation 
Maya Stuart-Fox is the Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Economic Development 
Branch in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, DPMC. That 
Department is responsible for implementing the IBE along with the Department 
of Finance. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
The IBE was introduced into the CPR in 2011 under the Gillard Government. At 
that time Indigenous Affairs was part of the Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (‘FaHCSIA’). That Department did not 
have the same level of influence as DPMC and that made implementing the IBE 
more difficult. Some departments can be quite resistant to implementing new 
policies that affect their own operations and so it assists to have the influence of 
PM&C. 
Further although the IBE was the brain child of Indigenous Affairs, responsibility 
for the CPR was with Finance and FaHCSIA had little influence over it. It really 
took the combination of the integration of Indigenous Affairs into DPMC and a 
Minister who was really interested in procurement and a supportive Prime 
Minister to start to make progress. So originally CPR Exemption 17 (the IBE) was 
in effect but nobody knew about it. With the combined influence of the Minister, 
Prime Minister and DPMC the targets were able to be introduced.  
Issues that have Impacted on IBE 
The uptake of the IBE varied with different agencies. The Department of Human 
Services had a large Indigenous clientele and were used to working with the 
disability exemption to the CPR (Exemption 16) so they were a lot more open to 
the use of the IBE. Other Commonwealth were not used to using such 
procedures and were quite sceptical. That scepticism extended to other 
procurement policies such as the Australia First Policy because that was seen as 
industry protection and contrary to value for money. Using procurement to 
achieve social policy objectives was a significant mental shift. To make that shift 
happen required a very big impetus from the top people for them to give it their 
imprimatur. 
The Department of Defence and Human Services showed that value for money 
can be satisfied by reference to a familiar market without actually going to that 
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market on each tender. There is no moving away from value for money with IBE 
or in the IPP. There may have been a feeling that if an officer used the IBE they 
would be hauled over the coals and also that use of the IBE made otherwise 
simple procurement tasks hard and complicated. This is why the IBE needed 
senior buy in and the setting of targets to make it more effective. 
The real issue was that there were no targets. Officers did not have to use the 
policy and if they do not have to use the policy then the normal response is to 
think ‘if you didn’t have to, why take the risk, why stick your neck out’. The lack 
of take up of the IBE before the IPP targets was 100 per cent to do with this issue 
and not a supply side problem.  
… why would you, as a procurement officer, stick your neck out? You don’t 
have to. No one rewards you for doing it. Everyone kind of raises an 
eyebrow. Why are you doing it? So the only people that really did it was 
where you had a … clear alignment with organisational mission, where you 
could … make an argument in those terms, but … why would people in 
Department of Education or … anywhere else, or defence? Procurement 
officers being who they are – they’re good at running processes. Social 
policy is not their gig. Saving the world is not their gig. Getting good value 
for money is. There were just no drivers. There were zero drivers. 
Where there was some success is where there were officers with a sufficiently 
high level of delegation to be making purchasing decisions who had some 
personal involvement or concern for Indigenous affairs. This is what was seen in 
Defence, Human Services and Tax. It was this group of only about five people 
that had a real impact when the IPP was being developed because they had 
shown it could be done. It really took this previous practical experience to get 
the targets included. 
Maya spoke to meetings of procurement officers at the EL2 level and at first they 
would say ‘why are you bothering’; they were sceptical, even a bit hostile. It was 
suggested that it will never work because supply is not there. This really changed 
once people had had an actual experience of working with Indigenous suppliers, 
they became really committed. Their Secretaries really loved it, it became a 
virtuous circle.  
The Indigenous supply side has expanded as any market does to meet the 
increase in demand, but there still needs to be a strong and predictable increase 
in demand to make this happen. This is why the targets need to be enforced to 
ensure that people can invest in expanding supply with confidence. It needs the 
Minister to publicly affirm that the target will be met to get the confidence to 
develop JVs and the like. 
So there was a bit of a chicken and egg but really the key was fixing the demand 
problem. However there is still work to do on the supply side. DPMC, IBA and 
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Supply Nation are all part of this work, but supply will never increase to meet a 
non-existent demand. The demand has to be there first. So that’s why Maya is 
sceptical − very, very sceptical − of arguments that put it down to supply issues. 
The other technical impediments (contracts size, insurance requirements etc) 
really come down to a hearts and minds issue. If officers can be convinced that 
they want to do this thing they will find a way to make it happen. But if they 
continue to be reluctant they can find many reasons to make it difficult. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
When the IPP targets were introduced it wasn’t just setting numbers. 
The Secretary [of DPMC) has made very clear to the other secretaries that 
they are going to be meeting this target. We have had the Minister write to 
the other Ministers, because it is important. … [S]o, in other words, it’s 
come absolutely from the top-down and everyone’s been told to do it. We 
have met and spoken to every single procurement group and team. 
Meet the supplier events were organised and Finance organised training around 
the exemption. There probably needs to be more focus on helping suppliers with 
their pitch but PM&C will do that. 
There also needs to be consideration of building the targets into Commonwealth 
money that is administered by the States. The Territory does this well. This policy 
is still in but it is a work in progress. It would be best if the States came up with 
their own policy of course but the Commonwealth will pursue the matter 
through COAG. 
A good procurement approach will look at breaking up work into packages that 
Indigenous businesses can manage and then looking at putting the rest to 
tender. By breaking the work up in this way the Commonwealth will be able to 
increase the targets over time. This is a much better approach then just saying 
‘in 2020 the target will be x’ because then everyone just gets in a flap in 2019. 
The increasing targets allow Indigenous businesses to ‘grow’ over time. A 
department needs to work with the companies over time. The Department of 
Defence is excellent at this. There are some really good individuals there and 
they have no difficulty with their targets. 
The main issue in the future will probably be to assist Indigenous companies with 
bigger and bigger contracts. We need to be more agile in supporting this. IBA has 
not been as agile as it could be. The game needs to lift 200% in terms of the 
support provided, particularly in capital and different types of finance; there 
needs to be more sophisticated financial products and business support. This 
isn’t just ‘so you want to start a small business workshop’. 
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The other thing is that there needs to be acceptance that at times things will go 
wrong. 
I remember the procurement officers being really open about it upfront, 
saying, “Look, things go wrong in contracts all the time, right?” Things go 
wrong in every business all the time, but the first thing that goes wrong 
with an Indigenous business, and everyone will go, “Oh, see, that was a – 
that was really high risk. That was a bad idea”. So at some point that’s 
going to happen and we need to be mature enough to say, “You do realise 
this happens all the time”. 
Black-Cladding 
The issue of black cladding can be difficult to define. There is a paper supplier 
who gets his product from Indonesia and works with a large (non-Indigenous) 
corporate supplier. Maya thinks that is a good outcome but acknowledges 
someone could pitch that differently. To the Commonwealth a lot of the 
motivation goes to employment outcomes but also that the individual 
Indigenous business owner and their family are better off. DPMC understands 
that the IPP is encouraging a lot of large non-indigenous companies to look at JV 
type arrangements. It is also strengthening the Indigenous hand when it comes 
to JV structure negotiations. 
Even the employment issue can vary across industries. An Indigenous civil 
engineering firm will be able to get better Indigenous employment outcomes 
than an Indigenous technical data analysis firm that has to compete with large 
corporates for Indigenous financial analyst graduates. The intent is not to make 
it harder for the Indigenous business to make money. So there needs to be 
mature debate about employment outcomes. 
It can be difficult for politicians to talk about wanting to make (Indigenous) 
individuals rich. It is easier to talk about employment outcomes. 
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4.10. Yvette Sims, 16 March 2016 (Group C) 
Assistant Secretary, Procurement Policy and Advice in the Department of 
Finance 
Describe Your Organisation 
Yvette Sims is the Assistant Secretary, Procurement Policy and Advice in the 
Department of Finance. (She has since moved departments). The position is 
responsible for the CPR. The IBE (Exemption 17) is part of the CPR.  
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
The IBE was introduced in 2011 as part of the original Closing the Gap strategy. 
The IBE was introduced before Yvette started in this position though. The 
(former) Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations as well 
as Indigenous Affairs in the former FaHCSIA were significant players in setting in 
up. The Department of Finance First Assistant Secretary at the time, John Grant, 
was also influential. 
The CPR incorporates all of Australia’s international obligations in relation to 
procurement. The CPR is a relatively short document but it includes all of the, 
what are known as, ‘exceptions’ that are included in the various Free Trade 
Agreements (‘FTAs’). All the FTAs have exceptions regarding small and medium 
enterprises and also the Indigenous exemption. Technically the IBE would also 
apply to a corporation with 50 per cent Maori ownership because of the terms of 
the Australia - New Zealand Government Procurement Agreement. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
The ANAO report suggesting that there have only been four uses of the IBE 
between 2011 and 2015 is not reliable because there was no data kept. It may 
have been one or 500. It appears ANAO got its data from interviews with a 
number of sample agencies; there is no reliable certain figure. 
When Finance did a data matching exercise between Supply Nation accredited 
firms and successful tenderers on AusTender the result was 29 contracts 
awarded in 2012-13 and 19 in 2013-14. There is no requirement to record use of 
the IBE in awarded contracts. 
Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement there is an obligation to record use of limited tender 
provisions and should these agreements come into force use of exemptions from 
Division 2 of the CPR and conditions for limited tender will be recorded on 
AusTender. 
113 
 
The Department of Finance was a strong advocate of including monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms as part of the new IPP. Ensuring a reliable list of 
Indigenous suppliers (as in Supply Nation) improves monitoring because it makes 
data matching quite easy. 
One difficulty (pre IPP) was simply being able to identify an Indigenous Supplier 
to procure from.  
… one of the issues until the Indigenous procurement policy, and until there 
was a publicly available list [of Indigenous suppliers] is while the CPRs have 
enabled people to very easily and simply procure from an Indigenous 
business without needing to approach the open market, if I was a buyer and 
I wanted to pursue that, first thing I’d want to consider was how do I know 
where to find an Indigenous business? That … was the stumbling block 
because there was no information available unless your organisation 
[department] happened to be a member of Supply Nation. If your 
organisation was a Supply Nation member, you could access a subset of 
Indigenous businesses, but the list of businesses certified by Supply Nation 
was not easy to access or navigate. So there are a whole range of factors 
there ... but the minute you start making things difficult for people, they can 
then sensibly say, “Why am I bothering?”. 
This was absolutely the main impediment to the early (pre IPP) use of the IBE.  
Across the Commonwealth public service and with Indigenous businesses and 
advocates we were having this conversation in the lead up to the IPP and 
overwhelming the absence of a reliable supplier list was identified as the key 
impediment. 
It was not that procurement officers were not aware of the IBE: 
… there are procurement professionals in every agency, who know the CPRs 
back to front including the exemptions. 
The supplier capacity issue often manifested in a simple uncertainty of the 
unknown, noting that while any individual would use a firm that they or an 
acquaintance had had a positive experience of previously but that: 
[t]hat’s very different to the proposition which is there is a business that I’ve 
never heard of … I have no idea whether or not they’ve ever delivered 
anything to the Commonwealth before and me taking a chance on that 
business. So I think the fact that it is Indigenous business is irrelevant. It’s 
just the unknown. 
It is not that it’s an Indigenous business; it’s that it is an untried business. The 
concern then is not so much satisfying value for money but a concern about 
failure to deliver. 
Another factor may have been reluctance on the part of procurement officers to 
experiment with new procedures. Yvette suggested there was: 
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… a reluctance to do something different … that’s far broader than just 
engaging Indigenous business. That’s just part of human nature, in my view. 
 It was not though a lack of awareness of the existence of the exemption. 
Procurement officers in every agency know the CPR back to front. If those 
officers wanted to they could have used the exemption. The Department of 
Finance publicised it. It was included in the monthly procurement bulleting and 
discussed at the regular forums. So there may have been a reluctance to try 
something new but there was certainly awareness of the existence of the policy. 
There was a perception that a difficulty was demonstrating value for money. 
I agree that that was the perception. I’ve heard that many times. I disagree 
with it  
Yvette’s disagreement with the reality of the ‘value for money’ perception was 
because she knew of: 
… many examples of people justifying a condition for limited tender so they 
can approach a single supplier that they used before that doesn’t happen to 
be Indigenous business ... There are lots of creative ways of getting the 
business that you want, so I – if people can find the ability to do that, then 
they can absolutely be able to justify value for money when approaching a 
single supplier from a different perspective. 
The speculation about difficulty in satisfying value for money may have been a 
convenient way to describe a reluctance to try someone new. 
The Department’s data does not support a contention that it is technical 
difficulties that inhibit SME, including SME taking advantage of procurement 
opportunities. The data tells us that each year about 70 per cent of contracts are 
awarded to SMEs and around 305 are awarded to small businesses. Further 
about 70 per cent of contracts by volume are valued at less than $80,000 so 
there is not a question of contracts being too large. To make the process easier 
for all businesses the Department has developed the Commonwealth 
Contracting Suite, standard terms and conditions for all procurements of 
$20,000 or less. This makes it a simple, standardised process for small or 
medium businesses. The maximum size of contract in the suite is 14 pages, and 
generally a lot shorter. It may have been more difficult in the past but it is not 
now.  
It is probably unfair to point to the procurement officers in the Departments 
rather than the actual decision-makers. A procurement section in a department 
will normally be headed up by an officer at the Executive Level 2 level and they 
would normally only be directly involved in any high-value procurements. More 
normally the procurement section would only provide advice to the relevant 
operational section (saying learning and development or communications) who 
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would undertake their own procurement. It is at this level that the actual 
procurement decision is made and it’s at this level that you get the uncertainty 
about the capacity of an unknown supplier. The thing about the IPP is that it 
forces an agency to get over that uncertainty because there is a target to meet. 
Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
Within the public service generally there is a greater commitment to the ‘public 
good’ than normally exists in the private sector and this is the case also with 
advancing Indigenous economic development. Across the service, there is a 
number of quite senior officers who were advocating for the development of 
Indigenous suppliers. This was well before the Forest Review and the launch of 
the IPP. Departments such as Tax, Human Services and Defence were all making 
the effort. What the IPP does is provide a more robust framework to achieve 
that in. It has also increased the level of interest in developing Indigenous 
suppliers. 
There may be more historical data on the use of the disability exemption that 
has been around a lot longer. 
  
116 
 
 
4.11.  Pete Dunn, 29 February 2016 (Group C) 
Business Development Manager, GHD 
Describe Your Organisation 
Pete Dunn is a national Business Development Manager for GHD. GHD is an 
Australian-based but global engineering and professional services company 
working with Government and the private sector. Pete has worked for about 30 
years with Indigenous people; about 15 of those as an academic. Pete realised 
that there had been little success with welfare models but that overseas 
international development programs with an enterprise focus had more success. 
At GHD most people had little exposure or understanding of Indigenous people 
and issues. As a result Pete focused on aligning GHD commercial goals with 
Indigenous development goals. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
Within 18 months of the IBE was promulgated in May 2011 Pete was looking for 
ways of using it. He had heard about it only by chance and it frustrated him that 
it had not been used. Inquiries with several Department of Finance officers 
suggested that the lack of take up of the IBE was due to a lack of promotion of 
the policy. In response to this arranged meetings with a number of procurement 
officers from various departments: Finance, Defence, Immigration and Border 
Protection, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade − about a dozen all up. 
Generally these meetings got negative responses because none of those officers 
knew any Indigenous people or businesses.  
Pete also worked with a number of Indigenous suppliers particularly in their 
relations with the Department of Defence. These companies included PSG, Barpa 
and National Aboriginal Construction Partners (‘NACP’) from the Kimberley. 
Barpa and NACP are community owned. PSG is owned by two individuals. It was 
PSG that was the first contract (although there is some suggestion that the 
Indigenous Internet Service Provider – Message Stick was). However no one was 
keeping a record of when the IBE was applied so it is hard to know. However 
when PSG was awarded a $6 million contract by Defence, the Minister put out a 
press release. That should have helped with the legitimacy of the IBE but it didn’t 
seem to make much difference. The NACP was awarded the contract after the 
IPP was announced but it was set up before the IPP. 
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The biggest contract let under the IBE so far is a $15 million security contract. 
This was done under a subcontract arrangement with Wilson Security. The 
subcontract arrangement is new – usually it is a JV model. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
The absence of the publication of any guidelines around the IBE at the time it 
was promulgated exacerbated procurement officers’ reluctance to use the 
policy. Even when there was high level support in Defence, the procurement 
officers themselves were quite resistant because of fear of consequences. 
I can understand from a bureaucrat’s perspective that there may be a policy 
there but if you’re the only one that’s sticking their head up, you could get it 
chopped off.  
In addition there was the lack of marketing of the program to the Departments. 
The main Commonwealth spend is in Defence and so that was where the focus 
needed to be. There was nothing like the disability industries supplier index that 
existed and it took a while for Supply Nation to get into the space. Supply Nation 
wasn’t really active. 
Even as late as 2013 there was still no promotion of the policy. In 2013 there was 
a change in government and that made a difference. Indigenous Affairs was 
moved into DPMC. Even then there was little awareness of the policy even in the 
Department of Finance that administered. Some officers in the Department of 
Defence suggested that the IBE would not succeed unless its use became 
mandatory. Uncertainty around the notion of value for money was certainly 
another factor that affected procurement officers’ attitude to the IBE. 
One factor the Commonwealth Government did not understand is that the IBE is 
really about the private sector investing in Aboriginal businesses it is not actually 
about Government at all. The Commonwealth did not understand the origins of 
the program in the US and that it was about cultivating an emerging ‘black 
economy’. In turn the private sector did not know or understand the program. 
The private sector was stuck in the world of corporate social responsibility and 
had no positive examples of partnering with an Indigenous business. There 
needed to be partnering between private sector and Indigenous business and for 
that partnership to approach Government to use the IBE and that was not 
happening. 
It was in those Departments were the relevant officers had some personal 
experience of working with Aboriginal people − working in the law, working in a 
community − that is where you got the most sympathetic hearing.  
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Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
The introduction of the IPP targets is positive but whether it is enough is unclear. 
There still needs to be that crucial private sector/Indigenous business link. The 
IBE still needs a more defined role in the IPP. It still needs better marketing. 
The targets should be set around value not number. Number targets will allow 
Departments to focus on very small contracts that don’t encourage the creation 
of the new economy. 
The targets will encourage officers who have a genuine commitment to the black 
economy but also those who simply want to be seen to perform, even to 
outperform other Departments. Some Departments have recently approached 
Pete for assistance in the creation of a business to give contracts to. This is such 
a change from before the introduction of the IPP targets. 
The management of workflow is also important. There needs to be work of a size 
that can be managed and there needs to be a regular flow of work, particularly if 
the business is to train up and employ young people. 
In order for a young business [to grow] … they need a quantum of work, 
they need continuous work, they need that to be flowing through their 
business in order to do what they really want to do which is to employ, train 
up more indigenous young people and to be handed a hundred fifty 
thousand dollar contract and that’s the only one you’ve got as a sole source 
for an Aboriginal business is really – it’s not enough. It needs a quantum of 
work. 
There also needs to be greater clarity about what constitutes value for money. It 
needs to be made clear that reference to the known market is a legitimate 
indication of ‘value for money’ even in a single source situation. It would help if 
‘value for money’ could clearly include social factors – employment of Aboriginal 
employment. 
It may also be that the time frame for the targets is too short to create an 
Indigenous economy. 
One thing the mandatory IPP targets have done is to encourage State 
Governments to follow suit. We’re seeing WA, NSW, the ACT and Victoria 
looking at following. 
I think is really important is that the federal government did not understand 
that it’s not about them … the IBE and subsequent procurement policies are 
about driving the private sector to invest in Indigenous businesses. 
It is important that there is attention to training so that there will be the people 
to take into the Aboriginal businesses as they grow, particularly in the area of 
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professional positions. There also needs to be attention to encouraging 
businesses in remote areas. 
Black-Cladding 
There is an extreme minority where clearly a black person is being put in front of 
a non-Indigenous business to try and pick up work. That is what black cladding is. 
There is not a lot of that because it is obvious. This is different from where there 
is a genuine developing partnership. 
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4.12. Leah Armstrong, 13 April 2016 (Group C) 
Chairperson, Supply Nation 
Describe Your Organisation 
Leah Armstrong is the Chairperson of Supply Nation. Supply Nation, previously 
known as the Australian Indigenous Minority Supplier Council, was set up in 
2009 specifically to promote and advocate the growth of Indigenous-owned 
businesses through the supply chains of major corporations and government 
agencies. It’s modelled on the US National Minority Supplier Development 
Council model set up under the Nixon administration 40 years ago. In the US the 
target is broader than Indigenous suppliers to extend to other minority groups. 
Subsequently some leaders from the US Council came out and did a round of 
discussions with State and Commonwealth officials advocating the development 
of supply chain models. That did not lead to immediate legislative change along 
the US model but the Commonwealth did announce its Indigenous Opportunities 
Policy which included the IBE which was introduced in 2011. 
Describe Your Involvement with IBE 
It is probably true to say that the Commonwealth Government, particularly with 
the IOP first and then the IPP, has primarily an Indigenous employment 
generation objective.  
The model that [Supply Nation] took from the US was about creating wealth 
in Indigenous families and giving Indigenous-owned businesses and creating 
that space in the economy for entrepreneurship as they have done in the 
US. But most definitely, the Australian policy context both with the 
development of the IOP and the current one [the IPP] have always tried to 
focus on is that there should be that employment outcome in it. And it is a 
bit of a tension, … employment is an outcome. We’re not disagreeing that 
employment can be – is an outcome, but it’s not a measure. 
Supply National has pushed back on this but certainly the language of 
Government and the Forrest Review focusses on the improved Indigenous 
employment outcomes that arise in Indigenous firms.  
It is important that the additional outcome of employment creation does not 
overwhelm the key objective of Indigenous firm development. The issue may 
lead to some conservative reaction to the IPP into the future. 
The role of Supply Nation in the IBE (IPP) is to provide the certification that the 
supplier being considered is indeed Indigenous. It was a function that was 
adopted from the US model. So the role of Supply Nation was to identify and 
certify Aboriginal-owned businesses at 51 per cent and to assist with networking 
and making connections; providing a way for government agencies and 
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corporate procurement officers to approach, identify and make the connection. 
Then Supply Nation would monitor the spend and the actual contract. 
Since the introduction of the IPP in July 2015, Supply Nation introduced a 50 per 
cent Indigenous-owned registration process as well as the earlier 51 per cent 
certification process that had previously been in place. The certification process 
also involves Supply Nation being satisfied that the CEO is Indigenous and that 
the decision-making control is with an Indigenous owner. 
Previously the Supply Nation database was only open to Supply Nation members 
(both Indigenous suppliers and non-Indigenous procurers). The new Indigenous 
direct database is a free, open source database for anyone to access. Supply 
Nation continues to do the training and networking functions. 
Issues that Have Impacted on IBE 
The original IBE was a ‘best endeavours’ policy. At the same time a number of 
private sector corporations were also identifying potential procurement targets 
as part of their reconciliation action plan processes. When the IBE was reviewed 
in 2014 it became apparent that the Commonwealth spend was about $6 million 
compared to about $30 million from the private sector. Clearly it was not 
effective and just was not being utilised. 
Even though the Supply Nation database was there, many Commonwealth 
agency procurement officers had no real awareness of it and if they were aware 
had no real motivation to go out of their way to use it. If they had used it, it was 
there. 
However, it is not just a question of knowing about the list. There is also the 
issue about whether a procurement official had confidence in the capacity of the 
suppliers on the list to deliver the product. Even if an Indigenous supplier had 
gone out and satisfied whatever pre-tendering requirements had been put in 
place that does not mean the procuring officer will have confidence in capacity. 
In part this confidence issue may have arisen in the way that Indigenous firms 
presented themselves. In part it may have risen because of the limited 
experience of procurement officers with the Indigenous community. 
These procurement officers probably never even had any contact with 
Indigenous people, let alone Indigenous-owned businesses. 
There is also just the normal risk aversion in a procuring officer against doing 
something new and unusual. The IPP targets operate as a tacit encouragement 
to use the policy and that helps although it is also the accountability factor of 
having target and having to report against it. 
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Ways IBE Can Be Improved 
The Departments that have had real success, say Tax and Defence, are those 
Departments that have built relationships with suppliers.  
… if you look at Defence, and even ATO, … as an example, in the last 12 
months, they have really sort of skyrocketed in their procurement. They talk 
about how their success has been around how they’ve been engaging and 
building relationships.  
A lot comes down to the ability of the individual procurement officer to identify 
and build those relationships. 
It must be remembered that the IBE has been in place only for four years. When 
there are much more sophisticated Indigenous businesses and much more 
growth in the sector the risk aversion of procurement officers will not be such an 
issue. It is still early, Supply Nation has been to meetings where procurement 
officers have struggled to understand that an Indigenous business does not 
necessarily have a cultural aspect to it, or why shouldn’t an Indigenous business 
import product from China, since virtually every other business does. 
Pre-qualification requirements can be an impediment to Indigenous suppliers 
wanting to take up Government work. There are other issues that need to be 
looked at: access to capital, expert human resources, existence of networks, and 
the absence of specialist advice. All of these matters need to be addressed and 
targets alone won’t do that. The issue of the need to maintain cash flow in the 
slow process of undertaking Commonwealth work can also be an impediment. 
The 25 per cent equity JV would lead to improved employment outcomes and 
that may be the motivation behind the Creating Parity recommendation. 
IBA has capital and a wealth of experience; it certainly has a role to play. It has 
expanded its role as a commercial broker with a unit set up intended to identify 
big Commonwealth contracts that could go to Indigenous businesses that IBA 
could support. It’s unclear where this project is at. They also had a fast-track loan 
program but it is not clear how utilised it was. 
Black-Cladding 
The US maintains the 51 per cent standard as does Supply Nation. Supply Nation 
introduced the 50 per cent registration classification really to accommodate 
Government. However it’s important that Government understands that 50 per 
cent does not ensure that Indigenous people are at the forefront in terms of 
decision-making and control of the business. 
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… you could even have a 50 percent ownership of a business, and pretty 
much the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander owner is put up as the 
spokesperson or the front, I guess, in other words. However, [that owner] 
has no sort of control or management decision-making. So it’s pretty much 
basically a clad or a front for a non-Indigenous person so that – that’s my 
interpretation of the black cladding business. 
It has not come through as a real issue yet. It does not need highlighting but it is 
something that people should be conscious of. That’s why Supply Nation is 
maintaining the 51 per cent certification. It’s also important to maintain the 
public credibility of the IPP. 
The US also has a separate registration category for JVs with a lower percentage 
of minority equity. In this category there are criteria around strategies for 
increasing minority equity and control and for the non-minority interest’s exit. 
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 CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS 
5.1. Introduction 
At the outset it is useful to restate the research question that this investigation 
aims to clarify. This was earlier stated as being: What factors have limited the 
effectiveness of the IBE? 
From this central question several subquestions were identified: 
• What are the circumstances when the IBE has been used? 
• What benefit to Indigenous people can be attributed to the IBE? 
• Why is the IBE not utilised more often? 
• How can these identified limiting factors be overcome? 
In attempting to address these questions this analysis Chapter is comprised of 
seven sections following this introduction. Section 5.1 will consider the data 
gathered in relation to the circumstances of use of the IBE and will analyse 
respondents’ information regarding Indigenous employment in the firms that 
were considered as part of the research. Section 5.2 provides an introduction to 
the structure of analysis of respondents’ responses to the issues of what were 
the perceived significant factors affecting usage of the IBE and how it could be 
improved. It also provides a summary of the respondents’ responses. Sections 
5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 will look at key factors identified by respondents as affecting the 
level of use of the IBE. Each of these sections will also contain analysis of 
respondents’ suggestions as to how these limiting factors may be overcome.  
As may be recalled from Chapter 1 above these key factors can be clustered into 
related issues Foremost amongst these ‘clusters’ is the combination of 
‘procurement officer risk aversion’; ‘doubts about supply certainty’; ‘calculating 
value for money’; and ‘procurement officer conservatism’ as related negative 
factors. These factors were seen as connected with ‘introduction of targets’; 
‘greater advocacy’; ‘tolerance of mistakes’; ‘better measuring’; and ‘better 
definition of value for money’. These matters are discussed in section 5.3. 
Another ‘cluster’ was the factor ‘lack of supplier development work by procuring 
agency’ being (loosely) linked to ‘certification requirements’ and likely to be 
diminished by methods such as ‘greater emphasis on supplier development’; 
‘discussion with suppliers about allocations’; ‘state government adoption’; 
‘ongoing policy stability’; and ‘more emphasis on training the Indigenous 
workforce’. The improvement methods of ‘more practical training for suppliers’ 
and having a ‘central point of contact in departments’ were often connected to 
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responses around this cluster. These second cluster of factors are discussed in 
section 5.4. 
A third broad cluster was comprised of the factors ‘awareness amongst 
suppliers’ and ‘limited supply options’. These factors were linked and seen as 
connected to the improvement methods of ‘development of a greater spread of 
Indigenous businesses’; ‘more precision in the Supply Nation directory’; and 
‘greater role for IBA’. Chapter 5 contains the complete analysis of the negative 
factors impacting upon utilisation of the IBE and the methods by which 
respondents suggested these factors could be overcome. This third group is 
discussed in section 5.5. 
Section 5.6 raises the issue of ‘black-cladding’. Black-cladding was not part of the 
original research question or subquestions. A number of respondents however 
referred to the matter during interviews, particularly in the context of the 
discussion of the desirability of developing JV arrangements as a method of 
increasing Indigenous supplier capacity and diversity. Respondents’ comments 
on the issue of black-cladding are included in the reports of their interviews and 
section 5.6 provides some analysis of these comments. 
5.2. Use of the IBE and Aboriginal Employment 
5.2.1. Extent of Use of the IBE 
It will be recalled that earlier in this paper the findings of the ANAO on use of the 
IBE between 2011 and 2015 were provided. This material constituted the only 
publicly available data on the use of the IBE for this period. The tabular summary 
is reproduced below for ease of reference (ANAO 2015, 73): 
 
Entity Nature of Contract Date Value 
Industry Event Management June 2013 $0.1 million 
Defence Construction May 2014 $0.7 million 
Defence Construction January 2015 $1.5 million 
Department of 
Human Services 
Cleaning February 2015 $8.3 million 
 
The research interviews conducted between February 2016 and April 2016 
suggested that this data was not comprehensive. The interviews with Shane 
Jacobs [86] of PSG and Phil Lindenmayer [99] of DHS indicate that nine contracts 
were awarded to PSG prior to July 2015 when the IPP targets were introduced. 
Three of these appear to be caught in the ANAO data. The interviews with Simon 
Walter [71-72], Jeremy Clark [76] and Anonymous [82] indicated that there were 
several other contracts that were negotiated in the period before July 2015 but 
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executed after that date. These contracts will presumably be identified in the 
data relating to achievement of the IPP targets. Despite this, the fact of their in-
principle conclusion in the period prior to July 2015 suggests they are usefully 
included in the current analysis. In total this would suggest that approximately 
11 contracts can be attributed to the IBE. This conclusion must though be subject 
to two qualifications.  
First, as will be remembered, the IBE operates as an exemption to the 
requirement contained in Division 2 of the CPR that contracts for the supply of 
goods and services of a value above $80,000 or construction services above $7.5 
million be awarded subsequent to a public tender process. As such, technically, 
the award of a construction services contract of a value of less than $7.5 million 
is not by virtue of operation of the IBE. On this technical analysis in the period to 
July 2015 that there appears to have been only two contracts that would have 
exceeded that value: one to PSG for the provision of cleaning services to DHS 
and the other also to PSG for construction services to the ATO. Shane Jacobs [82] 
suggested the ATO contract was the consequence of a tender process. It is not 
immediately clear whether that was a public tender process. 
The technical operation of the IBE with respect to Division 2 of the CPR noted, it 
must also be noted that several respondents (Yvette Simms [113], Ian Cumming 
[95]-[96], Simon Walter [72]) confirmed that irrespective of the Division 2 
thresholds, single source tenders for a contract of any significant value (which 
appeared to be in excess of $100,000) can be attributed to the existence of the 
IBE. This is not to suggest that as a matter of course contracts above 
(approximately) $100,000 are not put to public tender. Rather it was suggested 
that a single source tender would only be used if there was a particular reason 
for doing so. The reliable previous provision of a service by a supplier was the 
most likely reason identified. The existence of the IBE constituted another. This 
analysis was presumably the rationale for the ANAO identifying three contracts 
that are below Division 2 thresholds as attributable to the IBE. 
The second qualification, which is related to the first, is that in the interview with 
Yvette Simms [112] of Department of Finance it was suggested that in the years 
2012-13 and 2013-2014 there were a total 48 contracts awarded to Supply 
Nation registered businesses. It is unclear how many of these were awarded as a 
result of a single source tender. Following on from the discussion above, if any of 
these 48 contracts were awarded as a result of a single source tender then they 
could, for consistency’s sake, be attributed to the IBE. 
These ambiguities noted, the current analysis will consider the circumstances of 
the award of the contracts to PSG, Barpa and eNPC. While this may not be a 
comprehensive identification of all contracts attributable to the IBE it is a 
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number significantly in excess of that identified by the ANAO and would 
represent a significant sample of the 48 contracts identified by Yvette Simms of 
the Department of Finance. 
An issue that these considerations highlight is that there was no requirement or 
even mechanism to identify that a contract awarded to an Indigenous firm as a 
result of a single source tender was pursuant to, or even attributable to, the IBE. 
With the introduction of the procurement targets under the IPP an opportunity 
(and a motivation) for Departments to identify the award of contracts as a result 
of the IBE is introduced in order to demonstrate satisfaction of the relevant IPP 
targets. Further, the absence of easily accessible data as to the use of the IBE 
may have impacted on the perception of ‘risk’ around its use that is discussed in 
the following section. 
5.2.2. Circumstances of Use of IBE 
The identified IBE attributable contracts were awarded to three firms. Of these 
the overwhelming majority of contracts were awarded to a single firm, PSG. 
Further, overwhelmingly the contracts were for constructions services. Two 
were for cleaning services. One (identified by the ANAO) was for event 
management. All the firms that can be identified as having been awarded IBE 
attributable contracts were ‘established’ firms. Barpa could be seen as operating 
as an exception to this as it was a newly established JV. However, given that the 
non-Indigenous JV partner business had been involved in construction for in 
excess of 150 years, Barpa too could be said to have many characteristics of an 
established company. Finally, all the identified contracts were awarded by four 
Departments, with DHS and Defence awarding the greatest number. As the 
interviews with Phil Lindenmayer [99] and Ian Cumming [96] indicate, all the 
contracts awarded by these Departments were the result of a deliberate 
program of ‘supplier development’ by the Departments aimed at creating an 
ongoing and expanding relationship with the chosen supplier. In short it would 
appear that (with the possible exception of the ANAO identified ‘event 
management’ contract) there is no instance of a firm becoming aware of a 
contract in advance of public advertisement and demanding award pursuant to 
the IBE. As Simon Walter states [72]: 
It is unlikely that a ‘cold call’ seeking allocation of a particular job would be 
successful. Despite the IBE, if the procuring officials did not want to allocate 
a job to a firm, plenty of ways could be found to avoid doing so. 
In summary, in all the cases that could be identified during the research period, 
the IBE was used only in circumstances where there was cooperation between 
an established Indigenous firm and a department which had an identified 
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objective of developing an Indigenous supplier with a view to a creating long-
term commercial relationship with that supplier. 
5.2.3. Employment Outcomes 
The fact that the Commonwealth’s objective in supporting the IBE (and 
subsequently the IPP) was to increase Indigenous employment levels was 
broadly accepted by all respondents and was documented in the 
Commonwealth’s own IPP related research and information (DPMC 2014; DPMC 
2015c). The research that supports this objective on the basis that an increase in 
Indigenous employment levels leads to an improvement in a range of other 
social economic indicators has previously been referred to (Biddle 2011; SCRGSP 
2014). So too has the research that suggests that Indigenous firms’ increase in 
the level of economic activity undertaken by Indigenous-owned enterprises 
should lead to an increase in the number of Indigenous Australians in the labour 
force (Altman 2001; Furneaux & Brown 2008; Hunter 2014). The greater rate of 
Indigenous employment in Indigenous firms has been quantified by Hunter 
(2014) who finds that Indigenous majority-owned Indigenous businesses 
reported 72.4 per cent Indigenous workforce. The figure for majority Indigenous-
owned and jointly owned business as a composite class was on average a 64 per 
cent Indigenous workforce. The equivalent figure for non-Indigenous business is 
0.7 per cent. 
The employment outcomes reported by the representatives of the Indigenous 
firms interviewed support this research and the Commonwealth’s faith in the 
notion that facilitating the expansion in Indigenous firms will improve Indigenous 
employment levels. Shane Jacobs [86] from PSG reported an increase in 
Indigenous employment from approximately 10 per cent to in excess of 36 per 
cent and a significant Indigenous supply chain. Anonymous [82] from eNPC 
reports a 50-60 per cent Indigenous employment rate. Marcia Langton [90] 
when speaking of ICRG reports a 70 per cent Indigenous employment rate. 
Simon Walter [71] and Jeremy Clark [76] from Barpa report a 75 per cent 
Indigenous workforce. While the Barpa workforce is small (four individuals) they 
also reported on the introduction programs to measure and improve Indigenous 
employment levels in the more numerous subcontractors. Finally Anonymous (2) 
[103] from FMG reported that amongst that companies suppliers an Indigenous 
employment base of 4 per cent in 2011 before the introduction of Indigenous 
procurement policies had improved to levels of between 8  and 10 per cent for a 
non-Indigenous company and up to 40-50 per cent for an Indigenous company. 
Anonymous (2) reported that the current overall percentage (Indigenous and 
non- Indigenous companies averaged) was 13 per cent. 
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While this sample is too small to represent a valid quantitative investigation it 
certainly suggests that the Commonwealth’s ambition of improving Indigenous 
employment through encouraging the growth of Indigenous businesses is well 
placed. 
5.3. Factors that Affect Utilisation of the IBE 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The following three sections of this Chapter examine the factors that were 
identified by the respondents as negatively impacting upon the utilisation of the 
IBE by Commonwealth departments. This matter of course constituted one of 
the main questions put to respondents during the interview. A further question 
put went to suggestions for how the efficacy of the IBE could be improved.  
It will be recalled that as part of the literature review chapter it was noted that 
Flynn, McKevitt and Davis (2015, 446-447) identified seven main impediments to 
SME participation in public procurement. These were: 
• Bureaucracy; 
• Lack of communication between SMEs and public procurers and too much 
weighting on cost; 
• SME lack of knowledge over how to source opportunities or engage with procedural 
aspects of tendering; 
• Onerous tender documentation and unprofessional procurement staff; 
• Time demands of completing tender documentation; 
• Requirements of previous relevant experience and financial costs of tendering; and 
• Large contract size and information asymmetries. 
Of course the foregoing factors were identified as impediments to SME 
participation in public procurement generally, not factors that affected the usage 
of a procurement program that had the secondary objective of the 
encouragement of SMEs. This distinction noted, it is still worthwhile to bear in 
mind these identified impediments when considering the factors identified by 
respondents in the current study. The above factors are considered again at the 
conclusion of this Chapter in light of the analysis of the research results. 
As outlined in the methodology chapter the interview recordings were 
transcribed and the transcriptions analysed by the researcher. The responses to 
these questions were ‘coded’ in the sense that the information contained in the 
transcript was subdivided and assigned into categories for the purpose of 
creating links between locations in the data and sets of concepts or idea (Basit 
2003). The data, once assigned into categories, was tabulated and the number of 
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respondents identifying a factor as impacting negatively on the use of the IBE 
summed. The tabulated information is presented below. 
Factor Number of Responses 
Procurement officer risk aversion 11 
Doubts about supply certainty − factor in risk aversion 7 
Calculating ‘value for money’ − factor in risk aversion 8 
Officer conservatism/lack of motivation − factor in risk 
aversion 
8 
Awareness (amongst suppliers) 7 
Lack of supply options 7 
Lack of supplier development work by procuring agency 8 
Certification requirements 6 
 
It should be noted that respondents were not limited as to the number of factors 
that could be identified. Nor were they asked to rank factors on the basis of 
significance. Despite this a number of respondents did identify what in their view 
was the single most significant factor. This identification is discussed in the 
sections below in the context of closer analysis of each of the factors identified. 
Respondents were also asked to identify methods that could improve the 
efficacy of the IBE. As with factors that negatively impacted on usage of the IBE, 
the responses were ‘coded’ and the data, once assigned into categories, was 
tabulated and the number of respondents suggesting a identifying a method as 
leading to possible improvement in efficacy summed. The tabulated information 
is presented below. 
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Method Number of Responses 
Introduction of targets (IPP) 12 
Greater advocacy 4 
Better measuring 6 
Better (re)definition of value for money 4 
Determine IPP targets by contract value alone 1 
Greater emphasis on supplier development 9 
Discussion with suppliers about allocations 5 
More practical training for suppliers 5 
Central contact point in Departments 1 
Greater flexibility in JV ownership arrangements 2 
Development of greater spread of Indigenous businesses 2 
More precision in Supply Nation directory 4 
Greater role for IBA 2 
More emphasis on training Indigenous workforce 2 
Tolerance of mistakes 2 
State government adoption 5 
Ongoing policy stability 2 
 
 As with the negatively impacting factors, respondents were not limited in the 
number of methods they could suggest nor were they asked to rank the 
importance of the methods they did suggest. Again despite this a number of 
respondents did identify what in their view was the single most important 
method of improvement in their view. 
Although clearly separated in the foregoing tables, various negative factors and 
methods of improvement were often connected in respondents’ responses. 
Foremost amongst these ‘clusters’ was the combination of ‘procurement officer 
risk aversion’; ‘doubts about supply certainty’; ‘calculating value for money’; and 
‘procurement officer conservatism’ as related negative factors. These factors 
were seen as being connected with ‘introduction of targets’; ‘greater advocacy’; 
‘tolerance of mistakes’; ‘better measuring’; and ‘better definition of value for 
money’.  
Another ‘cluster’ was the factor of ‘lack of supplier development work by 
procuring agency’ being (loosely) linked to ‘certification requirements’ and likely 
to be diminished by methods such as ‘greater emphasis on supplier 
development’; ‘discussion with suppliers about allocations’; ‘state government 
adoption’; ‘ongoing policy stability’; and ‘more emphasis on training the 
Indigenous workforce’. The improvement methods of ‘more practical training for 
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suppliers and having a ‘central point of contact in departments’ were often 
connected to responses around this cluster. 
A third broad cluster was comprised of the factors ‘awareness amongst 
suppliers’ and ‘limited supply options’. These factors were linked and seen as 
connected to the improvement methods of ‘development of a greater spread of 
Indigenous businesses’; ‘more precision in the Supply Nation directory’; and 
‘greater role for IBA’. The following sections of this Chapter will analyse each of 
these clustered factors and methods of improvement. 
5.3.2. Risk 
5.3.2.1. Sources of Risk 
Overwhelmingly the view that use of the IBE was seen as a risk by procuring 
officers was identified as the single most significant factor affecting utilisation of 
the IBE. It was identified as a factor by 11 of the 12 respondents (the other 
respondent did not address the issue of public servant perceptions at all). Six 
respondents nominated perception of risk as the single most important factor in 
the limited usage of the IBE. Interestingly it was also seen by Anonymous (2) 
[99]-[100] as the most significant factor that had negatively impacted upon the 
FMG procurement program. As Marcia Langton [90] described the issue − there 
was reluctance to use the policy by Commonwealth officers because of the 
perceived “inherent risks involved in implementing the policy”.  
5.3.2.2. Value for Money 
The ‘risk’ was seen as comprised of three elements. The first element was that 
under a single source tendering arrangement it was difficult for a procuring 
officer to demonstrate satisfaction of the CPR requirement to achieve ‘value for 
money’. Eight respondents identified this as a factor. As noted in Chapter 2 it 
was also identified by the ANAO (2015, 23): 
Entity staff interviewed by the ANAO perceived a number of potential 
barriers to the IBE’s use, including … having sufficient information to assess 
whether a value for money outcome would be achieved through the use of 
the IBE, compared to undertaking an open tender process.  
Concern about the ability to demonstrate the achievement of ‘value for money’ 
under a single source procurement arrangement is often connected to a 
conflation of lowest price with ‘value for money’. As noted above in Chapter 2, 
the CPR Division 1 rules specify value for money includes (rule 4.5): 
 
a. the quality of the goods and services;  
b. fitness for purpose of the proposal;  
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c. the potential supplier’s relevant experience and performance history;  
d. flexibility of the proposal (including innovation and adaptability over the 
lifecycle of the procurement);  
e. environmental sustainability of the proposed goods and services (such as 
energy efficiency and environmental impact); and  
f. whole-of-life costs.  
The ‘whole of life’ costs are defined to include matters such as original purchase 
price, maintenance costs and disposal costs.  
The recognition that value for money ‘is rarely synonymous with lowest price’ is 
commonly recognised also in relevant literature. Yet, also as noted in Chapter 2, 
quantitative analysis of public (as compared to private) procurement officers 
involved in construction projects in the UK found that 78 per cent of officials saw 
tender price as equal to or more important than all other ‘project specific 
criteria’. The equivalent figure in private sector procurement was 68 per cent. 
Anonymous (2) [103] identified a concern around achieving value for money in 
the sense of cost as one of the key factors that initially impeded the FMG 
procurement policy. 
It would appear than that identification of a concern about achieving value for 
money is not simply a concern about achieving lowest price but that price is 
likely to be a significant factor in this concern. 
A common basis for the conflation of price and value for money is described by 
Phil Lindenmayer [100]: 
… where you have a busy and in some cases, stressed procurement person 
and they’re trying to say, “Okay well, holistically does this represent better 
value for money?” “Oh, geez. I don't know. They look sort of fairly similar. 
I’ll take the cheaper one.” That tends to be – it’s much easier to be able to 
argue to somebody – to say – just to prove this was the lowest bid. 
Irrespective of the extent to which price is conflated with broader notions of 
value for money, respondents queried whether the practice of single source, 
compared to open, tendering was the basis of the concern about achievement of 
value for money. The nuance in the identification of assurance of the 
achievement of value for money as a factor impeding use of the IBE is described 
by Yvette Simms [114]: 
I agree that that was the perception. I’ve heard that many times. I disagree 
with it.  
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She continued [114] that she knew of:  
… many examples of people justifying a condition for limited tender so they 
can approach a single supplier that they used before that doesn’t happen to 
be indigenous business ... There are lots of creative ways of getting the 
business that you want, so – if people can find the ability to do that, then 
they can absolutely be able to justify value for money when approaching a 
single supplier from a different perspective. 
Similarly, Ian Cumming [97] was of the view that Defence had no concern in the 
satisfaction of value for money requirements through reference to other similar 
acquisitions and many other ways: 
… there's many different ways that you can test the value for money 
proposition. So I don't think there was a discomfort from our point of view 
on that basis.  
These comments suggest that while respondents identified both risk aversion 
generally and specifically concern about demonstration of the achievement of 
value for money as factors that impacted upon the use of the IBE, embedded 
within these factors two core elements appear to emerge from the respondents’ 
comments. The first factor was concern around supplier capacity. Seven 
respondents identified this factor. The second element was a general resistance 
to change also described as an ‘absence of motivation’ for change on the part of 
procurement officers. Eight respondents identified this factor. 
5.3.2.3. Supplier Capacity 
Supplier capacity is explicitly identified in the CPR definition of value for money 
(“the potential supplier’s relevant experience and performance history” and “the 
quality of the goods and services”). Accordingly the notion of supplier capacity as 
an aspect of concern around achieving value for money should be 
acknowledged. Phil Lindenmayer [100]-[101] referred to a perception amongst 
some procurement officers that Indigenous firms were not ‘real players’ or 
‘industrial strength’. The perception of the limited capacity or reliability of 
Indigenous businesses was described quite directly by Ian Cumming [96]: 
I think there is still some caution about going to an Aboriginal business 
because people don't want to be seen to be told to go to an Aboriginal 
business because they aren't necessarily a business that will fulfil the 
obligations of the contract … but I think people still perceive that there is 
this thing "why would you go to an Aboriginal business when they can't do 
the job when there is someone who can?" Well, the understanding is of 
course that you don't go to somebody who can't do the job whether they be 
whatever colour, race, creed, or whatever.  
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Yvette Simms [113] identified that the supplier capacity issue often manifested 
in a simple uncertainty of the unknown, noting that while any individual would 
use a firm that they or an acquaintance had had a positive experience of 
previously but that: 
[t]hat’s very different to the proposition which is there is a business that I’ve 
never heard of … I have no idea whether or not they’ve ever delivered 
anything to the Commonwealth before and me taking a chance on that 
business. So I think the fact that it is Indigenous business is irrelevant. It’s 
just the unknown. 
Leah Armstrong [121] identified two possible bases for the perception of 
supplier capacity as involving unacceptable risk, noting that in part the 
confidence issue may have arisen in the way that Indigenous firms presented 
themselves. In part it may have risen because of the limited experience of 
procurement officers with the Indigenous community. She stated: 
These procurement officers probably never even had any contact with 
Indigenous people, let alone Indigenous-owned businesses. 
The uncertainty regarding supplier capacity was reported also in the case of the 
Barpa JV company. As Jeremy Clark described it [77]: 
One of the issues we came up against was the fact that Barpa was a new 
company, even though our capacity partner, Cockram, has been around for 
150 years and has a fantastic track record on jobs and it has done jobs up to 
140 million dollars’ worth. There was some uncertainty about Barpa’s track 
record because we didn’t have one … But our capacity partner has done 
heaps, and they – while, they accepted that; in the bureaucratic type black 
and white mind, we had no track record. 
Interestingly, Anonymous (2) [103] identified procurement officer concern 
around supplier capacity and reliability as the second key factor that initially 
impeded the FMG procurement policy. 
5.3.2.4. Procurement Officer Conservatism 
Another element of the overall factor of risk aversion that was frequently 
reported was that of the inherent conservatism of those undertaking a 
procurement function. The basis of this conservatism was described by Phil 
Lindenmayer [100]: 
… for very good reason … what tends to happen is that the processes are 
designed to be repeatable and therefore … take some of the perceived or 
actual risk out of the procurement. [This] allows you to get a comparatively 
secure or comparatively reliable … acceptable outcome each time you do it. 
And therefore when there is something sort of new that doesn’t fit the 
mould, then there’s a sense of “oh, well, what risk does this bring?”  
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The inter-relation between conservatism and risk aversion was also identified by 
Simon Walter [73]: 
It just goes against all their public sector grain of, you know, the heavy 
responsibility they have to spend public money and the incredible due 
process they have to go through, the burden of all that, to suddenly short 
circuit it with this favouritism is kind of possibly seen as risky. 
Yvette Sims suggested [114] that this reluctance to try something new is simply 
human nature in noting: 
… a reluctance to do something different … that’s far broader than just 
engaging Indigenous business. That’s just part of human nature, in my view. 
Phil Lindenmayer [100] suggested procurement officers are particularly likely to 
be averse to the novel: 
The psychology issue is that people who tend to be attracted to do 
government procurement are people who are very comfortable with 
structure, process, and I suppose, the need to be able to demonstrate and 
document. So, [it is] their sort of natural behaviour. 
 This inherent risk aversion is compounded by a lack of incentive as Maya Stuart 
Fox [109] reported: 
… why would you, as a procurement officer, stick your neck out? You don’t 
have to. No one rewards you for doing it. Everyone kind of raises an 
eyebrow. Why are you doing it? So the only people that really did it was 
where you had a … clear alignment with organisational mission, where you 
could … make an argument in those terms, but … why would people in 
Department of Education or … anywhere else, or defence? Procurement 
officers being who they are – they’re good at running processes. Social 
policy is not their gig. Saving the world is not their gig. Getting good value 
for money is. There were just no drivers. There were zero drivers. 
5.3.2.5. Risk Summarised 
The headline factor of ‘risk’ can then be seen to be comprised of several 
components; some actual, some more psychological. The perceived risk in the 
use of the IBE can be seen as stemming from a concern that value for money in 
the sense of price may not be able to be demonstrated. It also manifests in an 
apparently greater concern that an Indigenous supplier may fail to perform their 
contractual obligations (which constitutes an additional attribute of ‘value for 
money’). This concern in turn has two components: first, the concern that stems 
from trying any new supplier; and, second, the concern that stems from using an 
Indigenous business in circumstances where the procuring officer may have had 
no experience of Indigenous businesses or even Indigenous people. The final 
component is more psychological. It suggests that any one, particularly a person 
likely to be attracted to work in government procurement, is unlikely to want to 
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do something new if there is no immediate benefit and some apparent risk in 
doing so. Under the heading of ‘risk’ it remains to consider what methods of 
overcoming the cluster of risk related factors where suggested by respondents. 
5.3.3. Overcoming Risk 
Four methods of overcoming risk where identified. Broadly these were: 
‘introduction of targets’; ‘greater advocacy’; ‘better measuring’; and ‘better 
definition of value for money’. At the outset it should be noted that while 
respondents saw merit in each of these methods, the methods were also seen as 
connected in that each of them ‘legitimised’ the use of the IBE by procurement 
officers. This theme is explored further below as part of the consideration of 
each individual method. 
5.3.3.1. Introduction of Targets 
Shane Jacobs [88] summed up the commonly identified two-fold effect of the 
introduction of the IPP targets: 
I think that was the game changer and I think now it’s filtering through the 
DNA of federal government. I think; one with the targets; and, two; with all 
the media that’s around it and you know, Nigel Scullion saying “this has to 
happen, this is happening … there’s a target now”. You know, the Ministers 
or the Dep secretaries are going to sit in front of budget estimates and 
they’re going to ask them “Why didn’t you do it?”. 
The IPP targets are seen as important because of the requirement to comply 
with them but perhaps more importantly because they legitimise use of the IBE 
(or Indigenous single source supply more generally). The accuracy of this 
perception amongst respondents is supported by the over-achievement of the 
2015-16 targets reported by DPMC. 
The interconnectedness of the imposition of targets with the legitimacy, indeed 
the imperative, to use the IBE is summed up by Maya Stuart-Fox [110]: 
The secretary [of DPMC] has made very clear to the other secretaries that 
they are going to be meeting this target. We have had the Minister write to 
the other Ministers, because it is important. … [S]o, in other words, it’s 
come absolutely from the top-down and everyone’s been told to do it. We 
have met and spoken to every single procurement group and team. 
The juxtaposition in the situation after the imposition of targets: “it’s come 
absolutely from the top-down and everyone’s been told to do it” with that 
before the imposition of targets: “There were just no drivers. There were zero 
drivers”, both as described by Maya Stuart-Fox is marked. 
The unanimous endorsement for the introduction of the IPP targets from 
respondents was accompanied by comments that went to the structure of the 
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targets. Simon Walter [69] noted how particularly important the remote area 
set-aside was. A number of respondents commented on the issue of setting 
targets by reference to contract value or contract number. The IPP currently sets 
departmental targets by reference to contract number but imputes an averaged 
value to each contract and allows a department to satisfy targets also by 
reference to the value of contracts awarded. There were mixed views on the 
issue. 
Marcia Langton [92] was firm in the view that targets should be set by value: 
[A] Commonwealth department could go to four Indigenous companies and 
sole source four contracts for, say, stationery, and each contract’s worth 
$5,000 and then they’ve reached their target. But what is the point of that? 
That is not creating economic development. It’s not encouraging 
entrepreneurship. It’s not actually the spirit of the policy in any way at all in 
terms of sharing the government spend fairly with the Indigenous business 
sector, that’s cheating the system. 
Professor Langton and Anonymous (2) both noted that the successful FMG One 
Billion Opportunities procurement policy utilised value (and not number) based 
targets. The FMG policy was the basis for the recommendation in the Creating 
Parity report that was the foundation for the IPP targets. 
By contrast Shane Jacobs [89] noted that if some Departments issued a lot of 
small office supply contracts just to satisfy the target even that would assist in 
developing small Indigenous office supply companies. The issue of number 
versus value of contracts was also intertwined with the process of developing 
purchaser confidence in suppliers’ capacity through issuing contracts of 
increasing value. 
As noted in the introduction to this discussion an examination of the DPMC 
2015-2016 IPP target data indicates that 1,509 contracts with a total value of 
$284 million have been issued over this period. The average contract value was 
approximately $188,000. Information about the median data value was not 
currently available. However, information released by departments (DFAT 2016) 
and that revealed by the research suggested that within the total contract value 
were a number of quite significant contracts issued. This would of course 
operate to reduce the average contract value. Without more detailed data in 
relation to the 2015-16 IPP targets further analysis is difficult. It will have to 
suffice at this stage to note the dichotomy of views represented on one hand by 
Professor Langton who advocated using the policy to further develop existing 
businesses into larger businesses and Shane Jacobs on the other who suggests 
that the development of even micro businesses is important. One factor that 
should be considered in this regard is the analysis contained in Morrison et al 
(2014). As noted in Chapter 2 while this research indicates that Indigenous firms 
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of all sizes employed Indigenous people at very high rates, the median number 
of employees across all 324 businesses involved was one. This would suggest 
that in term of the creation of number of Indigenous jobs, encouraging the 
development of larger firms may lead to better outcomes. 
5.3.3.2. Greater Advocacy 
Advocacy of the IBE was specifically identified as a method to increase utilisation 
by both suppliers (Simon Walter and Jeremy Clark) and purchasers (Phil 
Lindenmayer and Ian Cumming). To many other respondents the notion of 
advocacy seemed implied in the discussion around the publication of the setting 
and achievement against targets which is discussed further below.  
As a stand-alone method it was seen as having three important roles. First, as 
suggested above, having political leaders (especially government ministers) 
advocate use of the IBE legitimised use of the exemption and assisted in 
overcoming the risk aversion that to a certain extent was inherent in 
procurement officers. Second, advocacy of the program was seen as an 
important buttress against an expected reaction to the IBE that would eventually 
come from some non-Indigenous business interests that would perceive they 
were disadvantaged by the IBE. Finally, advocacy of the program was seen as 
important insurance against negative reactions created when the inevitable 
occurred and there was either the failure of an Indigenous supplier or allegations 
of mis-governance made against a supplier.  
As Maya Stuart-Fox [111] described the issue: 
I remember the procurement officers being really open about it upfront, 
saying, “Look, things go wrong in contracts all the time, right?” Things go 
wrong in every business all the time, but the first thing that goes wrong 
with an indigenous business, and everyone will go, “Oh, see, that was a – 
that was really high risk. That was a bad idea”. So at some point that’s 
going to happen and we need to be mature enough to say, “You do realise 
this happens all the time”. 
Simon Walter [74] described the general issue of advocacy quite succinctly: 
I think the way to get more out of it is through leadership and through vocal 
advocacy and championing of it and making an example of successful cases 
and say: “Hey everybody! Look at these guys. They used exemption to do 
this. This is fantastic. This is what we want.” If [government is going to] be 
aggressive like that, I think you’ve got to be tolerant of some issues maybe 
arising and having a few stuff ups and saying: “We know there’s gonna be 
stuff ups. That’s what you get”, and it’s not just the Aboriginal businesses 
and contracts that have stuff ups. There’s plenty of stuff ups all over the 
joints, so let’s not have one stuff up in an IBE awarded contract pull it – the 
whole thing. We’re ready for it and we know it’s going to happen, but that’s 
part of what we do, but we’re running a portfolio here. We put 80 contracts 
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out. Three of them went bad, so what? You look at contracts in a white 
business and probably ten of them went bad. So, I just think there’s a real 
need for strong public advocacy and championing and backing people who 
do it. 
5.3.3.3. Better Measuring 
This matter was often seen as a corollary to the introduction of the IPP targets 
and explicitly identified by six respondents. Simply put the issue was that the 
introduction of the IPP targets themselves would not be as effective in achieving 
the desired effect unless there was an effective measurement of a department’s 
achievement of those targets and a consequence for non-achievement. 
Anonymous (2) similarly described the positive impact of introducing Indigenous 
procurement as a KPI for both the company and individual managers in the 
success of the FMG One Billion Opportunities policy. 
Amongst some respondents there was a level dubiousness about the 
genuineness of the enforcement of the targets once promulgated. Jeremy Clark 
[80] is an example: 
The targets have to be enforced and they keep telling us they’re going to be 
and they’re going to be held to account ... Well, I’ll need to see that. 
The issue of accountability for the achievement of targets was often also 
associated with advocacy in a manner described by Phil Lindenmayer [102]: 
… the reporting will create of an impetus of itself, because there is nothing 
as effective as a little bit of creative competition between agency heads. … 
[T]hey want to – what I desperately wanted and still want is our secretary 
to be able to sort of look over the table at secretaries’ board at the 
department of whatever and say, “How are you going with your indigenous 
business target? Oh. By the way, we got to triple our target this year”. 
The attention to improving the measurement of Indigenous supply contracts 
demonstrated by the 2015-16 targets data suggests that Phil Lindenmayer was 
quite prescient. 
5.3.3.4. Better Definition of Value for Money 
This method was identified by three respondents (Pete Dunn, Marcia Langton 
and Anonymous (2)). Anonymous (2) identified it as a method that had been 
employed at FMG. In essence the method suggests that the level of Indigenous 
participation in a supply proposal should form an explicit part of the tender 
evaluation matrix. The effect would be that the level of Indigenous participation 
in a supply proposal would be included as a factor in the definition of ‘value for 
money’ contained in the CPR along with factors such as quality, fitness for 
purpose, supplier flexibility, and environmental sustainability. The rationale 
being that explicit inclusion of Indigenous participation would give procurement 
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officers greater confidence in assessment of Indigenous participation as a 
relevant consideration not only in utilisation of the IBE but also in competitive 
tender situations. 
Anonymous (2) [105] described the process at FMG: 
… [A]s part of the tender evaluation … they were weighted and that score 
would be a part of the overall assessment and evaluation of who actually 
was the successful tenderer. So, what that did was that the … what I call the 
smart contractors, start to realise that it was in their best interest to start to 
form relationships with Aboriginal businesses. And also, the contractors 
started to realise that – well, if they actually went in a joint venture with an 
Aboriginal party, then their score was much higher. 
5.3.3.5. Overcoming Risk Summarised 
Most of the methods of overcoming the reported perceived risk in utilisation of 
the IBE went to the IPP targets and matters associated with the targets. Given 
the staggering turn around in use of the IBE following the imposition of targets, 
this focus would appear completely warranted. Despite any ambiguity in the 
reporting of Indigenous supply contracts that may be contained in 2015-2016 
targets data unarguably the targets have been effective in overcoming 
reluctance in utilisation of the IBE. This noted, there is still merit in the several 
other methods identified. Advocacy had a perceived role in the acceptance of 
the IBE strategy amongst the broader community beyond Commonwealth 
procurement officials, particularly with current or potential Indigenous suppliers. 
Improved measurement and transparency around measurement had an 
advocacy function and helped to give confidence in the IBE process, and the 
redefinition of value for money would assist in the ongoing development of the 
Indigenous supply sector beyond any short-term government program. 
5.3.4. Supplier Development 
The lack of a supplier development oriented approach was the second broad 
cluster of factors seen as impeding utilisation of the IBE and associated remedial 
methods. This cluster included the factors ‘lack of supplier development work by 
procuring agency’ which was often connected at some level to ‘certification 
requirements’. The remedial methods that were suggested were ‘greater 
emphasis on supplier development’; ‘discussion with suppliers about 
allocations’; ‘more practical training for suppliers’ and having a ‘central point of 
contact in departments’. Interestingly the desirability of ‘policy stability’ and 
‘state government adoption’ of IBE style policies was also seen as related 
methods of improving utilisation of the IBE. The analysis of this cluster will 
commence with a discussion of the reported nature and role of supplier 
development. 
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5.3.4.1. The Nature of Supplier Development 
In the context of the current discussion ‘supplier development’ refers to the 
process of a procuring agency establishing direct contact with an Indigenous 
supplier ahead of the making of any procurement decision. The purpose of this 
contact is to allow the procuring officer and the Indigenous supplier to identify 
opportunities that are within the capacity of the Indigenous supplier and in 
addition to map out a program of supply opportunities that will allow the 
capacity of the Indigenous supplier to grow over time.  
The planned growth contemplated by a supplier development approach also has 
the effect of reducing the procuring officer’s perception of risk around engaging 
a new (Indigenous) supplier. This is because the early smaller contract 
opportunities carry only minor consequence in the event of non-performance. 
However, performance of these early contracts allows a demonstration of 
capacity and a reduction in (perceived) risk in the award of later more significant 
contracts. 
Finally, the planned award of contracts of increasing value allows for an 
Indigenous supplier to satisfy certification requirements such as those of the ISO 
14001 relating to Environmental Management Systems and those of the Federal 
Safety Commissioner. Complete certification under both these regimes requires 
both the adoption of the appropriate policies and demonstration of the 
implementation of these policies in practice. However complete certification 
under such schemes is a mandatory pre-requisite for the award of contracts 
above a certain value (in the case of the Federal Safety Commissioner 
$4 million). This can create a catch 22 for new suppliers: a contract cannot be 
awarded without certification but certification cannot be obtained without 
demonstration of implementation of the systems through performance of a 
contract. A supplier development approach can break through this catch 22 by 
awarding a contract of sufficient value to demonstrate implement of systems but 
still below the value where mandatory certification requirements applies. 
The supplier development approach as described above was deployed by both 
the Department of Defence and the Department of Human Services. It was also 
used extensively by FMG. 
5.3.4.2. Supplier Development Described 
Phil Lindenmayer [99] described the basic mechanics of the supplier 
development that DHS undertook with PSG: 
We did a total of four under the threshold … They did one small fit-out for 
80,000 dollars. They did another one, I think, for 110, one for 170, one for I 
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think about 200 or thereabouts over a period of about 18 months. That then 
got our property people and the outsource service provider into a mindset 
to say, “Okay, right, here’s a company that can deliver”. 
Leah Armstrong [122] emphasised relational aspect of the process of supplier 
development: 
… if you look at Defence, and even ATO, … as an example, in the last 12 
months, they have really sort of skyrocketed in their procurement. They talk 
about how their success has been around how they’ve been engaging and 
building relationships.  
Anonymous (2) [104] described the quite deliberate and hands-on approach to 
supplier development that was central to the FMG One Billion Opportunities 
policy: 
Aboriginal businesses were knocking on our door looking for opportunities 
and they were brand new, never had a contract before, but they had built a 
team around them and we then basically helped them. We basically got 
them in, so we didn’t actually go up to tender, we just direct sourced with 
them. We … built a project up with them. And then we really helped them 
manage the project with them on site to a point where we could … then 
back off. And so, that model was very, very successful. 
Anonymous (2) continued to discuss the role of the JV and subcontracting in 
Indigenous supplier development at FMG. Under this approach an existing FMG 
supplier would form a JV with an Indigenous corporation to fulfil an FMG 
contract. Alternatively, a portion of the contract would be subcontracted to an 
existing Indigenous supplier. Anonymous (2) noted that this approach was 
initially not attractive to existing suppliers. In response to this FMG introduced 
the AES as part of its tender assessment. Under the AES the extent of use of an 
Aboriginal subcontractor was included as a factor in the tender assessment 
matrix (in a similar manner to that described earlier under ‘redefining value for 
money’). This provided an incentive to existing contractors to include Aboriginal 
subcontractors. A crucial component of this process was the monitoring of actual 
use of Aboriginal subcontractors subsequent to the contract award to ensure 
that undertakings were complied with. A JV between an existing supplier and an 
Indigenous firm was weighted even higher and this encouraged the rapid 
development of a number of JV models. 
5.3.4.3. Supplier Development in the Public Sector 
Ian Cumming [96] described both the nature of supplier development and one 
significant reason why there may have been reluctance to adopt the supplier 
development approach in the Commonwealth public service: 
In the public sector the procurement process is like hanging a poster on the 
outside of the door and saying "those who are willing to bid, come and see 
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me." You don't walk out the door, down the street and say "okay, you. I'd 
like you to work for me. Come with me. Can you work for me? Tell me about 
how good you are. What sort of price? Are you value for money? Okay, I will 
take you".  
A supplier development approach then is quite different from the approach 
normally adopted in public sector procurement which centres on the 
competitive public tender. This is because the necessity to have early (pre-
contract award) discussions with a supplier could be perceived as undermining 
aspects of Division 1 of the CPR. Namely that all Commonwealth procurements 
should be (DOF 2014, 13, rule 4.4): 
• non-discriminatory and encourage competition; 
• use public resources in an … ethical manner; and 
• facilitate accountable and transparent decision making;  
 
Of course the perception that supplier development undermines these principles 
can be addressed (and is discussed in some greater detail in Chapter 2 above). 
Suffice to note at this stage that developing Indigenous suppliers can also 
encourage the development of competition; there is nothing unethical about 
addressing persistent appalling Indigenous disadvantage; and transparency and 
accountability can be maintained while adopting a supplier development 
approach. 
While the perceptions of supplier development as offending Division 1 CPR 
principles can be responded to, respondents that identified this factor suggested 
that a supplier development approach was a necessary part of the utilisation of 
the IBE and that most departments had been reluctant to adopt this approach 
because of the perception. The need for advocacy of the program (discussed 
above) was suggested as one method of overcoming these perceptions. 
5.3.5. Developing Supplier Development 
Respondents suggested several methods of encouraging the use of a supplier 
development approach by procuring officers. The most common (nine 
respondents) was ‘greater emphasis on supplier development’. The three other 
methods that were suggested were ‘discussion with suppliers about allocations’, 
‘more practical training for suppliers’, and having a ‘central point of contact in 
departments’. 
5.3.5.1. Greater Emphasis 
The most common suggested method of overcoming the identified lack of use of 
a supplier development approach by agencies was also the most obvious: simply 
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that the agencies should use it. Again, the advocacy of the IBE, including of a 
supplier development approach and its legitimacy by the political leadership and 
senior officers was seen as important in this regard.  
5.3.5.2. Allocation Planning 
The emphasis in the comments regarding ‘discussion with suppliers about 
allocations’ was focussed on enhancing the ability of the Indigenous supplier to 
plan a growth path for the firm based upon some certainty of future 
Commonwealth demand. 
Pete Dunn [118] described the implications: 
In order for a young business [to grow] … they need a quantum of work, 
they need continuous work, they need that to be flowing through their 
business in order to do what they really want to do which is to employ, train 
up more indigenous young people and to be handed a hundred fifty 
thousand dollar contract and that’s the only one you’ve got as a sole source 
for an Aboriginal business is really – it’s not enough. It needs a quantum of 
work. 
Pete Dunn’s analysis also explains why to respondents that identified the 
methods the question of ongoing policy stability and stage government adoption 
of IBE type policies were seen as important and related methods. Through 
ensuring a stable Commonwealth policy environment and through the additional 
demand that would be generated by State government adoption of similar 
policies the ongoing demand necessary for the orderly sustainable growth of 
Indigenous suppliers (including new entrants into the market) could be achieved. 
It was in this context that there was a reference to the training of the Indigenous 
workforce. That is the comment was not in the context of an overall need for 
greater Indigenous education and training opportunities but that there needed 
to be a tailoring of the provision of training opportunities as a form of firm based 
labour force planning built upon the foundation of allocation planning. 
5.3.5.3. Supplier Procurement Training 
The final two methods of encouraging a supplier development approach were 
quite practical. The first was to ensure that there was a known central point of 
contact in each agency. This was seen as method both facilitating the 
development of relationships between departments and Indigenous suppliers 
and as a method of ensuring there was at least one individual with experience in 
the explanation of the administrative requirements of the procurement process 
to Indigenous businesses. The related and more common suggestion was to 
increase the availability of practical training to (existing or potential) Indigenous 
suppliers in the satisfaction of Commonwealth procurement requirements.  
146 
 
5.3.5.4. Supplier Development Conclusion 
Supplier development is clearly a crucial approach in increasing Indigenous 
participation in government procurement. As identified in section 1.2 the 
research suggested that the only occasions the IBE had been utilised (at least 
before the IPP targets) was in circumstances where there was a deliberate 
supplier development approach taken by the procuring agency. 
A risk of the unavoidable process of categorising qualitative data provided by 
respondents is that the intimate connections between categories are 
diminished. This is particular true in the case of ‘risk’ and ‘supplier development’. 
The process of supplier development allows a relationship to develop between 
procurer and supplier. The development of the relationship allows the procurer 
to develop confidence in the capacity of the supplier. The development of 
confidence in the capacity of the supplier operates to reduce the perception of 
risk by the procurer regarding the use of a new (Indigenous) supplier. This in turn 
assists in satisfying the (existing) definition of ‘value for money’. The repeated 
use of the same supplier also operates to reduce any additional administrative 
burden created by using a new (Indigenous) supplier. 
5.3.6. Supplier Awareness 
The final cluster of factors focussed not so much on the relationship between the 
procuring agency and an Indigenous supplier but rather on the awareness of 
each other’s existence. The two factors going this issue were ‘awareness 
amongst suppliers’ and ‘limited supply options’. The methods of overcoming 
these awareness impediments can be described as ‘development of a greater 
spread of Indigenous businesses’, ‘greater role for IBA’, and ‘more precision in 
the Supply Nation directory’. 
5.3.6.1. Procurers awareness of Indigenous suppliers 
Yvette Simms [113] identified some of the issues from the perspective of the 
procuring agency: 
… one of the issues until the indigenous procurement policy, and until there 
was a publicly available list [of Indigenous suppliers] is while the CPRs have 
enabled people to very easily and simply procure from an indigenous 
business without needing to approach the open market, if I was a buyer and 
I wanted to pursue that, first thing I’d want to consider was how do I know 
where to find an indigenous business? That … was the stumbling block 
because there was no information available unless your organisation 
[department] happened to be a member of Supply Nation. If your 
organisation was a Supply Nation member, you could access a subset of 
indigenous businesses, but the list of businesses certified by Supply Nation 
was not easy to access or navigate. So there are a whole range of factors 
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there ... but the minute you start making things difficult for people, they can 
then sensibly say, “Why am I bothering?”. 
Shane Jacobs discussed the matter from the perspective of the Indigenous 
supplier. When asked why he thought other Indigenous firms had not pursued 
the same opportunities that PSG had secured, Shane responded [87]: 
I can’t answer for other people, but just from me talking to other suppliers 
… I think it’s a monetary issue. You’ve got to be able to invest. I think the 
Federal Safety Accreditation would have cost us $30,000-$50,000. Then the 
next issue to come into play is going to be Bank Guarantees. The 
department’s going to say to them “We want a couple of hundred thousand 
dollar bank guarantee.” … I think there are not a lot of mature Aboriginal 
suppliers out there, and yeah, that scares them, mate. The whole process 
scared them, you know? And that’s why I think – I don’t know, whoever it is, 
if it’s Supply Nation, if it’s the IBA, if it’s the Chambers, there’s going to be a 
lot educating happening. 
Shane also noted that most of the ‘mature’ Aboriginal firms had been engaged in 
the mining industry but were now starting to turn their attention to IPP work. 
Both the respondents quoted above referred to Supply Nation’s role in 
connecting procuring agencies with Indigenous suppliers. Almost all of the 
respondents (7) that referred to this networking role for Supply Nation 
commented positively (or at least not negatively) on it. The issue of access to the 
Supply Nation directory that was referred to by Yvette Simms was overcome 
with the launch of the IPP when the directory was relaunched as ‘Indigenous 
Business Direct’ which allowed for general public access. At this time the Supply 
Nation registration (of at least 50 per cent Indigenous ownership) compared to 
the long-standing certification (in essence greater than 50 per cent ownership 
and an Indigenous CEO) was introduced. The more open registration 
classification allowed many more Indigenous suppliers to be included in the 
register. 
This improvement noted, there was also comment from two respondents that 
the directory lacked sufficient precision to be truly useful. Jeremy Clark laughed 
[72] when he commented that on the directory there were over 400 Indigenous 
construction firms operating in Victoria – the directory was in fact showing every 
firm that had indicated they would work in Victoria. 
5.3.6.2. Indigenous Supplier Awareness of the IBE 
Yvette Simms, Maya Stuart-Fox, Phil Lindenmayer and Ian Cumming were all 
clear that department procurement officers would have been aware of the 
existence of the IBE. As Yvette Simms stated [113]: 
… there are procurement professionals in every agency, who know the CPRs 
back to front including the exemptions. 
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However, the same was not the case with Indigenous suppliers’ awareness of the 
IBE. The research respondents included personnel from three Indigenous firms 
each of which had had varying levels of involvement with the IBE. In each case 
the firms became aware of the IBE only in 2013 despite its original adoption in 
May 2011. In each case the firm had had contact with Pete Dunn of GHD. Pete 
Dunn had made two of the firms aware of the IBE and assisted the third (PSG) in 
representation to government after PSG had, through its own CEO’s research, 
become aware of the IBE. Pete Dunn himself became aware of the policy in late 
2012 apparently through his own contacts. From the interview it was not 
apparent that Supply Nation had a significant involvement in the IBE until the 
process of review which commenced in 2014 and led to the IPP. 
From this it would seem an almost inescapable conclusion that there was no 
promotion of the IBE amongst Indigenous suppliers at all until the release of the 
Forrest Report (Creating Parity) in August 2014. This is not to suggest the IBE was 
deliberately kept hidden. PSG and Pete Dunn became aware of it through their 
own research. However, there was simply no promotion of the IBE until the 
policy development process that culminated in the announcement of the IPP. 
In these circumstances a lack of Indigenous supplier awareness of the existence 
of the IBE and a consequential failure (inability more accurately) to commence 
the process of developing relationships with procurers must be considered a 
significant issue in the limited utilisation of the IBE. This factor combined with 
the reluctance of procuring officers to approach Indigenous suppliers as 
considered above in the context of both risk and supplier development, clearly 
had dramatic consequences on the utilisation of the policy. 
5.3.6.3. Supplier Existence 
The factor of the mutual awareness of the existence of Indigenous suppliers and 
departments keen to purchase was often combined with a question as to the 
existence of relevant Indigenous suppliers. Phil Lindenmayer [101] summarised 
this issue: 
… most of the money we spend is on stuff that’s really not a strong target 
for indigenous business. We lease a lot of buildings. There may very well be 
some indigenous businesses there, but I’m not aware of too many. We buy 
lots and lots of heavy duty IT stuff … like mainframes and enterprise 
software and communications equipment. We buy a lot of 
telecommunications services. So, in terms of what the broad categories of 
the things we buy are, an awful lot of it is stuff where indigenous businesses 
do not operate actively in their own right. My personal understanding is 
that with the more operational things that state and local governments do, 
there’s probably more opportunity than for Commonwealth departments. 
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It should be stated there were a number of exception to this general proposition 
that were identified by respondents: Indigenous financial analyst consultants 
and Indigenous internet service providers to name but two. However, amongst 
the seven respondents that identified lack of supply options as a factor the issue 
of existence of relevant suppliers was often noted in addition to an awareness 
issue. 
IBA commonly featured as a potential method to assist in overcoming the issue 
of relevant Indigenous supplier existence. However, respondents usually 
suggested that IBA’s (then) current strategies were less than effective in this 
regard. 
Professor Langton [91] was quite direct: 
Look, IBA is another one of these clunky entities in the Commonwealth’s 
reach into the Indigenous business sector and for instance their interest 
rates have been far too high, well above market rates. The conditions under 
which they insist on having some equity or shareholding in operations is a – 
I think oppressive and onerous in many circumstances from talking to 
people who are in them. … Business moves fast, bureaucrats move at a 
glacial pace. It is just hopeless. 
While Professor Langton was the most forthright on the matter almost all other 
respondents felt that IBA should have been more active and (or) effective in 
proactively assisting in the development of Indigenous suppliers to exploit the 
opportunities that had been created by the IBE. A notable exception to this 
consensus was Shane Jacobs [88]: 
We have a close working relationship with IBA. IBA have really supported 
our growth and to be honest with you I don’t think we would be in this 
position today if it wasn’t for the IBA supporting us … IBA helped us out with 
seed funding on our projects. They helped us out with some capital to 
attract staff, get our own equipment. Like … our cleaning opportunities, we 
needed equipment to start them, so, they helped us out. So that’s seed 
funding to start the jobs off. 
5.3.6.4. Supplier awareness and existence conclusion 
The fact that this cluster of matters has been considered after risk and supplier 
development should not be seen as an indication of its practical significance. As 
noted earlier, the impact of the absence of any promotion of the existence and 
opportunities created by the IBE to Indigenous suppliers, particularly those 
Indigenous suppliers that Shane Jacobs described as ‘mature’ – with the capacity 
to carry the financial burden involved in successful tendering – would appear to 
have been dramatic. This is particularly so, also as noted by Shane Jacobs, 
Anonymous and suggested by Professor Langton, when many of the mature 
Indigenous suppliers were engaged in the mining industry in northern Australia. 
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These factors combined with the factors identified under the headings of risk 
and supplier development really suggest a complete answer to the 
underutilisation of the IBE. 
5.4. Black-Cladding 
The term ‘black-cladding’ is recently frequently discussed in the context of the 
IBE and the IPP in particular (Foley, 2013; Burrell, 2015; Mundine, 2016). The 
term lacks a distinct definition although Professor Langton [93] provided the 
essence of it: 
There are various forms of black cladding, but what it is is a non-Indigenous 
owned company taking advantage of an Aboriginal person by either giving 
them a free carriage shareholding or a consultancy fee on a daily or other 
basis to give the impression that the company has some Indigenous content 
whether it be shareholding, employment and Indigenous supply chain. 
Usually, none of that exists. 
As noted earlier, the issue of black-cladding was not part of the original research 
question or subquestions. However, over the course of the research period there 
was increasing political attention being paid to the matter. A number of 
respondents referred to the matter during interviews. In addition the question of 
black-cladding often arose in the context of the desirability of developing JV 
arrangements as a method of increasing Indigenous supplier capacity and 
diversity. For these reasons eight respondents spoke of their definition of black-
cladding and the extent the matter constituted a legitimate area of concern. 
Respondents’ comments around these areas are included in the reports of the 
interviews under a distinct heading. They have also been analysed and coded in 
a similar fashion as the responses to the main research questions. In general 
these comments go to two matters: how a legitimate JV company could be 
distinguished from a black-cladding sham; and, the extent to which the creation 
of individual Indigenous wealth was a legitimate outcome of the application of 
the IBE. The following section provides some analysis of the comments around 
these issues. 
5.4.1. Black-Cladding and Joint Ventures 
There were four Indigenous firms that were involved with the research: eNPC, 
ICRG, Barpa and PSG. Of these, all except PSG was a JV company (Barpa) or had 
operated in a JV (eNPC and ICRG). ICRG had significant non-Indigenous equity as 
did its subsidiary Guma ICRG. The joint-venture model is then quite prevalent in 
the Indigenous business sector. The JV model was often seen as an important 
mechanism to facilitate the partnership between Indigenous interests and the 
non-Indigenous business sector that may have greater resources and expertise. 
In fact all (eight) respondents who addressed the black-cladding issue saw that 
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JV structures could be important in developing Indigenous supply capacity. 
However, the desirability of facilitating this partnership was balanced against the 
risk that a JV was simply a black-cladding sham. Often the issue was discussed in 
terms of the level of Indigenous ownership that was required to obtain access to 
the IBE or other preferred status. In various fora the figures of 51 per cent, 50 
per cent and even 25 per cent had been referred to. 
To access the IBE the supplier must be at least 50 per cent Indigenous owned. 
The 50 per cent Indigenous ownership is also a requirement of Supply Nation 
registration. The Supply Nation certification requirement is for 51 per cent 
Indigenous ownership. The Supply Nation registration category was introduced 
for the purpose of supporting the launch of the IPP. The Forrest Review Creating 
Parity report recommended that 25 per cent Indigenous ownership be sufficient 
to access the IBE. Not surprisingly the FMG One Billion Opportunities policy also 
adopts a 25 per cent Indigenous equity requirement. A number of the 
respondents discussed the rationale behind these figures. 
Leah Armstrong [123] explains why, although Supply Nation introduced the 50 
per cent registration category to accommodate the IPP, the Supply Nation 
preference was for the 51 per cent ownership level which is why this remained 
the requirement for certification: 
… you could even have a 50 percent ownership of a business, and pretty 
much the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander owner is put up as the 
spokesperson or the front, I guess, in other words. However has no sort of 
control or management decision-making. So it’s pretty much basically a clad 
or a front for a non-Indigenous person so that – that’s my interpretation of 
the black cladding business. 
Anonymous (2) [106] describes the consideration of the issue at FMG: 
So if you’ve got the capability partner coming along that’s providing majority of 
the capability and therefore taking most of the risk, but you’re handing control 
of that business or joint venture to a less inexperienced party, it’s going to be 
very, very difficult to form those relationships. So I was always advocating the 50 
per cent where it is equal board representation, equal decision-making and it’s 
equal so you’re go into a business relationship where no party has the upper 
hand on the other and you work together to build the capability over a period of 
time. Where the 25 per cent comes into it, our definition is minimum of 25 per 
cent. Ninety-five per cent of our $1.8 billion in contract is actually 50 per cent or 
higher [Indigenous ownership]. But we’ve had some situations where an 
Aboriginal husband and wife had done a joint venture with a non-Aboriginal 
business and therefore, that joint venture is only 25 per cent owned. 
Professor Langton [92]-[93] outlined that a primary motivation behind the 
Creating Parity 25 per cent recommendation was to facilitate the 
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development of Indigenous suppliers at the medium more than the small 
end of the spectrum: 
We need capability partners, we need joint ventures, we need the 
subcontracting arrangements … we need partnerships of various kinds to 
bring in capability partners, and to bring in capability partners that have 
effective control and hand it over. Hand over the business within a set 
period of time under a contractual arrangement. And who in business is 
going to do that if the demand is that − the Indigenous ownership is 50 or 
51 per cent? Nobody in their right mind would do it, just watch shark tank, 
right? What are the offers made? Well from the investor, the investor is 
going to want a majority shareholding and then when you’re talking about 
− you’re going to put 50 million out there to make a project happen, why 
would give an Indigenous business with no capability, no capital track 
record, and no equipment a 51 per cent free carried shareholding? You 
wouldn’t if you were serious about business. You just wouldn’t. If the 
requirement was to give them a 25 per cent option or even 25 per cent free 
carry or under a loan arrangement, sure, you’d consider that. You would 
want to stagger the contract so that you get your return and then at the 
end of the contract, the Indigenous business would be in effective control, 
would take over the whole operation, and the non-Indigenous company has 
taken their return. 
Leah Armstrong discusses the particular arrangements that apply in the US to JVs 
of the kind described by Professor Langton. The US Minority Supply 
Development Council has a separate registration category for JVs with a lower 
percentage of minority (e.g. Indigenous) equity. In this category there are criteria 
around strategies for increasing minority equity and control and for the non-
minority interest’s exit. 
Anonymous (2)  [102-103] describes a highly pro-active approach at FMG that 
operates to ensure whatever the equity level the Indigenous supplier is not 
simply black-cladding and also demonstrates a supplier development approach: 
You do your due diligence on the contractor. You ensure that the 
capabilities if – you want to know who the people are – if you do your 
internal due diligence and your pre-qualifications on them – and these sorts 
of things, then black cladding to me doesn’t – we’ve never had an issue with 
it. It doesn’t really arise because we actually drilled down to what is your 
Aboriginal employment, what are the parties bringing to the table to deliver 
these services. We survey them on a monthly basis to ensure what they’ve 
said they’re going to do, they do. The other thing that we’ve done that 
we’ve been doing for about the last three or four years is if we award a 
contract to an Aboriginal joint venture, then instead of special clauses that 
we put into that contract that we talk about the sum of the outcomes that 
we want to see from the joint venture about building the capacity, transfer 
of information. We actually get invited to their board meetings as an 
observant. We’re not there for the commercial because we don’t want to 
know their commercials, but we certainly are there to sort of get a feel on – 
that the Aboriginal party actually knows what’s going on in the contract, 
that information is being shared between both parties and the Aboriginal 
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party really is making informed decisions about the project and what’s 
happening. 
Many respondents thought that while black-cladding was an issue that 
warranted attention there was a risk its prevalence could be overstated in 
attempt to undermine the policy. Also, as is apparent from some of the 
comments reproduced above, there were a number of comments to the effect 
the issue was more nuanced than simply the percentage of (nominal) Indigenous 
ownership. 
Pete Dunn [118] had a pointed last word on the role of JVs in the IBE: 
I think is really important is that the federal government did not understand 
that it’s not about them … the IBE and subsequent procurement policies are 
about driving the private sector to invest in Indigenous businesses. 
5.4.2. Employment and Wealth 
The discussion around Indigenous ownership and corporate structures also led 
several respondents to comment on a possible divergence between the 
Commonwealth Government’s objectives around the IBE and those of a number 
of Indigenous stakeholders. Leah Armstrong [120] described the tension: 
The model that [Supply Nation] took from the US was about creating wealth 
in Indigenous families and giving Indigenous owned businesses and creating 
that space in the economy for entrepreneurship as they have done in the 
US. But most definitely, the Australian policy context both with the 
development of the IOP and the current one [the IPP] have always tried to 
focus on is that there should be that employment outcome in it. And it is a 
bit of a tension, … employment is an outcome. We’re not disagreeing that 
employment can be – is an outcome, but it’s not a measure. 
Maya Stuart-Fox noted that employment data can be a difficult measure because 
it can vary depending on the nature of the industry. She used the example of an 
Indigenous-owned technical financial data analysis firm and an Indigenous-
owned civil engineering firm commenting that it was easier for the latter to 
demonstrate employment outcomes but the former was just as important to the 
development of the policy. The development of a diverse Indigenous supply 
sector was also a legitimate goal of the policy. 
Jeremy Clark also identified the complexity of the issue. He stated that an 
Indigenous-owned company may not be achieving its employment targets but 
still be being run very profitably. A profitable Aboriginal company will return 
benefits to the community and that in the longer term they would employ 
Indigenous people. The issue was not just about jobs in the short term. He also 
identified another issue about the focus on employment targets [81]: 
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There is also an issue that some people are happy to support a program 
that helps Aboriginal people “but geez we don’t want to see them actually 
driving a Mercedes, be wealthy or be successful”. Really they are happy to 
help Aboriginal people to not be a welfare burned but not get above any 
white people. It’s the same in sport – be a good grateful player but don’t 
get too big for your boots. I think business involvement, the economy it’s 
the same. 
5.5. Research Analysis in Light of Literature Conclusion 
At the conclusion of the literature review contained in Chapter 2 a number of 
key themes were identified. At this point it is useful to revisit those themes and 
consider them in light of the foregoing analysis of the research results. 
• The processes of procurement in both the public and private sectors are essentially 
similar. The distinction is the environmental and contextual factors (for example 
legal, policy, cultural factors (Johnston and Lewin 1996; Thai 2001). 
Analysis of the research results particularly the experience of FMGs one billion 
opportunities policy supports the notion that there is a broad similarity between 
procurement processes as it affects a preferential procurement program such as 
the IBE. Further, the extensive emphasis that respondents gave to procurement 
officers perceptions of risk and tendency towards risk aversion does support the 
notion of a distinction based on environmental and cultural factors. This noted 
the reported experience of FMG indicated that private sector procurement 
officers shared a particular aversion to supply uncertainty and increased 
complication of the procurement process. This suggests the environmental and 
cultural distinctions should not be overstated. 
• Generally participation by SMEs in the public procurement is seen as positive but a 
number of currently identified impediments to such participation include (Flynn, 
McKevitt and Davis 2015); 
o Bureaucracy; 
o Lack of communication between SMEs and public procurers and too much 
weighting on cost; 
o SME lack of knowledge over how to source opportunities or engage with 
procedural aspects of tendering; 
o Onerous tender documentation and unprofessional procurement staff; 
o Time demands of completing tender documentation; 
o Requirements of previous relevant experience and financial costs of 
tendering; and 
o Large contract size and information asymmetries  
The research analysis does confirm that many, but not all, of these impediments 
were also identified by respondents. For example: ‘requirements of previous 
relevant experience’ is represented in research in the expressed concern around 
Indigenous supplier’s reliability and capacity; ‘SME lack of knowledge’ equates to 
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the identified concerns of ‘supplier awareness’; and ‘lack of communication 
between SMEs and public procurers and too much weighting on cost’ equates to 
the ‘lack of emphasis on supplier development’. ‘Large contract size’ is also 
relevant to the notion of supplier development and ‘risk around value for 
money’. Many of the other identified impediments are reflected in the 
respondents’ responses although perhaps not given as great an emphasis. 
• Mechanisms to overcome these impediments include (Akenroe & Aju 2013): 
o Broad procurement reform (bureaucratic simplification); 
o Subsidies; 
o Capacity building; and 
o Targets. 
While the research did not suggest any particular emphasis on broad 
procurement reform (although there was some limited suggestion this may 
be valuable) the broad consensus around the significance of the IPP targets 
and the importance of the development of a supplier development approach 
parallels the latter two mechanisms identified by Akenroe and Aju. 
• The issue of the legitimacy of pursuing secondary objectives within the public 
procurement process is impacted upon by various competing ‘strands’ within 
procurement ideological discourse. Erridge and McIlroy (2002) identify three such 
strands: 
o Commercial (minimum price); 
o Regulatory (transparency and accountability); and 
o  Socio-economic (rectifying imperfect markets and nature of public 
enterprise). 
Each of these strands was apparent in respondents’ responses. The emphasis on 
minimum price was reflected in the discussion of the role of value for money. 
The reported reluctance to adopt a single source tender resonates with the 
regulatory strand. Finally, the commitment of some agencies to utilising the IBE 
is reflective of the socio-economic strand. As suggested also by Erridge and 
McIlroy (2002), often these strands are unreconciled and competing within a 
single agency. 
• In addition, while there are various analyses of the cost of including secondary 
objectives the outcomes (for example Denes 1997) of which may depend on the 
objective pursued, the incorporation of secondary objectives in public procurement 
has been a policy tool deployed by governments for centuries (McCrudden 2004).  
Analysis of the CPR did suggest that the IBE was one amongst a number of other 
Commonwealth procurement related policies. 
• In the context of Indigenous preferential procurement programs such as the IBE 
there is significant empirical evidence both as to existing Indigenous disadvantage; 
that participation in the workforce reduces this disadvantage (SCRGSP 2014; Biddle 
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2011) and that Indigenous firms are significantly more likely to employ Indigenous 
people (Morrison et al 2014; Hunter 2014). 
The respondent Indigenous supply firms reported Indigenous employment levels 
in excess of those reported by Morrison et al. 
• While there are some broadly mixed data there is empirical evidence (primarily for 
the US) to support the proposition that procurement programs targeted at 
‘minority’ are effective in increasing economic activity by these groups (US 
Commission 2005) but that there is inadequate monitoring and particularly 
evaluation of such programs (Storey 2008). 
Certainly after the imposition of the IPP targets the DPMC 2015-16 target data 
would suggest that the program is effective. However, also as noted by Storey, 
there is a clear absence of effective evaluation and monitoring mechanisms. 
In short while there may be some difference in emphasis the experience of the 
IBE including with the subsequent introduction of the IPP targets suggest the 
accuracy of existing scholarship in the area. This in turn supports the continued 
operation of the program but also consideration of additional measures such as 
broad procurement reform, subsidies and more effective evaluation and 
monitoring. 
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 CHAPTER 6 − CONCLUSION 
The IBE represents a significant and unique development in Commonwealth 
Government Indigenous Affairs policy. Certainly there is nothing particularly 
original about the notion of a Commonwealth sponsored employment program 
for Indigenous Australians; in various forms, such programs have been in 
existence for decades. These programs have usually involved elements of 
Commonwealth funding to various Indigenous or non-Indigenous organisations 
to either directly employ and/or train for employment Indigenous Australians. At 
times, particularly more recently, there may have been some private sector 
involvement in these programs. Most commonly this involvement would have 
been as host (employer) to a trainee, although there are other models. The 
Jawun organisation model, where non-Indigenous private sector mentors assist 
in the development of Indigenous community organisations is an example, 
although it is not strictly an employment program. 
The fundamental attribute that makes the IBE unique is its focus on encouraging 
Indigenous employment through developing an Indigenous private sector. The 
other key feature is that it involves no direct Commonwealth expenditure. Two 
paragraphs from the Prime Minister and Minister for Indigenous Affairs July 
2015 statement (referred to in Chapter One) highlight these joint objectives (C of 
A 2015, 2): 
Indigenous businesses are key to creating jobs and employing more 
Indigenous Australians. Indigenous businesses are around 100 times more 
likely to employ an Indigenous person than other businesses.  
This policy is about creating opportunities for these Indigenous businesses 
to grow and employ more people. It is also about stimulating private 
investment in new Indigenous businesses.  
Leah Armstrong identified the ideological connection between Supply Nation 
which was an original advocate for the IBE and the US National Minority Supply 
Council. The US organisation was integral in preferential procurement programs 
under the Small Business Act 1953 (US) and Works Employment Act 1977 (US) 
(see above Chapter 2). As McCrudden noted programs of this nature are 
(2007, 8): 
an attempt to “restructure the economy more broadly … This was an 
attempt to stimulate the growth of an entrepreneurial [originally] black 
middle class”. 
The truly unique aspect of the IBE is this ambition, not just to encourage an 
improvement in Indigenous employment outcomes, but to stimulate the 
development of an entrepreneurial Indigenous middle class in this country. It is 
this unique ambition that underpins the importance of analysis of aspects of the 
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IBE that may have impeded the fulfilment of this ambition and the identification 
of improvements to the policy that may expedite its achievement. 
With this importance in mind, the fact that, overwhelmingly, the absence of 
targets initially attached to the IBE was seen by respondents as the major 
impediment to utilisation both directly and indirectly through the implications of 
perceptions of risk and legitimacy in combination with the dramatic increase in 
utilisation of the IBE subsequent to the introduction of the IPP targets in July 
2015 is very positive. However, this fact should not overshadow the other issues 
identified by respondents. 
Significant amongst these are: 
• Appreciation that in the early years of the IBE it appeared completely 
unsupported by any policy framework, external stakeholder 
communications strategy and systematic system of recording the 
utilisation of the IBE; 
• In addition to the introduction of targets, the perceived importance of 
advocacy to facilitate both Indigenous supplier awareness of 
opportunities and in reducing perceptions of risk amongst procurement 
officers; 
• The importance of the adoption of a coordinated supplier development 
approach both for the purposes of improving utilisation of the IBE, 
overcoming certification and other technical impediments to 
procurement engagement, and for facilitating the stable development of 
Indigenous suppliers; 
• The similarity of experience between the private and public sectors in the 
development of successful Indigenous preferential procurement policies; 
and, 
• The importance of JV structures in the development of particularly more 
complex Indigenous suppliers and the distinction between a legitimate JV 
and ‘black-cladding’. 
In addition, the reports from Indigenous supplier respondents regarding the 
effectiveness of their engagement with the IBE in developing their business and 
the subsequent positive effect on Indigenous employment levels suggests that 
the IBE is indeed effective in achieving this aspect of its desired outcomes. 
Bearing in mind both the significance of the IBE and the intuitive appeal of many 
of the respondent-identified methods of improvement of the IBE, the limitations 
of the current research must also be noted. 
The research was a qualitative study based around interviews with 12 
respondents and review of the very limited relevant extant documentation. As 
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noted in Chapter 3, a qualitative study of this nature cannot and does not seek 
to perform the same function as a comprehensive qualitative inquiry; it does not 
assert the predictive character of such comprehensive quantitative research. 
However, as advocates of a qualitative approach note (Creswell 2013, 6): 
Qualitative inquiry represents a legitimate mode of social and human 
science exploration without apology or comparisons to quantitative 
research.  
Certainly, as noted in the methodology Chapter, qualitative research is well 
suited to situations where there is little existing data upon which to base finely 
nuanced research questions or develop quantitative survey instruments. A 
particular attribute of qualitative research is that it generates enormous 
amounts of rich data that the researcher must attempt to manage and analyses 
(Diefenbach 2009). The sheer volume of data created underpins methodological 
consideration around what can ultimately only be subjective decisions about 
which data is the subject of detailed analysis. However, it also presents the 
researcher with hard decisions about the matters that can be explored in a 
necessarily finite written research report and what matters must be pursued at a 
later time. One strength of qualitative research is that it can serve basis for 
developing proposals for subsequent inquiry (Diefenbach 2009): quantitative, 
qualitative, or both. 
The current project has suggested a number of such areas of fruitful further 
research the possibilities of which are enhanced by the DPMC 2015-2106 IPP 
target data which suggests the growth of the phenomenon population (both in 
procuring agencies and Indigenous suppliers) that would support a more 
quantitative approach. Areas of possible future research suggested by the 
current project include: 
• A quantitative analysis of factors that have impacted on Indigenous 
suppliers’ use of the IBE guided by the issues identified in the current 
study; 
• More detailed case study analysis of Indigenous suppliers engaged with a 
supplier development approach with a view to identifying methods to 
refine and improve this approach; 
• A more comprehensive comparison of the factors affecting the efficacy of 
Indigenous (and other) preferential procurement policies in the public 
and private sectors; 
• Analysis of whether the costs of procurement under the IBE have 
increased historic (that is, pre IBE) Commonwealth procurement costs; 
• Longitudinal analysis of Indigenous firms that have engaged with the IBE 
to ascertain the existence or not of long-term IBE dependence and 
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employment trends and analysis of variance in these trends across 
private Indigenous firms and community owned firms; and 
• Longitudinal analysis of JV structures to identify the extent and rate of 
Indigenous partner capability development and the impact on the non-
Indigenous JV partners Indigenous employment outcomes. 
Of course the foregoing possible further research avenues are not 
comprehensive. A plethora of additional matters particularly going to the impact 
of the development of Indigenous firms on Indigenous social indicators and in 
regional and remote localities also suggest themselves. 
In closing it is appropriate to again express gratitude to the interviewees without 
whom this research would not have been possible. Each respondent has a 
particularly busy working schedule and yet they all gave up their time to be 
interviewed, and to review transcripts and the final reports. This fact alone 
indicates the deep personal commitment of each of them to the success of the 
policy. 
A final quote from Jeremy Clark [81] is an appropriate place to conclude: 
Preferential procurement really does give us a foot in the door to be 
involved in the business world and if we can have successful indigenous 
businesses in a range of industries – that would hopefully lead us as a 
people to lift a lot of our poorer cousins, and brothers and sisters to a level 
where they can achieve a better standard of living and being able to offer a 
good education for their children, provide an opportunity to enter into the 
career that they’ve never thought of and as well as support vehicle to 
strengthen their cultural ties to their country and everything else. It’s not 
just all about economy, but you need capacity and resources to achieve a 
lot of what we need to achieve as Aboriginal people. 
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